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USING CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES TO LIMIT GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISES
Christoph Henkel1

“So, my odds are good. I am on a winning streak. Everybody wants to
get in on the action. How can I lose, right?” Selena Gomez, The Big Short
(2015).2
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional economic analysis assumes that Central Counterparties
(CCPs) may help to reduce systemic risk and avoid future financial crises
by mandating the central clearing of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.
This view largely goes unchallenged by governments, regulators,
practitioners, and many international standard setting bodies. But if this
assumption is correct, why are we increasingly confronted with the
potential failure of CCPs? Why do these potential failures threaten
significant spillover and cascade effects, which may cause financial crises
rather than preventing them? This article attempts to provide a
compelling explanation for these negative effects.
In this article, I question the received wisdom about the role that CCPs
play in preventing financial crises. I further challenge the conventional
view about how counterparties should be used by focusing on CCP
recovery and resolution mechanisms in the U.S. context. This article
analyzes why the current approach, which assumes that CCPs serve as
financial risk mitigators, is problematic and may cause future global
financial crises.
As a result, this article asks and answers four main questions. First,
what are the consequences of using central clearing, especially after the
Great Recession, and what impact does this approach have in the United
States? Second, what effect do interconnections in central clearing have
on risk mitigation in the global financial system? Third, do we have the
appropriate tools to intervene if a CCP, or several interconnected CCPs,
becomes insolvent? Lastly, are there any recent developments that would
strengthen the benefits of central clearing and the CCP model?
This article argues that the central clearing mandate of OTC
derivatives, meant to eliminate or at least reduce the moral hazard of toobig-to fail, has instead concentrated risk and made CCPs less safe and
effective in the U.S. context. The failure of one major systemically
important and interconnected CCP may trigger cascade effects through
global financial markets, making a public bailout all but a certainty. In
comparison to what happened with Lehman Brothers or AIG, the bailout
of a major interconnected CCP may be of such epic proportions that it
dwarfs all earlier bailouts in terms of its size and magnitude.
Within this context, it is surprising that one of the largest derivative
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markets by volume, the United States, has not implemented any uniform
or effective recovery or resolution mechanism to address a catastrophic
failure of any major CCP. In addition to CCPs, the networks these
institutions rely on to conduct their business may also need to be
considered as systemically important. Indeed, the existence and essential
nature of these networks may accelerate and exacerbate cascade effects.
The European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on a framework
for the recovery and resolution of CCPs3 may serve as an example on how
to create a more functional recovery system in the United States. But
because of the immense volume of derivative contracts currently and
increasingly being cleared by only a handful of global and interconnected
CCPs, it is unclear if any resolution or bankruptcy system can ever fully
prevent a public bailout in this context.4 In fact, it seems fair to argue that
each of the major CCPs may not be too-big-to-fail, but rather too-big-tobail.
This article is not exhaustive and does not discuss internal risk
mutualization at CCPs, nor other ex-ante prudential measures to reduce
the impact of default by any number of clearing members.5 Rather, this
article focuses on the much greater systemic risk of cascade effects
resulting from extreme tail events.6 The reason is that this type of risk
may overwhelm any internal liquidity facility and trigger a CCP to
become insolvent overnight.7
3. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Central Counterparties and Amending Regulations (EU)
No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365, COM (2016) 856 final (Nov. 28, 2016); see also
Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Framework for the Recovery and
Resolution of Central Counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012,
and (EU) 2015/2365, SWD (2016) 368 final, (Nov. 28, 2016).
4. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial
Institution Bankruptcy, 97 N. C. L. REV. 243 (2019) (“A successful bankruptcy is not possible for a large
financial institution absent massive financing for operations while in bankruptcy, and that financing can
only reliably be obtained on short notice and in distressed credit markets from one source: the United
States government.”).
5. CCPs currently are only required to be able to either withstand the default of the clearing
member to which it has the largest exposures or of the second and third largest clearing members, if the
sum of their respective exposures are larger (Cover-2). See, e.g., European Union Regulation 648/2012,
2012 O.J. (L 201); see also David Murphy & Paul Nahai-Williamson, Dear Prudence, won’t you come
out to play? Approaches to the analysis of central counterparty default fund adequacy, 30 BANK OF
ENGLAND, FINANCIAL STABILITY PAPER 7 (arguing that the ‘cover 2’ measure is arbitrary),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-paper/2014/dear-prudence-wontyou-come-out-to-play-approaches-to-the-analysis-of-ccp-default-fund-adequacy.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Darrell Duffie, Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties 3 (Stanford Graduate
Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 3256, 2014) (arguing that the failure of a major CCP could occur during
periods of extreme market events); see also Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing
Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?, 1 REVIEW OF ASSET PRICING STUDIES 74- 95 (2011).
7. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1649 (2013);
see also Russell Barker, Andrew Dickinson, Alex Lipton & Rajeev Virmani, Systemic Risks in CCP
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CCPs continue to be widely misunderstood and are often compared to
banks. This article will provide some needed context about CCPs, the
products they clear, and how they operate. In Part II, this article will
address the importance of interconnectedness of CCPs and the growing
number of clearing member networks. In Part III, the article will then
focus on the possible failures of CCPs. Specifically, it will analyze
several examples of prior failures or near failures of CCPs and a few
different default and non-default events will also be discussed. Part IV
outlines the objectives of CCP recovery and resolution mechanisms,
including an analysis of shortcomings of presently available recovery and
resolution procedures in the United States. Finally, in Part V, this article
concludes by discussing various proposals on how to avoid the threat of
a systemic risk through new forms of intermediation, CAT bonds, and
systemic risk taxation or surcharges.
II. POSITIVE ANALYSIS
Broadly defined,8 a Central Counterparty (CCP) is “an entity that
interposes itself between the counterparties to trades, acting as the buyer
to every seller and the seller to every buyer.”9 CCPs, in other words, are
intermediaries that pool the risk of default for all clearinghouse
members.10 These goals are achieved by maintaining a matched book of
positions, which requires the offsetting of assets and liabilities. This
offsetting occurs through margining and netting.11
Networks at 14 (2016) (“[T]ail losses and increased liquidity requirements require a careful modeling so
as to capture the substantial wrong-way risk between volatility of market variables and defaults”).
8. See, e.g., Rebecca Lewis, Taking a deep dive into margins for cleared derivatives, CHICAGO
FED LETTER NO. 371 (2016).
9. Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and Technical Committee of the
International Organization on Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Principles for financial market
infrastructures, Bank of International Settlements and International Organization on Securities
Commissions 8 (2012).
10. The “pooling” occurs through mutualization and not through risk pooling or diversification as
typical insurance mechanisms. All clearing members “remain contingently responsible for mutualizing
losses in the event any of the clearing members defaults.” And, this loss mutualization must be understood
as a “means by which members of a clearinghouse (and other clearing associations) provide ‘selfinsurance’ for their activities.” Robert T. Cox & Robert S. Steigerwald, A CCP is a CCP is a CCP,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, POLICY DISCUSSION PAPER VOL. PDP, NO 2017-01 at 8 (2017).
In other words, through mutualization clearing members insure each other and themselves in case of
default. The risk of default is therefore shared among all clearing members.
11. See, e.g., Fernando Cerezetti, Jorge Cruz Lopez, Mark Manning & David Murphy, Who pays?
Who gains? Central counterparty resource provisions in the post Pittsburgh world, 7 JOURNAL OF
FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 12-15 (2019); see also Robert T. Cox & Robert S. Steigerwald,
A CCP is a CCP is a CCP, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, POLICY DISCUSSION PAPER VOL. PDP,
NO 2017-01 at 5 (2017); Mark Jozsef Manning & David Hughes, Central counterparties and banks: vive
la difference, 4 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (2016) (“In the absence of a default,
the CCP operates with a ‘matched book.’”). For a more comprehensive discussion see also Sect. II.B.3.
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Margining may be the CCP’s most important tool to manage default
risk.12 Until a derivative contract is closed out, margining requires that
each counterparty places a predetermined portion of each trade’s value in
a CCP account.13 Netting, on the other hand, is the right to offset
payments that an institution has to make and is entitled to receive,
allowing the combination of multiple cash flows into one single net
payment.14

Through the pooling of risk and the sharing of potential losses as
between clearing members, the probability of insolvency is reduced at the
individual and group levels.
The following in-depth discussion of some of the most important
aspects of how CCPs function is meant to provide a better understanding
of these institutions and explain how CCPs may be able to limit cascade
effects in derivative markets.

12. PETER NORMAN, THE RISK CONTROLLERS: CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING IN
GLOBALISED FINANCIAL MARKETS 10-12 (2012).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., JON GREGORY, CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES: MANDATORY CLEARING AND
BILATERAL MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR OTC DERIVATIVES 60-73 (Wiley 2014) (Noting that netting
has been critical for the growth of derivative markets by reducing the overall credit exposure in the
markets when compared to notional value of these markets). However, netting is not without drawbacks,
because it can negatively impact the dynamics and liquidity of derivative markets. For example, while
the overall size of credit exposure may be smaller, the netted positions tend to be much more volatile than
the underlying gross positions. This difference in itself may create a significant systemic risk. Id. Netting
and offset, of course, also make it much more difficult for participants to move in and out of various
positions and particularly if some of the positions create different risk exposures. Id. It is true that some
of this downside risk does not extend into multilateral netting, which maybe one of the main arguments
in favor a the central clearing mandate described in this article, but multilateral netting might instead result
in a less transparent market due to the fragmentation of positions, which are either non-clearable or
clearable trades. Id. at 71-73.
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A. Derivative Transactions Defined
Generally speaking, derivative contracts are agreements between two
or more counterparties.15 Counterparties are the opposing parties in a
derivative transaction.16 In other words, counterparties represent the
buyers and sellers in these financial instruments and can be individual
persons or any corporate legal entity.
Most derivative contracts are traded by large derivative dealers as
counterparties, including Citigroup Inc. and JP Morgan Chase & Co.17
Other major derivative dealers may include Bank of America, HSBC, and
Goldman Sachs.18 Also, large energy companies such as Royal Dutch
Shell, BP, and Vitol may serve as major derivative dealers.19
All derivative contracts may be customized to meet the needs of the
particular parties and typically draw their value from the underlying
reference item the counterparties wish to use.20
For example,
commodities such as sugar or pork bellies can be chosen as the reference
item that determines the initial value of the contract.21 Other potential

15. See generally ANDREW CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO
FORWARDS, FUTURES, SWAPS AND OPTIONS 1 (2d ed. 2010).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Dakin Campbell, Citigroup overtakes JP Morgan as Top U.S. Derivative Dealers,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 29, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-29/citigroupovertakes-jpmorgan-as-biggest-u-s-derivatives-dealer [https://perma.cc/X8QN-X24Z]; see also Satyajit
Das, Q&A Regulation and the derivative markets, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2010),
https://www.ft.com/content/833a0994-6e32-11df-ab79-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/7V3G-HJSZ];
Bank for International Settlements, Statistical Release – OTC Derivatives Statistics at end-June 2016,
Monetary and Economic Department 4 (Nov. 2016), https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1611.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C43Y-EE8B]; International Swaps and Derivatives Association, ISDA Margin Survey
2017 (Sept. 2017), https://www.isda.org/a/VeiDE/margin-survey-final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XMN53LX].
18. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Markets & Policy Implementation,
Counterparties, List of Primary Dealers, https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealers
[https://perma.cc/KWQ8-KLDJ] (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
19. See, e.g., Alexandra Alper & Sarah N. Lynch, Regulators spare all but the biggest swap
dealers, REUTERS BUSINESS NEWS (Apr. 18, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financialregulation-swaps/regulators-spare-all-but-biggest-swap-dealers-idUSBRE83H0YE20120418
[https://perma.cc/V4MT-LKAE].
20. See, e.g., MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES 3 (2nd ed. 2011).
21. Id. at 11
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referents are the weather, cryptocurrencies,22 indexes or money.23
While complex in nature, all derivative contracts are nevertheless
simply a variation of only four basic agreement types: the forward, future,
swap, or options contract.24 A forward is a contract in which a buyer
agrees to purchase the underlying unit from the seller at a specified price
on a specified future date.25 A future is nothing more than a standardized
forward contract, which is traded on an exchange.26 The exchange is a
regulated trading platform providing better guarantees to counterparties
that contract obligations will be fulfilled.27 A swap, on the other hand, is
an agreement used to exchange cash flows and most often involves
interest payments.28 In a swap, the cash flow of the first counterparty is
based on a variable floating rate, while the cash flow of the second
counterparty is based on a fixed rate.29 Finally, an option is an agreement
that grants the holder the right, but not the obligation, to sell or buy
something at a specific price on or before a specific future date.30 Options
are also primarily traded on exchanges.31
In addition to the basic agreement types, OTC derivatives are further
divided into at least five broad groups: interest rate derivatives, foreign
22. See, e.g., Boris Groendahl, Donal Griffin & Silla Brush, Crypto Derivatives targeted by EU
regulator weighing curbs, BLOOMBERG BNA, SECURITIES DAILY (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-18/cryptocurrency-derivatives-may-fall-under-euretail-sales-curbs [https://perma.cc/3FJK-BT5L]; see also De Nikhilesh, ESMA Seeks Public Input on
Cryptocurrency Derivatives Policy, COINDESK (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/esma-callsfor-public-input-on-crypto-based-derivatives-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/M28L-VNE2]; European
Securities and Market Authority (ESMA), Statement on preparatory work of the European Securities and
Markets Authority in relation to CFDs, binary options and other speculative products, ESMA35-36-885
(June 29, 2017), https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/product-intervention-general-statement
[https://perma.cc/2EB9-ZWH8]; European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA), ESMA issues
updated statement on preparatory work of the European Securities and Markets Authority in relation to
CFDs, binary options and other speculative products (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.esma.europa.eu/pressnews/esma-news/esma-issues-updated-statement-preparatory-work-in-relation-cfds-binary-options
[https://perma.cc/EVE4-25BX]; European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA), Call for evidence:
Potential product intervention on contracts for difference and binary options to retail customers,
ESMA35-43-904 (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma35-43904_call_for_evidence__potential_product_intervention_measures_on_cfds_and_bos_to_retail_clients.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VB7-Y9D7].
23. See, e.g., JOHN E. MARTHINSEN, RISK TAKERS: USES AND ABUSES OF FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES 1-4 (2d ed. 2009).
24. See, e.g., ANDREW CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO
FORWARDS, FUTURES, SWAPS AND OPTIONS 1-2 (2d ed. 2010).
25. See, e.g., MICHAEL DURBIN, supra note 20, at 23.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 6-7.
28. Id. at 29.
29. Id. at 30.
30. Id. at 37-39.
31. Id. at 2.
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exchange derivatives, equity derivatives, commodities derivatives, and
credit derivatives.32
While not the biggest group based on outstanding notional value, credit
default swaps (CDSs), a group of credit derivatives, carry a much higher
risk due to their long-term nature and exposure to market factors.33 As
such, CDS derivatives may disproportionally contribute to a higher
counterparty risk in derivative markets and the systemic risk in financial
markets. CDSs have also played one of the most important roles in the
lead up to and during the financial crisis.34
CDSs were introduced in the 1990s as an insurance mechanism for
commercial debt and corporate bonds,35 which later extended to include
mortgage-backed bonds.36 At the end of 2008, the outstanding notional
amount of CDSs reached $38.6 trillion,37 and in the first quarter of 2009,
the notional amount of derivatives held by U.S. commercial banks was
approximately $202 trillion, with $14.6 trillion in CDSs as the third
largest category of derivatives.38
By the end of 2009, and as a direct reflection of the reduction in market
prices, the total gross market value fell by as much as a third, to $21.6
trillion.39 Since then, the CDS market initially grew at a moderate pace
with a notional value of $26.3 trillion at mid-year 2010, but fell to $19
trillion in 2014.40 In 2015, the total outstanding notional value dropped
to $12.3 trillion of total CDS contracts with a gross market value of $421
billion and a net market value of $113 billion.41
32. See, e.g., GREGORY, supra note 14, at 18.
33. Id.; see also Kouki Inamura, Akio Hattori, Yoshiyuki Fukuda, Yoshihiko Sugihara & Yuki
Teranishi, Wrong-way risk in OTC derivatives and its implication for Japan's financial institutions, 2012E-6
BANK
OF
JAPAN
REV.
1-2
(2012),
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/wps_rev/rev_2012/data/rev12e06.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH8M-JEQ9].
34. Michael Greenberg, The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission Hearing 11 (June 30, 2010) (Testimony of Michael Greenberger, Law Sch. Professor, Univ.
of Maryland Sch. of Law) (“It is now almost universally accepted that the unregulated multi-trillion dollar
OTC CDS market helped formant a mortgage crisis, and finally the ‘once-in-a-century’ systemic financial
crisis…”),
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=cong_test
[https://perma.cc/3F4K-2BW3].
35. See, e.g., PAUL C. HARDING, A PRACTICE GUIDE TO THE 2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES
DEFINITIONS 2-3 (2004).
36. See, e.g., DURBIN, supra note 20, at 204-206.
37. Summaries of Market Survey Results, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N,
https://www.isda.org › attachment › ISDA Market Surveys 2010-1995 [https://perma.cc/3HFD-AGXC].
38. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, OCC’S QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: FIRST QUARTER 2009 (2009).
39. See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 3, at 12.
40. Bank of International Settlements, Monetary Economic Department, Statistical Release OTC
Statistics at the end-June 2014, 5 (Nov. 2014), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1411.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N7GB-K9FV].
41. Bank of International Settlements, Semiannual OTC derivative statistics (OTC, credit default
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This downward trend continued through 2016; by 2017, the
outstanding notional value fell below $10 trillion, which is the lowest
level since 2007.42 However, at the same time, the centrally cleared
segment of CDS markets rose from $4.3 to $4.9 trillion or from 44% to
51% between December 2016 and June 2017.43 Today, the CDS market
remains the third largest derivative category behind interest and foreign
exchange derivatives.44
In a CDS contract, creditworthiness is the underlying pricing
mechanism, effectively making credit risk a tradable product. Under this
set-up, the first counterparty, in return for a premium payment, promises
to make a payment to the other counterparty if a third-party defaults on
her debt obligation.45 As such, it provides credit default protection and
compensates the protection buyer in case of loss or default.
Compensation may take place based on a settlement method previously
agreed upon by the counterparties. The compensation is typically a form
of cash or physical settlement.46 The protection seller may either take
physical delivery of the credit-impaired securities at a previously agreed
price or may pay the difference between the price and the securities’
current market value in cash.47 Today, an auction settlement is the
principal method of settlement of credit derivatives.48
While somewhat similar to an insurance contract,49 CDS contracts are
at the same time very different because their payout is generally
independent from any actual loss.50 Settlement is due when a credit event
occurs, regardless of whether the protection buyer suffers or even risks

swaps, by type and position) 32 (Nov. 2016), https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1611.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BKF-92K3]; see also EDMUND PARKER, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: UNDERSTANDING AND
WORKING WITH THE 201 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES 7 (2017).
42. Bank of International Settlement, Statistical Release: OTC derivative statistics at end-June
2017, 5 (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1711.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWS6-ZT7R].
43. Id.
44. Id. The 2014 overall decline in CDS activity primarily contributed to the continuing
contraction in inter-dealer activity and an increase in trade compression. Id. Compression is a process
for tearing up trades, which enables economically redundant derivative trades to be terminated early
without changing each participant’s net position. For statistics on multilateral compressions of CDS
contracts. See, e.g. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Portfolio Compression, TRIOPTIMA,
www.trioptima.com/resource-center/statistics/triReduce.html [https://perma.cc/3J37-8MC4].
45. JOHN-PETER CASTAGNINO, DERIVATIVES: THE KEY PRINCIPLES 86 (3rd ed. 2009).
46. See, e.g., GREGORY, supra note 14, at 27.
47. Oskari Juurikkala, Credit Default Swaps and Insurance: Against the Potts Opinion, 26 J. INT’L
BANKING L. & REG. 128, 128 (2011) (arguing that CDS contracts in some cases may be construed as
insurance contracts).
48. See, e.g., PARKER, supra note 41, at 381.
49. See, e.g., Arthur Kimball-Stanley, Insurance and Credit Default Swaps: Should Like Things
Be Treated Alike, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 241, 246–47 (2008).
50. HARDING, supra note 35, at 19; see also Lloyds & Scottish Fin. Ltd. v. Cyril Lord Carpets
Sales Ltd., [1992] B.C.L.C. 609.
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suffering a loss.51 Credit events triggering a settlement are usually also
much broader than those in insurance contracts.52
The most common credit events triggering contract termination and
settlement are failure to pay, bankruptcy, and restructuring.53 In order to
ensure the optimal level of protection, the typical termination clause
establishes default even before any credit event occurs or before formal
bankruptcy or restructuring proceedings are initiated.54 For example, in
the ISDA Master Agreement, which is the standard master agreement of
most credit derivatives in the United States and Europe, default is
assumed if a reference entity “makes a general assignment, arrangement
or composition with or for the benefit of its creditors”55 or “seeks or
becomes subject to the appointment of an administrator, provisional
liquidator, conservator, receiver, trustee, custodian or other similar
official for it or for all or substantially all its assets.”56 This already very
broad definition is further supplemented by a catchall clause establishing
a termination right if a party causes any event that has an analogous or
equivalent effect to bankruptcy.57
B. Organization and Role of Central Counterparties
So, what is clearing and how does it function in the context of
derivative transactions? The concept of clearing OTC derivatives or the
use of CCPs are not a particularly new development or idea. The concept
of CCPs emerged in the 18th century to neutralize counterparty risk in
commodity markets and has significantly evolved since then.58
51. HARDING, supra note 35, at 19.
52. Id. at 18-19.
53. Id. at 6; see also, PARKER, supra note 41, at 337-48 (describing the most common seven credit
events as bankruptcy, obligation acceleration, obligation default, failure to pay, repudiation, moratorium,
restructuring and government intervention).
54. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank Nat’l. Ass’n and Novastar Mortg. Supplemental Interest Trust, Int’l
Swap Dealers Ass’n, Inc., Master Agreement § 4(a)(vii)(3) (May 27, 2005) [hereinafter Master
Agreement],
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1328469/000119312505124580/dex105.htm
[https://perma.cc/7J7W-2QW8]; HARDING, supra note 35, at 109; see also Jens-Hinrich Binder,
Bankenintervention und Bankenabwicklung in Deutschland: Reformnotwendigkeiten und Grundzüge
eines verbesserten Rechtsrahmens 17–18 (Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der
Gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung,
Working
Paper
No.
05/2009,
2009)
(Ger.),
http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/Arbeitspapiere/
Bankenintervention_und_Bankenabwicklung_in_Deutschland.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24F2-HMF2]
(arguing that this is already the case, and most default clauses in derivative contracts are structured to
allow for pre-bankruptcy termination). One reason for these early termination rights is clearly to avoid
any potential conflict with differing national insolvency rules.
55. Master Agreement, supra note 54, § 4(a)(vii)(3).
56. Id. § 4(a)(vii)(6).
57. Id. § 4(a)(vii)(8).
58. PETER NORMAN, THE RISK CONTROLLERS: CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING IN
GLOBALISED FINANCIAL MARKETS 7 (2012).
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In addition to basic clearing services, CCPs today provide many
additional services that are considered to add significant value to
derivative trades by reducing counterparty default risk.59 Typically, two
different CCP structures are distinguished: a vertical CCP or a horizontal
CCP structure. Vertically structured CCPs are integrated parts of a
corporate entity, group, or exchange and may only be used by members
or users of that entity.60 Horizontally structured CCPs are user-owned and
user-governed; they are institutionally separated from any trading
platform while also serving multiple markets and processing many
different asset classes.61
In the European Union, which has a common economic market, all
CCPs are considered to offer system-level stability.62 The United States
takes a similar approach. The difference is that in the European Union,
CCPs are automatically viewed as risk-minimizers, whereas in the U.S.
they must be so designated.63
The status of CCPs in derivative markets remains unclear and is often
confused with other types of clearinghouses. To be clear, what is required
of CCPs is context-specific and depends upon the needs of their
members.64 For example, in terms of financial services, central clearing
may only require the balancing of debt or the processing of payment
instruments or currency.65 Yet, as far as securities trades are concerned,
central clearing only requires standard operational processes.66 This is
very different from what is required in derivative markets.67 In this case,
when derivative contracts are traded, no additional performance is
required under these contracts once they are settled or extinguished.68
Each CCP performs its duties through the discharge of contractual
59. TINA P. HASENPUSCH, CLEARING SERVICES FOR GLOBAL MARKETS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLEARING INDUSTRY 37 (Cambridge University Press 2009); Kirsi,
Central Counterparty Clearing: Constructing a Framework for Evaluation of Risks and Benefits, BANK
OF FINLAND, DISCUSSION PAPER, 30/2004 at 14.
60. NORMAN, supra note 58, at 17.
61. Id. at 18.
62. See, e.g., Emanuel Alfranseder, Paweł Fiedor, Sarah Lapschies, Lucia Orszaghova & Paweł
Sobolewski, Indicators for the monitoring of central counterparties in the EU, 14 EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC
RISK
BOARD,
OCCASIONAL
PAPER
SERIES
12
(2018),
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/occasional/esrb.op14.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU8C-GXRN].
63. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Designated Financial Market Utilities,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated_fmu_about.htm [https://perma.cc/H6AEVL2J].
64. HASENPUSCH, supra note 59, p. 17-18.
65. Id. at 18
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., GREGORY, supra note 14, at 9.
68. HASENPUSCH, supra note 59, p. 18 (Noting that “[i]n the trading of derivatives, the legal
obligation is fulfilled when the duration of a contract expires or when a close-out of positions occurs (i.e.
an offsetting sell contract for the holder of a buy contract is entered into and vice versa).”).
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obligations, including (1) novation, (2) netting, (3) risk
management/monitoring, or (4) collateral management. The following
sections explain how CCPs carry out these contractual duties.
1. Novation
Novation may be the most essential and important service provided by
a CCP and the service that best describes its functions. Novation refers
to the process of replacing one contract party with another.69 For example,
if A and B are the original counterparties to a derivative trade, the CCP
will replace A as the counterparty to B and B as the counterparty to A.
The original bilateral contractual obligation between A and B are replaced
with an obligation of the CCP. The CCP then becomes liable on the
contractual obligation to perform on both the buyer’s and the seller’s side
at the same time.70 The CCP also automatically assumes the more onedimensional bilateral counterparty risk of default and replaces that risk
with that of a much higher quality risk that is backed by the CCP, all of
its clearing members, and its users.
2. Netting
Netting is also aimed at reducing counterparty risk.71 By definition,
netting is the process by which counterparties consolidate and reduce the
overall number of their outstanding derivative positions.72 Positions that
share the same underlying reference unit and attributes are partially or
completely offset and consolidated into one single obligation.73
Two types of netting procedures are possible: bilateral and multilateral
netting.74 In bilateral netting, only a limited number of two or three
counterparties may agree to offset their positions among each other.75 In
multilateral netting, CCPs may potentially involve an unlimited number
of counterparties and are able to consolidate a much larger number of
69. Id., at 28-29.
70. Raymond Knott, Alastair Mills, Modeling Risk in General Counterparty Clearing Houses: A
Review, FINANCIAL STABILITY REV., NO. 12, at 162 (Bank of England, 2002); Bank for International
Settlements,
Recommendations
for
Central
Counterparties,
13
(2004),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d64.pdf [https://perma.cc/332K-WDQ8].
71. See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice, ISDA
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, NO. 1, 7 (May 2011), https://www.isda.org/a/yiEDE/isdadiscussion-ccppirrong.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S6F-322G]; see also HASENPUSCH, supra note 59, at 24.
72. See, e.g., HASENPUSCH, supra note 59, at 24.
73. Id. at 26-27.
74. Id. at 25.
75. See, e.g., Kirsi Ripatti, Central Counterparty Clearing: Constructing a Framework for
Evaluation of Risks and Benefits 11, BANK OF FINLAND, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 30/2004 (Dec. 29, 2004),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3022510 [https://perma.cc/E7W9-WZQA].
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positions.76 Both types of netting procedures may allow CCPs to pool all
offsetting positions of its counterparties into one single debit or credit
obligation. 77 With a sufficiently high number of matched positions, CCPs
are able to reduce counterparty risk and increase overall efficiency in
derivative markets.78
3. Risk Management and Monitoring
CCPs also provide risk management services by monitoring and
adjusting the position risk periodically. The most important risk
management tool used by CCPs, which is the first line of defense against
the default of any of its members, is margining.79 Margin may be defined
as a requirement which is calculated by the CCP and held against a
clearing member’s obligation to perform on changes in value of the
positions held.80 Margining itself is the process in which the margin
requirement is measured, calculated and enforced, but also monitored and
adjusted. Collateral, on the other hand, is the instrument posted at the
CCP to meet the various margin requirements.81 The collateral put up by
clearing members to cover open positions are typically highly liquid
securities or cash.82
There are many different approaches to calculating margin, but
typically, CCPs require their members and users to place an initial margin
into a CCP account.83 The goal is to cover for market volatility and credit
risk of cleared positions.84 CCPs evaluate position changes and market
values continuously each day.85
If the values change, CCPs will place variation margin calls to its
members and users to cover for value changes and potential losses.86
Variation margin calls, which are defined as a request for additional
funds, are made on a daily or intraday basis and are made in cash or any
other liquid funds to settle unrealized profits or losses.87 Such

76. GREGORY, supra note 14, at 134; see also NORMAN, supra note 58, at 16.
77. HASENPUSCH, supra note 59, at 25-26.
78. Id.
79. David S. Bates & Roger Craine, Valuing the Futures Market Clearinghouse’s Default
Exposure during the 1987 Crash, 31 JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 248 (1999).
80. See, e.g., Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 11, at 8.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. NORMAN, supra note 58, at 10-11
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. GREGORY, supra note 14, at 149.
87. European Ass’n of CCP Clearing Houses, Functional Definitions of a Central Counterparty
Clearing House, POSITION PAPER 5 (2004).
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adjustments assure that none of the cleared positions fall below initial
margin levels and function as collateral adjustments against position
losses.88
4. Collateral Management
Collateral management is another risk management option. By
definition, collateral management is the process of matching and
controlling the counterparties’ assets and cash against the exposure of the
cleared derivative positions.89 As with margining, CCPs evaluate
collateral levels on a daily basis.90
If a shortfall is detected, the CCP will call for additional collateral
posting.91 Any excess of collateral may be released by the CCP.92 Any
shortfall, on the other hand, needs to be accounted for through the infusion
of additional collateral.93
5. Additional Financial Services
Many of the clearing services that are available to CCPs often require
additional financial services. These services often take the form of
liquidity provisions, lines of credit, custodianship, settlement services,
and cash management.94 Other options may also be used.95
However, because CCPs are not set up to offer many of these services
directly, they must ask other financial institutions to provide these
services for them.96 The financial institutions CCPs rely on for these
services are primarily large systemically important global banks.97
Unfortunately, these global banks are also clearing members.98
Of even greater concern, these systemically important financial
88. GREGORY, supra note 14, at 151-152.
89. HASENPUSCH, supra note 59, at 31
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Committee on Payments and Market
Infrastructure (CPMI), Financial Stability Board (FSB), International Organization of Securities
Commissioners (IOSCO), Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies 1 (July 5, 2017) [hereinafter
SGCCI Report], https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d164.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGY8-PYDY].
95. HASENPUSCH, supra note 59, at 32 (referring to additional services as “complementary
clearing services” Some examples are: provision of a single interface and access to different markets and
CCPs, technical and operational support, accounting and regulatory information provision, regulatory
reporting services, book-keeping, provision of risk management tools, interest calculation).
96. SGCCI Report, supra note 94.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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institutions are the very same entities that were targeted by central
clearing mandates.99 The main purpose of the central clearing mandate is
to replace the often complex and opaque web of derivative contracts
between financial institutions with a simpler and more transparent
network based on the principle of intermediation.100 In fact, the lack of
transparency of many derivative transactions was one of the factors
responsible for the financial crisis.101
As a result, by relying on their own clearing members to provide
important financial services necessary for conducting clearing services,
CCPs are creating entirely new systemic risks. The creations of these new
risks raise the possibility that the central clearing mandate cannot
successfully reduce the probability of cascade effects. In fact, because of
the uncertain nature of this change, CCPs may significantly increase the
chance of future economic downturns.102
Because a small core of highly connected CCPs and clearing members
dominate these relationships and networks, this risk is even more likely
to trigger a future downturn.103 The reason is that a shock to one central
element of the network may trigger a cascade effect that may reach far
beyond its periphery.104 Another reason is that the shared financial
resources, which are equally concentrated among the same core of CCPs,
may not serve their intended purpose to isolate risk.105

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System: The London Summit, G20 (Apr.
2, 2009), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html [https://perma.cc/4JQD-4FN9].
102. Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 688 (2010).
103. SGCCI Report, supra note 94, at 2-3. The concern about interdependencies between CCPs is
also mentioned as one of the key priorities in the so-called joint workplan on CCP resilience, recovery
and resolvability, and is also noted in the CPMI-IOSCO CCP resilience guidance, the CPMI-IOSCO CCP
recovery guidance and the FSB CCP resolution guidance. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, BD. OF THE INT'L
ORG.
OF
SEC.
COMM’RS,
2015
CCP
WORKPLAN
4
(Apr.
15,
2015),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d134b.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE3M-A235]; COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND
MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, BD. THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'RS, FINAL REPORT - RESILIENCE OF
CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES (CCPS): FURTHER GUIDANCE ON THE PFMI 27 (July 2017),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d163.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ6G-N44U]; COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND
MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE, BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’RS, RECOVERY OF FINANCIAL
10,
(July
2017),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d162.pdf
MARKET
INFRASTRUCTURES
[https://perma.cc/33W6-V8HS]; FIN. STABILITY BD., GUIDANCE ON CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY
RESOLUTION AND RESOLUTION PLANNING 18 (July 5, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P050717-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUM6-B4JF].
104. SGCCI Report, supra note 94, at 3.
105. Id. at 2 (finding that out of 26 CCPs investigated across 15 jurisdictions less than 50% or “ten
or so of the largest CCPs account for approximately 88 per cent of total financial resources provided to
all CCPs.”).
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According to a recent study,106 less than 7% of analyzed clearing
members accounted for 75% of total financial resources provided to all
CCPs.107 Yet, it is the access to these financial resources, including initial
margin and default funds that are supposedly some of the most essential
tools in preventing future public bailouts. The exposure of the largest
clearing members to this previously unrecognized risk suggests that the
default of leading clearing members may echo through the entire network
and trigger defaults across it.108 Any run on financial resources limited to
a core number of CCPs may further enhance this effect.
Finally, it is discouraging that CCPs and their clearing members fail to
appropriately monitor margin payments. As recently as March 2017,
Deutsche Bank accidentally paid $35 billion to Eurex Clearing, increasing
the collateral held by the CCP by more than half; Eurex Clearing is the
fourth largest clearinghouse in the world.109 The accidental payment
received by the CCP was the equivalent of 55% of the collateral held by
the clearinghouse on behalf of the entire market.110 While most of the
money was returned immediately, 4 billion euros remained with the CCP
for days.111
III. ISSUE PRESENTED
CCPs are generally considered safe and resilient, but they are not
immune to failure.112 During the past 40 years, there were only a few
106. Id.
107. Id.; see also Louie Woodall, CCPs’ largest members account for half of initial margin,
RISK.NET (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.risk.net/risk-quantum/5510006/ccps-largest-members-accountfor-half-of-initial-margin?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=RN.Daily.DU.A.MF0600&utm_source=RN.DCM.Scheduled_Updates&im_amfcid=17106621&im_amfmdf=17ddb322fab
b05abe4d7b376334022df [https://perma.cc/G8FC-MUVU] (referencing an analysis of 10 different global
CCPs, including LCH SA and JSCC).
108. This conclusion also draws into question whether the current standard in the U.S. and Europe
assessing the financial stability of CCPs is sufficient. This is often also referred to as “cover 2.” For
example, under the European market infrastructure regulation (EMIR), CCPs are only required to be able
to either withstand the default of the clearing member to which it has the largest exposures or of the second
and third largest clearing members, if the sum of their respective exposures are larger. See, e.g.,
Commission Regulation 648/2012 art. 42, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 37 (EU); see also MURPHY & NAHAIWILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing that the ‘cover 2’ measure is arbitrary).,
109. See, e.g., Will Hadfield, Deutsche Bank’s $35 Billion Error Boosted Eurex’s Coffers by 55%,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2018 8:18 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-20/deutschebank-s-35-billion-error-boosted-eurex-s-coffers-by-55 [https://perma.cc/XX4S-VFG9]; Jonathan Garber,
Deutsche Bank Reportedly Sent $35 Billion to an Exchange by Accident, BUS. INSIDER US (Apr. 19, 2018,
1:41 PM), https://www.businessinsider.sg/deutsche-bank-35-billion-mistake-fixed-in-minutes-2018-4/
[https://perma.cc/EJ53-PECZ].
110. Hadfield, supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. Gary Gensler, The Derivatives Debate - Clearinghouses Are the Answer, WALL. ST. J., Apr.
12, 2010, at A21; NORMAN, supra note 58, at 40; Michael Mackenzie, Call for “Bulletproof” Clearing
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instances when clearinghouses have failed or were close to failure.
In 1974, the Caisse de Liquidation des Affaires en Marchandises
(CLAM) in Paris was the first clearinghouse to fail.113 Due to volatility
in white sugar markets and heavy speculation, the price of sugar rose to
unsustainable levels, followed by market corrections and a crash.114
Speculators and market participants were unable to meet margin calls,
which resulted in significant losses for the CCP and its ultimate failure.115
Position losses, the failure to appropriately adjust margin requirements,
and the lack of any transparency in the loss allocation process were among
the main reasons for the failure.116
The second CCP failure involved the Kuala Lumpur Commodity
Clearinghouse.117 The CCP, which was only in operation for three years,
failed in 1983.118 After volatilities in palm oil markets, the default of six
clearing members triggered the failure.119 In a government report,
management inexperience and inaction at the CCP as well as a lack of
coordination between the CCP, the exchange, and regulators were later
blamed for the failure.120 Insufficient rigor, the lack of transparency, and
bad decisions by management were also among the causes for this CCP’s
failure.121
The third example of a CCP failure, which followed the market crash
on Black Monday in 1987, had the most far reaching cascade effect and
the highest potential of triggering a global financial crisis. This time, the
crash involved equity markets. The collapse of the Hong Kong Futures
Exchange Clearing Corporation rapidly swept across the Pacific and
directly impacted two of the biggest U.S. CCPs.122 The Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME)123 and the Options Clearing Corporation
Houses, FIN. TIMES, MAR. 22, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eacb29cc-7451-11e1-9e4d00144feab49a.html#axzz3StDxahnb [https://perma.cc/67DU-XTB8]; Fergus Coming & Joseph Noss,
Assessing the Adequacy of CCPs Default Resources, BANK OF ENG., FIN. STABILITY PAPER 1, 4 (2013).
113. See, e.g., VINCENT BIGNON & GUILLAUME VUILLEMEY, THE FAILURE OF A CLEARINGHOUSE:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 3 (2017).
114. Id. at 13-14.
115. Id.; see also NORMAN, supra note 58, at 131-32.
116. Bob Hills, David Rule, Sarah Parkinson, & Chris Young, Central Counterparty Clearing
Houses and Financial Stability, BANK OF ENG. FIN. STABILITY REV. 122, 129-130 (1999); BIGNON &
VUILLEMEY, supra note 113, at 3-4 (arguing that CLAM was not necessarily lenient in its risk
management, but rather engaged in market distortions, which the authors compared to risk-shifting).
117. NORMAN, supra note 58, at 133
118. Id.
119. See. e.g., NORMAN, supra note 58, at 133; GREGORY, supra note 14, at 268.
120. NORMAN, supra note 58, at 133.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., International Monetary Fund (IMF), Making Over-the-Counter Derivatives Safer:
The Role of Central Counterparties, Chapter 3 18, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (2010),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/01/pdf/chap3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZGN-ZQLB].
123. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) did not only dodge failure in 1987, it again had to
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(OCC) almost failed at the same time and survived only because of the
rapid injection of liquidity by the Federal Reserve and other banks.124
The Hong Kong Futures Exchange Clearing Corporation, similar to
CALM in Paris and the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House,
lacked clear structural and procedural safety mechanisms.125 The CCP
did not call for additional funds from its clearing members during the
period immediately preceding the crisis and while markets were rising to
unprecedented levels.126 As a result, the CCP’s default fund ran out of
money and required a bailout by the government at a cost of nearly HK$1
billion.
More recently, a clearinghouse failure took place in 2013, long after
the global financial crisis. Operations of the National Spot Exchange and
its clearinghouse in India were suspended because of widespread fraud,
corruption, and incompetent management.127 The board of directors of
the exchange and the CCP ignored the default of numerous of its clearing
members and did not implement any efficient risk management system.
In addition, high-risk derivative positions were traded without the posting
of any collateral and without any regulatory approval.128
Indeed, so far only the 1987 failure of the Hong Kong Futures
Exchange Clearing Corporation may have triggered cross-border cascade
effects raising the possibility of a global financial crisis. Yet, this was
prior to the implementation of the central clearing mandate and the
resulting transfer of systemic risk to CCPs. One may even argue that the
deal with numerous failing clearing members in 2005 and was required to conduct forced transfers of
Lehman’s positions in 2008; Ben S. Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN.
STUD. 133, 138 (1990); Pirrong, supra note 71, at 15 n.20.
124. See, e.g., VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT
AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 401-402 (2011); BERNANKE, supra note 90, at 148;
see also Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Clearinghouses, Financial
Stability, and Financial Reform at the Financial Markets Conference (Apr. 4, 2011) (transcript available
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110404a.htm [https://perma.cc/PM3UKGEY]).
125. See, e.g., Robert Cox, Central Counterparties in Crisis: The Hong Kong Futures Exchange in
the Crask of 1987, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, VOL. 4 (DEC. 2005)
126. Id.
127. Order 4/5/2013-MKT-I/B, 2013, Government of India, Forward Markets Commission 25-29.
128. Id. at 27-29; see also Debiprasad Nayak, National Spot Exchange: What Went Wrong, WALL
STREET
JOURNAL:
INDIA
IN
REAL
TIME
(Apr.
6,
2013),
https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/08/06/what-went-wrong-at-the-national-spot-exchange/
[https://perma.cc/YXN6-C659]; Henny Sender, James Crabtree, Black Marks Add Up for Blackrock in
India, FIN. TIMES, DEC. 11, 2013, https://www.ft.com/content/8f9d41e4-6193-11e3-b7f1-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/8VEU-C58V] (noting that the National Spot Exchange was suspended from trading after
a government investigation found investment irregularities); Ajay Modi, Future Prospects Look Dim,
BUSINESS TODAY, FEB. 2, 2014, https://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/corporate/commodity-futurestrading-hit-by-nsel-scam-mcx-hurting-most/story/202290.html
[https://perma.cc/J94Y-XPMU]
(describing the many scams and fraud schemes that are prevalent in futures markets in India and violate
government rules).
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2013 failure of the clearinghouse of the National Spot Exchange in India
was an outlier.
However, there was a second near failure in 2013 in Asia. The Korean
futures trader HanMag Securities collapsed in late 2013, resulting in
disproportionate and unjustified losses of numerous clearing members at
the Korean clearinghouse KRX. 129 Following a serious electronic trading
error and an algorithm malfunction, HanMag Securities faced
bankruptcy.130 Without any regard to any of its non-defaulting clearing
members, KRX repaid HanMag’s counterparties with funds taken directly
out of the default fund.131 A Singapore hedge fund profited with more
than $36 million from the error, while Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, and
Credit Suisse, as members of the KRX clearinghouse, lost millions.132
Even more troubling is the near failure of Nasdaq Clearing AB in
September 2018, which occurred during the same week as the tenth
anniversary of the Lehman failure.133 The Nasdaq Clearing AB exhausted
its own default fund and had to rely on two-thirds of its mutual default
fund contributed to by all of its non-defaulting clearing members.134 What
is particularly concerning about this episode is that Nasdaq’s default fund

129. See, e.g., Viren Vaghela, Korea Clearing Structure in Question After HanMag Trading Error,
RISK.NET (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.risk.net/exchanges/2331225/korea-clearing-structure-questionafter-hanmag-trading-error [https://perma.cc/G73M-23V8] (“HanMag Securities had to settle payments
worth 58.4 billion won including losses and other client margin by 4:00pm on the following day but only
paid 1.4 billion won”); Jung-a Song and Jeremy Grant, South Korea Exchange Rushes to Implement “Kill
Switch,” FIN. TIMES, DEC. 30, 2013, https://www.ft.com/content/09d1d30c-7135-11e3-8f9200144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/K34C-84GQ].
130. See, e.g., Song & Grant, supra note 129 (“South Korea’s exchange operator, Korea Exchange
(KRX), is rushing to implement a “kill switch” system designed to minimise the fallout from trading
algorithms going wrong after a local broker was brought to the brink of bankruptcy by erroneous electronic
trades this month”).
131. See, e.g., Jeremy Grant, Jung-a Song, & Phillip Stafford, Banks Launch Clearing Review After
Korean Broker Default, FIN. TIMES, MARCH 7, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/14b59838-a4d6-11e39313-00144feab7de [https://perma.cc/NS2U-B6E3] (arguing that this case of KRX “highlights how
clearinghouses have moved center stage as regulators and market participants reform the financial
system.”); Manmohan Singh & Dermot Turing, Central Counterparties Resolution – An Unresolved
Problem 10 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Papers WP/18/65, Mar. 2018) (noting that “the capital of KRX
was at risk only after the non-defaulting members’ default fund contributions [would have been
exhausted].”); see also Mark P. Wetjen, Comm’r, Commodity Future Trading Comm’n, Remarks Before
the
FIA
Asia
Derivative
Conference
(Dec.
4,
2014),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opawetjen-11
[https://perma.cc/QU63-K9BD]
(recalling the KRX bail-out as “a recent market event” and noting that “[t]he clearinghouse used a portion
of its guaranty fund to cover the defaulter’s losses, which resulted in clearing members losing some
portion of their default fund contributions; the clearinghouse itself did not suffer a loss because its skin in
the game came after the non-defaulting members’ contributions.”).
132. See, e.g., Vaghela, supra note 129 (noting that JP Morgan alone has paid more than 1.5 billion
won and the Singapore hedge fund Cassia Capital “was enriched to the tune of $36 million”).
133. See also infra Part IV.
134. Infra Part IV.
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was supposed to withstand the default of its two largest members.135 Yet,
the default was triggered by one individual trader, and that trader’s
defaulted portfolio only represented five percent of the total initial margin
pool for Nasdaq’s commodity clearing services.136
All of these described failures or near-failures were the result of
improper risk management practices, combined with the insolvency of
one or more clearing members.137 At its most basic level, the lessons to
be learned from these failures are that loss allocation and risk sharing
procedures of CCPs need to be transparent and liquidity shortfalls need to
be avoided. The latter may require a long-term historical perspective to
set proper margins and market liquidity to support default management.138
Further, operational risk may also be prevented through more consistent
risk monitoring and coordinated market oversight, which at a global level
may necessitate broader standard harmonization.139
IV. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
Central Counterparties (CCPs) may be a useful way of managing risk
in global financial markets.140 CCPs manage risk for counterparties by
taking on risk that would otherwise be borne by the real parties to complex
financial transactions.141 This risk management function has been
essential to the management of the global financial markets for more than
a century and is not a new development.142 CCPs have proven very
135. See, e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2012
O.J. (L 201) 1, ART. 42.
136. See, e.g., Louie Woodall, The Tale of Two CCPs: Nasdaq and ICE Breaches Carry Warnings
for the Market, RISK.NET (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.risk.net/our-take/6288441/a-tale-of-two-ccps
[https://perma.cc/VH5Y-L5VP] (describing the Nasdaq Clearing AB default and comparing it to a
clearing member default at ICE which involved a much larger margin breach of $1.2 billion at its peak);
see also Alessandro Aimone, Nasdaq Default Came at Time of Mass Margin Breaches, Risk.Net (Jan. 4,
2019),
https://www.risk.net/risk-quantum/6002426/nasdaq-default-came-at-time-of-mass-marginbreaches [https://perma.cc/H7WF-CK5A] (reporting that CCP’s clearing members incurred 49 margin
breaches at the end of September 2018).
137. See, e.g., Thomas Krantz, CCP Critical Risk Update by CPMI IOSCO, THOMAS MURRAY,
OPINIONS (JULY 16, 2018), https://thomasmurray.com/opinion/ccp-critical-risks-update-cpmi-iosco
[https://perma.cc/8A8T-PJB4] (noting that “some CCPs have not implemented practices that are fully
consistent with specific [PFMI] standards.”).
138. See, e.g., Pedro Gurrola-Perez, The validation of Filtered Historical Value-at-Risk Models, 12
J. RISK MODEL VALIDATION, 85, 85-110 (2018) (discussing VAR models based on historical simulation).
139. See. e.g., Chris Davis, Brace for More Nasdaq-Like Losses, HKEx CRO Warns, RISK.NET
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.risk.net/derivatives/6168081/brace-for-more-nasdaq-like-losses-hkex-crowarns [https://perma.cc/VWL5-LVF4] (Roland Chai says defaults more likely as global instability
increases; CCPs should focus on auction processes and monitoring of risk exposure).
140. See, e.g., RICHARD HECKINGER, ROBERT STEIGERWALD, IVANA RUFFINI, & KRISTIN WELLS,
UNDERSTANDING DERVIATIVES: MARKET AND INFRASTRUCTURE 12-13 (2013).
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Jonathan Ira Levy, Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of
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effective for managing financial risk of certain exchange traded financial
products,143 which include options, futures, swaps, or forward rate
agreements.144 As noted above, derivatives are financial instruments
referencing underlying assets or other variables, such as commodities,
currency, money, or equities from which the financial instrument’s price
or value is derived.145 In their most basic form, these instruments allocate
the risk of price fluctuations of these assets between counterparties.146
In response to the Great Recession and the particular role derivatives
played during the 2008 crisis,147 CCPs have gained new relevance and
importance.148
This is particularly true in light of the global
implementation of a mandatory clearing requirement for OTC
derivatives.149
CCPs are viewed as a reliable tool for reducing cascade effects and
helping to avoid future bailouts of large financial institutions.150 Cascade
effects may be described as the act of one systemically important financial
institution contributing to or triggering the failure of one or more
additional financial institutions.151 Of course, external factors may also
play a significant role in economic downturns that result in the failure of
systemically important financial institutions and all their interconnected
entities.152
The Lehman Brothers’ failure and the bailout of the American
International Group (AIG) by the U.S. government are illustrative
examples of bad policy, a deep misunderstanding of derivative markets,
and the ways in which cascade effects may negatively impact the global
economy.153
Commodity Exchange in the United States, 1875-1905, 111 AMER. HIST. REV. 307, 317 (2006); NORMAN,
supra note 58, at 57-66; see also PETER NORMAN, PLUMBERS AND VISIONARIES: SECURITIES
SETTLEMENT AND EUROPE’S FINANCIAL MARKET 18-27 (2007) (hereinafter “PLUMBERS AND
VISIONARIES”); GREGORY, supra note 14, at 6.
143. Domanski, D, L Gambacorta and C Picillo, Central clearing: trends and current issues, 59–
76, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, QUARTERLY REVIEW, (DEC. 2015),
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1512g.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8TK-F5YQ].
144. See, e.g., PARKER, supra note 41, at 8.
145. See supra Part II.A.; see also DURBIN, supra note 20, at 10-11.
146. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards A Governance Structure for
Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J 1153, 1166-68 (2012).
147. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 7, at 1651.
148. See, e.g., Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services,
Derivatives and Risk Allocation, DERIVATIVES CONFERENCE SPEAKER’S DINNER (SEPT. 24, 2009), at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-426_en.htm.
149. SGCCI Report, supra note 94, at 1.
150. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 102, at 686-691; GREGORY, supra note 14, at 44.
151. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 102, at 673
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., James B. Stewart & Peter Eavis, Revisiting the Lehman’s Brothers Bailout That
Never Was, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/business/revisiting-the-
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For example, Joseph J. Cassano, the Head of AIG’s Financial Products
Division, proved so oblivious to the risk of the AIG derivative portfolio
that, in fall of 2007, he famously noted that “it is hard for us, without
being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason
that would see us losing one dollar in any of those transactions.”154 Less
than a year later AIG was bailed out155 at a cost of more than $180 billion
to U.S. taxpayers.156
Indeed, it was the overreliance on OTC derivative contracts, paired
with a lack of transparency and inadequate risk management of these
financial instruments, which played a major role in triggering the Great
Recession.157 The lack of transparency of OTC derivative markets stems
from the fact that these financial instruments were typically only
negotiated and traded at a bilateral level between actual counterparties.
This is to say that the characteristics of the underlying assets in the market

lehman-brothers-bailout-that-never-was.html [https://perma.cc/VJ6H-THCG];
James C. DuPont,
Comment, A Second Chance at Legal Certainty: AIG Collapse Provides Impetus to Regulate Credit
Default Swaps, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 843, 846-48 (2009); Press Release, Federal Reserve Board, Federal
Reserve Board, with full support of the Treasury Department, authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group (AIG) (Sept. 16, 2008),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20080916a.htm [https://perma.cc/9LKLF2XF]; Stephen J. Lubben, Lehman's Derivative Portfolio, 1-2, SETON HALL PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH
PAPER (Dec. 2, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2698234 [https://perma.cc/B2AX-MPQB];
Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk, 2015 U. ILL. L.
REV. 699, 715-717.
154. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
28, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28melt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://p
erma.cc/T3NL-EDXB].
155. See, e.g., Alistair Gray, Greenberg Loses Battle Over Damages Related to AIG Bailout, FIN.
TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/28724c6e-34ce-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e?mhq5j=e3
[https://perma.cc/2YEL-9843]; Aaron M. Kessler, EX-AIG Chairman Wins Bailout Suit, but Gets No
Damages, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/business/dealbook/judgesides-with-ex-aig-chief-greenberg-against-us-but-awards-no-money.html
[https://perma.cc/G26B3AUD]; Andrew Harris & Susan Decker, Greenberg’s Starr Returns to Court Seeking Damages over AIG
JOURNAL
(Nov.
7,
2016),
Bailout,
INSURANCE
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2016/11/07/431674.htm [https://perma.cc/8SFV-8JP8];
Jonathan Stempel, Ex-AIG Chairman Greenberg loses appeal over 2008 bailout, REUTERS BUSINESS
NEWS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-aig-bailout-idUSKBN1851OU
[https://perma.cc/PWA6AZRH] (containing a detailed timeline of the legal suit pursued by Greenberg); Daniel Gross, Remember
the $182 Billion AIG Bailout? It Just Wasn’t Generous Enough, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/remember-the-dollar182-billion-aig-bailout-it-just-wasnt-generousenough [https://perma.cc/M7NG-Z4RS].
156. See, e.g., Andrew R. Sorkin, Breaking Even on AIG, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/business/05sorkin.html [https://perma.cc/6473-3SDT].
157. For a more nuanced perspective, see Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of
Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1186-87 (2010) (arguing that it was not the derivative portfolio
alone that was to blame for AIG’s problems, but rather the fact that AIG traders, on the one hand, sold
contingent debt linked to subprime mortgages and the AIG parent company, on the other hand,
simultaneously purchased the very same financial instruments for the company’s general investment
portfolio).
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were unknown and led to adverse selection problems.158 The bilateral
level trading prevented financial markets, investors, and regulators from
appropriately evaluating the risk that was associated with many different
types of derivatives.
In 2009, the G20 leaders formally recognized this market failure and
agreed on wide ranging derivative market reforms.159 One of the
hallmarks of these derivative reforms was the requirement that
standardized OTC derivative contracts should be cleared through
CCPs.160
The requirement of mandatory clearing combined with additional
reporting duties for all standardized OTC derivatives aims to limit
cascade effects and to guarantee better regulatory oversight.161 The idea
is to monitor the risk exposure of all clearing members or their clients and
to share losses in the event of a default.162 Most jurisdictions, including
the U.S. and the European Union,163 have undertaken similar reforms.164
Yet, more than a decade after the Great Recession, these reforms may
not have had the desired effect. Instead, this mandate may have
significantly increased the very category of risk it was meant to address,
thus making the potential need for public bailouts of CCPs, since they are
systemically important financial institutions,165 all but a certainty in the
158. See, e.g., EMIR Art. 2(7); see also European Commission Press Release IP/10/1125, Making
Derivatives Markets in Europe Safer and More Transparent, (Sep. 15, 2010),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1125&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en [https://perma.cc/5SKR-XTW7]; European Commission Press Release
MEMO/12/232, Regulation on Over-the-Counter Derivatives and Market Infrastructures—Frequently
29,
2012),
Asked
Questions,
(Mar.
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/232
[https://perma.cc/U7WD85P8].
159. It is noteworthy that regulators in the U.S. and Europe had already called for central clearing
of derivative contracts immediately after the rescue of Bear Stearns. See, e.g., Press Release, Statement
Regarding June 9 Meeting on Over-the-Counter Derivatives, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
(June
9,
2008),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2008/ma080609
[https://perma.cc/88SR-4Q8H].
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System: The London Summit, G20 (Apr.
2, 2009), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html [https://perma.cc/4JQD-4FN9]; Pittsburgh
Summit (the G20 heads of state and government committed to promote the standardization of all credit
derivative markets, requiring that all standardized OTC derivative contracts be cleared through central
counterparties and be reported to trade repositories.”).
162. Scott, supra note 102, at 693.
163. MICHAEL SCHILLIG, RESOLUTION AND INSOLVENCY OF BANKS AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, ¶¶2.20-2.22, at 27-28 (addressing FMI reforms in the European Union), and ¶¶2.40-2.41,
at 35-36 (addressing FMI reforms in the United States)(Oxford University Press, 2016).
164. Id., ¶¶2.23-2.27, at 28-30 (discussing various other national reform initiatives).
165. In the European Union Central Counterparties are per se considered systemically important or
may be designated by the European Commission and the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA) as systemically important, whereas in the United States CCPs need to be explicitly designated
by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as systemically. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
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near future.
Securitization in globally leveraged loan markets is of particular
concern. Low lending standards and mounting debt in these markets have
significantly increased the default risk of many overleveraged
companies.166 In favor of cheap financing, investor protections are being
eliminated and questionable collateral is used to underwrite loans167. The
rapid growth in leveraged loan markets has been driven by creditors’
seemingly unlimited risk appetite and increased securitization activities
through collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). CLOs are securities that
consist of a pool or various tranches of loans that may be organized by
maturity and risk.168 To sell these tranches to investors, CLOs may be
issued as collateral debt obligations (CDOs) by a business entity or trust
created for this purpose.169 Rather than being backed by mortgage
securities, which triggered the financial crisis in 2007, these CDOs are
backed by subprime corporate debt.170
TREAS., DESIGNATION OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL MARKET UTILITIES (2012),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Appendix%20A%20Designation%20of
%20Systemically%20Important%20Market%20Utilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTA7-Y4HJ].
166. See, e.g., Sam Fleming, Janet Yellen sounds alarm over plunging loan standards, FIN. TIMES
(Oct.
24,
2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/04352e76-d792-11e8-a854-33d6f82e62f8
[https://perma.cc/Y6M7-NYQN]; see also Colby Smith & Robin Wigglesworth, Boom in emerging
market corporate debt stirs fears, FIN. TIMES (Jan 19, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/3008bbf6-387811ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4 (noting that the global corporate debt market is an accident waiting to happen,
which, among other reasons, is fueld by the increased wave of corporate bond buying by mutual funds
and ETFs that allow investors to pull out money more quickly than before).
167. See, e.g., Joy Wiltermuth and Kirsten Haunss, Yellen warns of corporate distress, economic
fallout, REUTERS.COM (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yellen-distressed/yellenwarns-of-corporate-distress-economic-fallout-idUSKCN1QG2CZ [https://perma.cc/22KT-TNH3] (Janet
Yellen is cited as noting that she is “concern[ed] about the deterioration in lending standards that we have
seen [in leveraged loan markets]” and that “[a] large share of [these loans are] covenant-lite and some of
the explicit ways in which covenants have weakened are a concern.”).
168. See, e.g., Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO), Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/video/play/collateralized-loan-obligation-clo/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190520132821/https://www.investopedia.com/video/play/collateralizedloan-obligation-clo/].
169. See, e.g., Asset Backed Security - ABS vs. Collateralized Debt Obligation - CDO,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040715/what-difference-betweenINVESTOPEDIA,
collateralized-debt-obligation-cdo-and-asset-backed-security-abs.asp [https://perma.cc/4LKB-QP6J]; see
also Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, CLO Issuance Is Far Surpassing Other Types of Asset Backed
(Nov.
5,
2018),
Securities,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2018/11/05/clo-issuance-is-far-surpassingother-types-of-asset-backed-securities/#7e452d1b1384 [https://perma.cc/U2RP-XFVK] (Noting that
“[i]n an economic downturn, whatever type of investor ends up holding the leveraged loans, the
collateralized loan obligations which include leveraged loans, or the sellers of credit default protection
referencing CLOs, will have fewer credit protections than what they need to sustain losses.”); Matt Wirz
and Cezary Pedkul, Hedge Funds Revive the Junk Bond CDO, PRIVATE EQUITY NEWS (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.penews.com/articles/hedge-funds-revive-the-junk-bond-cdo-20181108
[https://perma.cc/R65N-SK6E] (“Issuance of corporate debt CDOs has tripled [in 2018] to at least $3.8
billion”).
170. It is important to note here that not every CLO or CDO may also qualify as a derivative
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Since the Great Recession, the leveraged loan market has more than
doubled in size, reaching approximately $1.3 trillion by the end of
2018.171 Though some estimates assume a size of more than $2.2
trillion.172 It is unclear how many of these loans are subprime.173 This
uncertainty has important implications in practice because any financial
institution that has excessive exposure to these types of CLOs may be
“runnable”174 and the lack of transparency may make it difficult to
determine what amount of capital and liquidity buffers would be required
for financial institutions to avoid any failures or bailouts in the future.175
Janet Yellen, the former chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System,176 and Senator Elisabeth Warren177 are among
many experts warning about the systemic risk associated with these loan
obligations178 and are predicting that many companies will go bankrupt or
product, but because of the high risk in leveraged or cove-lite loan markets, it is more than likely that
creditors may not only buy credit protection through credit default swaps or swaptions, but it is also likely
that most CLOs are packaged as synthetic collateralized debt obligation, which are a form of credit
derivatives.
171. . See, e.g., How Large is the Leverage Loan Market?, BANK OF ENGLAND (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/bank-overground/2019/how-large-is-the-leveraged-loan-market
[https://perma.cc/DM78-6QNK]; see also Sirio Aramonte and Fernando Avalos, Structured finance then
and now: a comparison of CDO and CLOs, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS QUARTERLY REVIEW (Sept.
2019), at 11-14, Box B, Graph B, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1909.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LAU92AK];
Leveraged
Loan
Primer,
S&P
GLOBAL,
http://www.leveragedloan.com/primer/#!definingleveraged [https://perma.cc/WXE6-JQ74] (noting that
“the S&P/LSTA Loan Index, widely used as a proxy for market size, topped the $1 trillion mark in April
2018, after growing every year since dipping to $497 billion in 2010”); Tirupam Goel, The rise of
leveraged loans: a risky resurgence?, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS QUARTERLY REVIEW (Sept. 2018),
at 10, Box A, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1809.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y93-Y7RN].
172. How Large is the Leverage Loan Market?, BANK OF ENGLAND (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/bank-overground/2019/how-large-is-the-leveraged-loan-market
[https://perma.cc/DM78-6QNK].
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Fleming, Global regulators launch inquiry into leveraged loans, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 6,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/2cb614ee-4067-11e9-b896-fe36ec32aece [https://perma.cc/P9EHT6LE] (runnable refers to institutions such as banks that could experience a run on deposits).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 166.
177. See, e.g., Kristen Haunss, Senator Warren presses lenders on leveraged lending, REUTERS
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://uk.reuters.com/article/reg-levlending/senator-warren-presses-regulators-onleveraged-lending-idUKL2N1XP24B [https://perma.cc/P2BJ-VWGU] (citing Senator Warren as noting
that she is “concerned that the large leverage lending market exhibits many of the characteristics of the
pre-2008 subprime mortgage market.”); see also Letter from Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Sen. from Mass., to
Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury, Joseph Otting, U.S. Comptroller, Jelena McWilliams,
Chairman Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Jerome Powell, Chairman Board of Governors Federal
Reserve System, Jay Clayton, Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018.11.14%20Letter%20to%20Regulators%20on%20L
everaged%20Lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5W7-3WDR] (arguing that “Securitizations like CLOs are
central to the leverage market.”).
178. See, e.g., Matt Phillips, Wall Street Loves These Risky Loans. The Rest Of Us Should Be Wary,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/business/economy/clo-corporate-
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default because they are significantly overleveraged.179 One example of
a case in point is Anastasia Beverly Hills, which used general intangible
assets to secure a $650 million loan.180 One of the assets offered as
collateral for this loan was the beauty company’s Instagram page with
more than 18.7 million followers.181
The only difference between credit derivatives issued in leveraged loan
markets in 2018 and credit derivatives issued in subprime mortgage
markets in 2008 is their reference entities, which are lowly rated corporate
debt rather than subprime mortgages.182 Due to the erosion of prudent
lending standards in leveraged loan markets, the risk exposure of CLOs
may be equal to or even worse than those of mortgage backed securities
before the Great Recession.183 What may be even more concerning is the
loans.html [https://perma.cc/J6G6-JWXM] (citing Professor Daniel K. Tarullo, former governor at the
Federal Reserve, that if there is a problem with leveraged loans that “this is where the unfinished business
of the post-financial crisis reform efforts is going to be revealed.”); see also Mayra Rodriguez Valladares,
Leveraged Loan Market Warnings Have Been Ignored For Over Five Years, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2018/10/26/leveragedloanmarketwarningshaveb
eenignoredforoveriveyears/#10793e0b3df3 [https://perma.cc/Q6VC-ZNYN] (noting that concerns have
been consistently been raised since 2013 and expressed in at least one guidance document by the Federal
Reserve, the OCC and the FDIC); How Large is the Leverage Loan Market?, BANK OF ENGLAND (Jan.
25, 2019), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/bank-overground/2019/how-large-is-the-leveraged-loanmarket [https://perma.cc/DM78-6QNK] (The BoE estimates that at least 45% of an estimated $2.2tn of
leveraged loans outstanding worldwide are held through CLOs and making the stock of leveraged loans
in 2018 very similar to the stock in subprime mortgages before the onset of the financial crisis, if measured
relative to the size of the relevant credit market.).
179. See, e.g., Wider Risk of Leveraged Loans Warrants Scrutiny, Tarullo Says, BLOOMBERG LAW
(Oct.
30,
2018),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X43T97DS000000?bna_news_filter=bankinglaw&jcsearch=BNA%252000000166c529d347ad77c7fd2e650000#jcite [https://perma.cc/77A9-T5FV]
(Professor Daniel K. Tarullo, former Governor of the Federal Reserve System, is cited as suggesting that
“[t]here is nobody charged with looking at whether [the securitization of leveraged loans] is creating a
risk of cascading consequences.”).
180. See, e.g., Joe Rennison & Colby Smith, Debt machine: are risks piling up in leveraged loans?,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/64c9665e-1814-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21
[https://perma.cc/MLE2-JXVG].
181. Id. (“With 18.7m followers and a roster of fans that includes the Kardashians and Naomi
Campbell, the Instagram page of beauty company Anastasia Beverly Hills offers crafty demonstrations of
how to use its products to get the perfect eyebrows and lips.”).
182. See, e.g., Key Features of CDOs now and CLOs Then, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS
QUARTERLY REVIEW (Sept. 2019), at 13, Table B, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1909.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LG6N-5W7E]; see also supra note 170 and accompanying text.
183. The author is aware of the fact that CLOs have fared relatively well during the Great Recession,
but he disagrees with those who simply argue that “CLOs begin with a “C” and end with and “O,” and
which should end the comparison with mortgage backed securities. See, e.g., Joe Rennison, CLOs: the
specialist loan vehicle luring yield-hungry investors, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/db97c650-1ec6-11e9-b126-46fc3ad87c65 [https://perma.cc/2FA8-CVPY]
(citing an investor as noting that “[CLOs] begin with a ‘C’; and end with an ‘O,’ says one investor, adding
that parallels should end there. ‘Overall, the asset class has proved resilient across several market
cycles.’”). The reasons for the author’s disagreement are multifold. First, in the wake of low interest
rates and reduced lending standards in cove-lite loans, risk exposures have shifted compared to pre-2008
loan markets. See, e.g., Valladares, supra note 169. In addition, market volumes have also more than
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fact that leveraged loan markets, similar to the subprime mortgage crisis,
also lack sufficient transparency which makes it virtually impossible to
properly calculate any true risk distribution in these markets.
Today, the exact size of the leveraged loan markets cannot be estimated
accurately.184 At least 25% of the leveraged loan markets in 2018 and
2019 may be unallocated.185 This makes it difficult to accurately calculate
risk and identity the exact end-investors. One implication is that the risk
of loss is difficult to measure.
The rapid growth of leveraged loan markets may, however, only be one
of many new concerns that could trigger significant cascading
consequences for CCPs.186 Additional, and maybe even broader,
concerns are widespread global differences in risk management and loss
sharing rules that CCPs rely on.187
These concerns have yet to be concretely addressed by scholars and
practitioners. That may be why Nasdaq Clearing AB blew through almost
all of its safeguards put in place after the Great Recession.188 This CCP
not only exhausted its own default fund, but also needed to use more than
doubled. Id. Second, while it may be correct that the volatility and corrections in leveraged loan markets
in December of 2018 may have proven some resilience of CLOs, this assumption may be based only on
the fact that AAA notes enjoy a higher level of protection than those in lower rated tranches. See, e.g.,
The FPC’s assessment of the risks from leverage in the non-bank financial system, Bank of England,
Financial Stability Report, Issue No. 44, at 51 (Nov. 2018), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2018/november2018.pdf?la=en&hash=7239DE596DD5DB14BEB17E1141C2CDEB73A8623C#page=51
[https://perma.cc/5B6L-9BNE]. Finally, CLOs, in similarity to mortgage backed securities, may be
defined as CDOs—it is obvious that both abbreviations start and end with the same letters of the alphabet.
See, e.g., Carol M. Kopp, Asset-Backed Security – ABS vs. Collateralized Debt Obligation – CDO,
INVESTOPEDIA (APRIL 20, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040715/what-differencebetween-collateralized-debt-obligation-cdo-and-asset-backed-security-abs.asp [https://perma.cc/TH3G58YL].
184. See, e.g., Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, Issue No. 44, at 42 (Nov. 2018),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2018/november2018.pdf?la=en&hash=7239DE596DD5DB14BEB17E1141C2CDEB73A8623C#page=51 (noting that
“[t]he outstanding stock of leveraged loans that would typically be distributed by banks to non-bank
institutional investors is estimated to be around US$1.8 trillion. This figure rises to US$2.2 trillion once
loans that would typically be held by banks themselves are included. And it would rise further if revolving
credit facilities provided by banks were also included.”).
185. Id.at 45.
186. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 166 (quoting Mr. Randal Quarles, the Financial Stability Board’s
chairman, as noting that “[o]ther areas under scrutiny are potential vulnerabilities in the fintech area and
among central counterparties.”).
187. See also supra, Part III.
188. See, e.g., Philip Stafford & David Sheppard, Trader blows €100m hole in Nasdaq’s Nordic
power market, FIN. TIMES (Sep. 13, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/43c74e02-b749-11e8-bbc3ccd7de085ffe [https://perma.cc/R658-YUGA]; see also Sarah Bell & Henry Holden, Two defaults at
CCPs, 10 years apart, BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW,
INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENTS, BOX A, at 75, (DEC. 2018),
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1812.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XHT-247W] (including a step by step
description of the events at Nasdaq Clearing).
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two-thirds of its mutual default fund, which included contribution from
all of its non-defaulting clearing members.189
The near failure of the Swedish CCP, which was used by more than
160 traders across Europe, is now subject to numerous regulatory
investigations.190 The single most important reason for this failure may
be the fact that Nasdaq granted the Norwegian derivative trader Einar Aas
the privilege to directly clear and guarantee his own trades as an
individual at the clearinghouse.191 As is common practice at many other
CCPs,192 Nasdaq clearing did not require this trader to go through any
institutional clearing member as a safeguard.193 A reason for this privilege
may be that Einar Aas was considered a derivatives trading Wunderkind
in Europe’s largest power markets.194 He posted at least $420 million in
taxable income since 2002 and was viewed as being one of the very best
traders in the European power markets.195 In 2016, Einar Aas earned
nearly $100 million in income alone and paid almost $27 million in taxes,
making him the single largest individual taxpayer in Norway.196
Yet, a wrong-way bet on the spread between German and Nordic power
contracts rapidly ended Einar Aas’ career in September 2018.197 Einar
189. Bell & Holden, supra note 188.
190. See, e.g., Joanne Faulkner, Nasdaq Trader’s €114M Loss Prompts Swedish Investigation,
LAW360 (Sept. 17 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1083292/nasdaq-trader-s-114m-lossprompts-swedish-investigation [https://perma.cc/KKR9-8H5C]; see also Samuel Agini, Regulator
criticizes Nasdaq over power trader’s €114M default, FINANCIAL NEWS (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/regulator-criticises-nasdaq-over-power-traders-e114m-default20190110 [https://perma.cc/ME78-FVA8] (“The Norwegian regulator said in its report that Nasdaq had
failed to periodically review the fitness of its member – of which Aas was one – to trade in the exchange.”);
Nasdaq ASA – summary of the final report, Finanstilsynet, The Financial Supervisory Authority of
Norway,
(Jan.
7,
2019),
https://www.finanstilsynet.no/contentassets/bdfdbb366f8648248a75f38545ddfbad/nasdaq-oslo-asa-summary-of-the-final-report-dated-7-january-2019.pdf?mod=article_inline
[https://perma.cc/9PCKY4UV] (noting that Nasdaq’s investigation has been inadequate); Luke Clancy, BIS slams Nasdaq
Clearing for risk management failure, RISK.NET (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.risk.net/riskmanagement/operational-risk/6232391/bis-slams-nasdaq-clearing-for-risk-management-failures
[https://perma.cc/NY5Q-3HJV] (noting that the Bank of International Settlements “issued a stern rebuke
to Nasdaq.”); Bell & Holden, supra note 188 (comparing the Nasdaq failure directly to the Lehman’s
failure).
191. See, e.g., Dan DeFrancesco, Nasdaq default: rivals question direct clearing, RISK.NET
(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.risk.net/risk-management/6046941/nasdaq-default-raises-questions-overdirect-clearing [https://perma.cc/YXM5-9KWK] (citing Terry Duffy, chairman and chief executive at
CME, as noting that CME does not accept individuals as direct clearing members).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Lars Paulsson & Mikael Holter, Phantom Trader Who Blew A Hole in World’s Oldest
Power
Market,
BLOOMBERG
ECONOMICS
(Sept.
17,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-15/phantom-trader-who-blew-a-hole-in-world-soldest-power-market [https://perma.cc/SMP7-66BW].
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Aas and his associates misjudged the positive impact of carbon emission
allowances on German power markets while at the same time failing to
anticipate the negative impact of weather forecasts on Nordic power
markets.198 On Monday, September 10, 2018, when markets opened, the
spread between these power contracts unexpectedly widened significantly
to a level seventeen times larger than normal, forcing Einar Aas into
bankruptcy.199 The market positions taken on by Einar Aas were too big
in relation to the liquidity in the market and Einar Aas was unable to
answer Nasdaq’s calls for additional collateral.200
Nasdaq Clearing tried to manage Einar Aas’ default by cutting his
trades and selling and auctioning off all of his positions, but the
clearinghouse was unable to avoid a loss of €114 million.201 To absorb
this loss, the CCP first exhausted its own default fund of €7 million and
then tapped into a second default fund of €166 million for the remaining
difference of €107 million.202 The second default fund was the mutual
default fund, which was created by contributions of all of the CCP’s nondefaulting clearing members.203 In relying on the mutual default fund,
more than 93% of the losses incurred by the CCP had to be backstopped
by its non-defaulting clearing members, which included some of the
biggest global banks and derivative traders, such as Morgan Stanley,
UBS, Equinor and Norway’s state oil company.204
The Nasdaq Clearing example demonstrates that it is not far-fetched to
assume that the probability of a CCP failure is much higher than
presumed, despite many of the prudential measures implemented at a
global level to prevent such failures. It may be true that Nasdaq Clearing
relied on the standardized portfolio analysis of risk (SPAN) algorithm to
calculate margin, which may be outdated,205 but newer modeling based
198. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 190 (“Aas was betting Nordic and German electricity prices
would converge, but changing weather patterns and a shift in German carbon emissions policies instead
pushed prices further apart.”).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Luke Clancy, Nasdaq slow to share defaulter info with peer CCPs, RISK.NET (Sept.
21, 2018), https://www.risk.net/risk-management/5968671/nasdaq-slow-to-share-defaulter-info-withpeer-ccps [https://perma.cc/B3WS-SRP9].
202. See, e.g., Philip Stafford & David Sheppard, Trader blows €100m hole in Nasdaq’s Nordic
power market, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/43c74e02-b749-11e8-bbc3ccd7de085ffe [https://perma.cc/44EG-TD3D].
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also Luke Clancy, After Nasdaq, cracks appear in foundation of clearing: Default fund
loss triggers debate on risk sharing, auction rules and ‘skin in the game’ CCPs, RISK.NET (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.risk.net/risk-management/6079516/after-nasdaq-cracks-appear-in-foundation-of-clearing
[https://perma.cc/BF2R-JHCV] (Citing the head of clearing at a large US bank as noting that “[i]f you’re
asking general clearing members to step in and backstop your default fund, then you shouldn’t be
disintermediating them by bringing members into your clearing house directly… .”).
205. See, e.g., Jo Burnham, Forget the Headlines: What You Really Should Know About The Nasdaq
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on increased back testing or historic value-at-risk (VAR) calculations
may not be more reliable.206 In fact, in 2018 at least nine systemically
important U.S. banks and U.S. units of foreign banks, which are all
clearing members at major interconnected CCPs, saw larger than
expected trading losses on at least thirty-four days exceeding their own
regulatory value-at-risk (VAR) model estimates by as much as 163%,
with some banks exceeding their model outputs three times in as many
month.207 What this indicates is that the newer VAR modeling used by
these financial institutions may not be accurate and significantly
underestimates the frequency and size of actual trading losses.208 This
further proves that using newer or more updated risk modeling alone may
not be enough to prevent any CCP failures.
V. CASE STUDY
The latest deregulation attempts in the United States may further
increase the likelihood of CCP failures and cascading consequences for
financial markets.209 Not only is industry standardization lagging
Default, OPENGAMMA (Sept. 28, 2018), https://opengamma.com/insights/forget-headlines-really-knownasdaq-default/ [https://perma.cc/N79D-GTUS] (“Like many ETD CCPs, Nasdaq used SPAN as the
margin algorithm for their power markets.”).
206. Id.; see also Pedro Gurrola-Perez, The validation of filtered historical value-at-risk models,
JOURNAL OF RISK MODEL VALIDATION, VOL. 12, NO. 1, 88-112 (Mar. 2018) (“[B]acktesting is a natural
way of testing a percentile forecast, it is not specifically designed to capture other features of the model,
such as its efficiency in adapting to new volatility conditions.”).
207. See, e.g., Alessandro Aimone, At US G Sibs, 11 VAR breaches in 2018, Risk Quantum,
RISK.NET (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.risk.net/risk-quantum/6412711/at-us-g-sibs-11-var-breaches-in2018 [https://perma.cc/8X8V-M836] (State Street reported three days of VAR breaches in the last quarter
of 2018 alone. After exceeding four breaches in a rolling 250-day period banks will be penalized under
U.S. rules.); Allesandro Aimone, Goldman suffers first VAR breach since 2016, Risk Quantum, RISK.NET
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.risk.net/risk-quantum/6403726/goldman-suffers-first-var-breach-since2016 [https://perma.cc/FR5E-7HEH] (the banks largest daily loss to its VAR stood at approximately
149%); see also Louie Woodall, Last orders at the VAR: Inaccurate risk-of-loss estimates threaten to load
extra capital charges on U.S. dealers, RISK.NET (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.risk.net/ourtake/6455876/last-orders-at-the-var [https://perma.cc/ST5P-5HB4] (“When actual losses exceed
modelled estimates, a VAR breach is the result. These are red flags to regulators. Frequent breaches imply
a bank’s VAR model is not fit for purpose.”).
208. See, e.g., Woodall, supra note 207.
209. See, e.g., Steven T. Mnuchin & Craig S. Phillips, A Financial System That Creates Economic
Opportunities: Capital Markets, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, EXECUTIVE ORDER
13772 ON CORE PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATING THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Oct. 2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-System-Capital-MarketsFINAL-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HEY-NY5A] (arguing for international coordination, but also
stressing that American interests must be advanced further); Tiffany Hsu, Treasury Report Calls for
Sweeping
Changes
to
Financial
Rules.
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/business/treasury-financial-rules-dodd-frank.html
[https://perma.cc/4FX5-2GJR]; see also REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ORDERLY
LIQUIDATION
AUTHORITY
AND
BANKRUPTCY
REFORM
2
(Feb.
21,
2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/OLA_REPORT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5UF-
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behind,210 but many recent trends seem to indicate the renewed embrace
of crisis-era products, such as bundled or synthetic CDS contracts.211 The
positions in CDS contracts that were linked to the Lehman and AIG
failures more than doubled in the first seven months of 2017, and trading
volumes are up more than 50% when compared to 2016.212 At the same
time, the total share of outstanding CDS contracts, which are centrally
cleared, jumped from 44% at the end of 2016 to 51% at the end of June
2017.213
This increased overall volume of centrally cleared derivative contracts
may result in additional risk concentration at CCPs214 and further
transform the global collateral landscape for clearing members. Higher
numbers of centrally cleared derivative contracts requires an increase in
posting highly liquid assets for use as collateral, limiting the use of these
assets for other investment purposes or as immediately available capital
buffers during economic downturns.215 The following examples and
trends are meant to underline the increased threat to CCP viability from
various new developments in financial markets.
YLFB] (noting that “[t]he President directed the Treasury to consider whether an improved bankruptcy
process ‘would be a superior method for resolution of financial companies’ as compared to [the Orderly
Liquidation Authority].”); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, Financial Scholars Oppose Eliminating
“Orderly Liquidation Authority” As Crisis-Avoidance Restructuring Backstop 2 (May 23, 2017),
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-economicsstudies/scholars_letter_on_ola_-_final_for_congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VUN-B9ZJ] (arguing that the
repeal of OLA would be dangerous).
210. See, e.g., Joanna Wright, Giancarlo urges EU to protect CCP equivalence deal, RISK.NET
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.risk.net/regulation/5349426/giancarlo-urges-eu-to-protect-ccp-equivalencedeal [https://perma.cc/9SD7-P7TC]; see also J. Christopher Giancarlo, An EU Plan to Invade U.S.
Markets: In response to Brexit, Brussels looks to expand its reach, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-eu-plan-to-invade-u-s-markets-1509907579 [https://perma.cc/8WR5TGAZ] (arguing that overlapping and uncoordinated regulation in the EU and the US would be disruptive,
expensive and detrimental to the U.S. trading markets and economy).
211. See, e.g., Joe Rennison, Investors pour back into crisis-era credit product, FIN. TIMES (Aug.
23,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/c4d815b2-86bc-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787
[https://perma.cc/9UJA-BGP3]; Joe Rennison & Eric Platt, Wall Street banks ride boom in leverage loans
as volumes soar, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/7882045e-bb5d-11e7-9bfb4a9c83ffa852 [https://perma.cc/RFR2-XXAZ] (reporting that Wall Street banks have set new records
underwriting leveraged loans in 2017).
212. Id.; see also Statistical release: OTC derivatives statistics at end-June 2017, BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, at 2-5 (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1711.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F9BL-ZTNV] (noting that the overall notional amount for derivative contracts has risen
by a lower percentage rate compared to 2016 and that the gross market value of outstanding OTC
derivative contracts is at its lowest level since 2007) [hereinafter BIS end-June 2017 Statistical release].
213. BIS end-June 2017 Statistical release, supra note 212, at 5.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n (ISDA), Research Study: ISDA Margin Survey
2017, at 8 (Sept. 2017), https://www.isda.org/a/VeiDE/margin-survey-final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L8P7JMJ] (noting that initial margin for cleared derivatives reached $173.4 billion as of March 3, 2017,
including an increase of 13.7% for CDS between the third quarter of 2015 and the first quarter of 2017,
from $28.4 billion to $32.3 billion).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

31

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2

428

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

A. Exchange Traded Funds and Exchange Traded Notes
Various new financial products and investment vehicles, such as
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs),
which are backed by derivatives, may pose a particular danger to CCPs.216
ETFs and ETNs are traded on major exchanges, including the New
York Stock exchange, and may both be defined as marketable securities,
which base their performance on an index or a specific class of assets.
ETFs primarily track shares of stock, commodities, bonds, or foreign
currencies, but may also be based on leveraged loans and CLOs.217
ETNs, on the other hand, are unsecured debt instruments dependent on
the credit ratings of the issuer.218
Exchange Traded Funds hold assets in excess of $4 trillion globally
and are predicted to reach $6 trillion in assets by 2020.219 Yet, no
jurisdiction has a specific set of regulations for ETFs. Rather, ETFs are
governed by a patchwork of stock exchange rules and securities
regulations.220 In addition, there is significant disagreement over whether
216. See, e.g., Jennifer Thompson, Regulators descend on booming ETF market, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
9, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d24fc1d6-60a1-11e7-8814-0ac7eb84e5f1 [https://perma.cc/RFP6FN39] (reporting that mid-year 2017 ETFs accounted for more than $4Tn in assets compared to $580bn
in 2006 and that ownership and pricing information is not easily available). The main problem for
transparency and the determination of risk exposure linked to ETFs is the fact that there is no specific set
of regulations for ETFs; various securities regulations and exchange rules apply to ETFs. See also Peter
Smith, Vanguard chief dismisses ETF bubble fears, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/691e2a14-8f35-11e7-a352-e46f43c5825d
[https://perma.cc/8P36-W2XS]
(Mr. McNabb is quoted as noting that he doesn’t “think what is happening in ETFs is systemic.”).
217. See supra Part I; see also Press Release, Highland Capital Management Announces Launch of
CAPITAL
(Jun.
11,
2018),
Dedicated
CLO
UCITS
Fund,
HIGHLAND
https://www.highlandcapital.com/highland-capital-management-announces-launch-of-dedicated-cloucits-fund/ [https://perma.cc/J37C-SAQC] (noting that CLOs offer yields that often exceed similar rated
credit instruments, which is due in part to their complexity).
218. See infra note 226.
219. See, e.g., Central Bank of Ireland Press Release, Exchange Traded Funds – Central Bank
BANK
OF
IRELAND
(May
15,
2017),
Publishes
Discussion
Paper,
CENTRAL
https://www.centralbank.ie/news-media/press-releases/exchange-traded-funds-discussion-paper
[https://perma.cc/2ERA-XQFC]; see also Exchange Traded Funds, CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND 7 (May
15, 2017), https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/publications/discussion-papers/discussionpaper-6/discussion-paper-6---exchange-traded-funds.pdf?sfvrsn=6
[https://perma.cc/H2K3-ZJMR].
While the U.S. makes up more than ¾ of the market, $358bn of assets in ETFs are registered in Ireland.
See, e.g., Jennifer Thompson, Regulators descend on booming ETF market, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/d24fc1d6-60a1-11e7-8814-0ac7eb84e5f1 [https://perma.cc/D6SD-F7H6]. In
the final weeks of 2019, the global net ETF inflows reached $570.5 billion, which is up by 10.6 percent
when compared to 2018. New business for BlackRock’s iShare ETFs rose by 8.2 percent to $180.2 billion
and ETF inflows for Vanguard increased by a total of 28 percent to $118.8 billion. See, e.g., Chris Flood,
ETF providers end 2019 on high with record assets, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/0b04a590-0fcc-4a2f-8453-cf753aa847a9.
220. ETFs are required to comply with all of the disclosure mandates in the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. If an ETF is organized, it must further comply with the
Investment Company act of 1940. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & John Morely, A Regulatory Framework for
Exchange-Traded Funds, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 844 (2018) (arguing that current regulation has a
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ETFs should be regulated as investment advisers or should be considered
an asset class in and of itself.221
Regulators do not understand the structure of ETFs well enough in
order to appropriately assess the risk involved with these products.222 In
addition, similarly to the role of derivatives during the Great Recession,
ETFs may trigger another systemic event due to their lack of
transparency.
For example, during the first half of 2017, U.S. domiciled ETFs had a
net inflow of over $240 billion, yet during the same period of time 36
ETFs were forced to close.223 The number of closures accelerated further
in 2018.224 As of April 2018, 70 EFTs had been closed since the
beginning of the year, an increase of almost 50% compared to 2017.225
This alone may not necessarily cause reason for concern, but what this
trend demonstrates is that the opening and closing of these funds seem
erratic and unpredictable and may possibly impact the overall volatility
of financial markets.226
“cubbyhole” problem, squeezing ETFs into a regulatory framework the is not sufficient is intended for
older, very different financial products); see also Carolina Wilson and Sarah Ponczek, ETF Rule Is On
The SEC’s Front Burner, or So Wall Street Hopes, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-08/etf-rule-is-on-the-sec-s-front-burner-or-so-wallstreet-hopes (arguing that the SEC “appears on track to remove hurdles for exchange-traded funds getting
to market”). Please note, effective December 23, 2019, the SEC adopted new rules to regulate ETFs.
Exchange Traded Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 33646, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
(Sep.
25,
2019)
(“Rule
6c-11
Adopting
Release”),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/33-10695.pdf. Also, on September 25, 2019, the SEC granted a
conditional exemption from certain Exchange Act rules to further reduce regulatory complexity for ETFs.
Order Granting A Conditional Exemption From Exchange Act Section 11(d)(1) and Exchange Act Rules
10b-10, 15C1-5, 15C-6, And 14E-5 For Certain Exchange Traded Funds, Release No. 34-87110,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept, 25, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/2019/3487110.pdf; see also, Chris Flood, US regulator overhauls requirements for launching ETFs, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/97b07b9a-e06c-11e9-b112-9624ec9edc59 (noting that the
reform is “intended to encourage more[ETF] providers to enter the fast-growing sector” and to “[sweep]
away a cumbersome approval process.”).
221. See, e.g., CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND, Exchange Traded Funds, supra note 219, at 9;
Principles for the Regulation of Exchange Traded Funds, BOARD OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
OF
SECURITIES
COMMISSIONS
(June
2013),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD414.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJA8-HN4Q]; see also
Gerrard Cowan, Just as in U.S., Europe Debates How to Regulate ETFs: Global regulators need to
develop ‘a common language of risk,’ WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/just-asin-u-s-europe-debates-how-to-regulate-etfs-1509937500 [https://perma.cc/CS4Z-H6CS].
222. See, e.g., Hu & Morely, supra note 220, at 863-865.
223. See, e.g., Elisabeth Kashner, Staying out of the ETF Graveyard, INSIGHT (Jun. 21, 2017),
https://insight.factset.com/staying-out-of-the-etf-graveyard [https://perma.cc/RXP7-BHGA]. For an
updated list of ETF closures, see Heather Bell, ETF Closures, ETF.COM (Apr. 17, 2018),
http://www.etf.com/etf-watch-tables/etf-closures?nopaging=1 [https://perma.cc/LA7Z-47W2].
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.; see also Robin Wigglesworth, How a volatility virus infected Wall Street, FIN. TIMES (Apr.
11,
2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/be68aac6-3d13-11e8-b9f9-de94fa33a81e
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Even more concerning is that less than 1% of ETFs receive more than
half of all investments, resulting in a significant concentration of risk.227
The funds receiving most of the money are also the industry’s oldest ETFs
that have been listed and traded for the longest time. One good example
is the iShares ETF fund series by BlackRock, which took in more than
$70 billion in investments during the second quarter of 2017 alone.228
While investments in more established funds might generally be
considered a good outcome, regulators do not treat new and old ETFs
equally.229
Specifically, ETFs approved and listed for the longest time are not
exposed to the same level of regulatory scrutiny as newer ETFs230 and are
not limited to increase their exposure to derivatives.231 The exponential
growth of ETFs as well as their increasing exposure to derivatives may
therefore transfer even more systemic risk to CCPs.
It may also be noteworthy that some ETFs232 and other similar funds233
[https://perma.cc/Y9U3-3ZSQ] (describing the inherent volatility of ETNs using the collapse of XIV on
February 2, 2018 as an example: “The US stock market suffered one of the swiftest 10 per cent slumps in
history, and global equities lost $4.2tn that week. In terms of dollars, that is more than the total losses
suffered by the Nasdaq index when the dotcom bubble burst.”).
227. See, e.g., Ryan Vlastelica, Less than 1% of ETFs getting half of all inflows in 2017,
MARKETWATCH (July 20, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/less-than-1-of-etfs-getting-halfof-all-inflows-in-2017-2017-07-19 [https://perma.cc/HFP3-2EWU].
228. Id.; see also Sarah Krouse, Blackrock’s earnings rise but fall short of views, MARKETWATCH
(July 17, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/blackrocks-earnings-rise-but-fall-short-of-views2017-07-17-124852329 [https://perma.cc/S7VU-KW2J].
229. See, e.g., Hu & Morely, supra note 220, at 885 (arguing that the inconsistency between old
and new funds “is made worse by a quirk of law that allows old advisers not only to continue operating
old funds under old regulatory policies, but also to create new funds under old regulatory policies.”).
230. See, e.g., BATS Global Markets, Inc., Re: Request for Comment on Exchange Traded
Products 2
(Jan.
14,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-15/s71115-40.pdf
[https://perma.cc/64WY-PC7V] (arguing that “inconsistent standards and treatment result in a
competitive disadvantage to both issuers and exchanges as it relates to previously approved ETFs that are
already listed and traded on another exchange because, in almost all instances, such previously approved
ETFs were not subject to the same level of standards or restriction applied by Commission staff to the
newer ETF, restricting the ETFs ability to compete with nearly identical ETFs already in the market.”).
231. See, e.g., Norm Cham, Director, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to
the ALI CLE 2012 Conference on Investment Adviser Regulation: Legal and Compliance Forum on
Institutional Advisory Services (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012spch120612nchtm [https://perma.cc/S5FP-SQM5] (noting that “[a]lthough the Division continues its
ongoing review of the use of derivatives by funds, Division staff will no longer defer consideration of
exemptive requests under the Investment Company Act relating to actively-managed ETFs that make use
of derivatives”); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Staff Evaluating the Use of
Derivatives by Funds (March 25, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-45.htm
[https://perma.cc/M7YP-KNTM].
232. See,
e.g.,
Business
Development
Company
ETFs,
ETFDB.COM,
https://etfdb.com/etfs/industry/business-development-company/
[https://perma.cc/K67Y-TPKY]
(“Business Development Company ETFs invest in business development companies (BDCs), which are
involved in helping grow small companies in the initial stages of their development.”).
233. Similar funds are closed-end-funds (CEFs), which trade shares on exchanges, but are not
considered an ETF per se. An example of a CEF that invest in direct lending is the Stone Ridge Alternative
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base some of their performance on mid-market lending indexes or
investments.234 Mid-market lending, or so-called private debt financing,
typically does not involve banks and is facilitated by specialized lenders,
insurance companies, or so-called business development companies
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA).235 Most of these
lenders are also often referred to as shadow banks, which are defined as
non-bank financial intermediaries that provide services similar to banks,
but outside of any regulatory oversight.236
The U.S. market in private debt, which provides about 4% of U.S.
corporate debt financing and is largely unsecured or based on subordinate
debt,237 has more than doubled in size since 2010, reaching nearly
$1trillion in 2018.238 Due to the lack of regulatory oversight and the

Lending
Risk
Premium
Fund,
LENDEX:US.
Prospectus,
STONE RIDGE
(2019),
https://www.stoneridgefunds.com/documents/LENDX_prospectus.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZKQ-RZAX].
234. See, e.g., Stephen L. Nesbitt, The Investment Opportunity in U.S. Middle Market Direct
Lending, The JOURNAL OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, VOL. 20(1), 92-99 (Summer 2017) (“Direct
lending to U.S. middle market companies is drawing increasing interest and capital from investors seeking
high current yield and price stability”); see also Larry Swedroe, Private Credit Performance, ETF.COM
(Nov.
21,
2018),
https://www.etf.com/sections/index-investor-corner/swedroe-private-creditperformance?nopaging=1 [https://perma.cc/CC6N-RF28] (“The increase of both supply and demand for
private credit has resulted in substantial growth in assets under management.”).
235. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-54 (1996); see also Nesbitt, supra note 234, at 92 (“Direct lending generally
covers loans made to U.S. middle market companies without the traditional intermediary role of a bank
or broker.”).
236. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve, Speech At the Russell Sage
Foundation and The Century Foundation Conference on "Rethinking Finance": Some Reflections on the
Crisis
and
the
Policy
Response
(Apr.
13,
2012),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm [https://perma.cc/2QNYZ9XV] (“Shadow banking, as usually defined, comprises a diverse set of institutions and markets that,
collectively, carry out traditional banking functions--but do so outside, or in ways only loosely linked to,
the traditional system of regulated depository institutions. Examples of important components of the
shadow banking system include securitization vehicles, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits,
money market mutual funds, markets for repurchase agreements (repos), investment banks, and mortgage
companies. Before the crisis, the shadow banking system had come to play a major role in global
finance.”).
237. See, e.g., Swedroe, supra note 234.
238. The exact numbers of middle market lending differ somewhat between approximately $700
and $909 billion, which is due to the lack of comprehensive third-party data. See, e.g., Robin
Wigglesworth, Non-bank lenders thrive in the shadows, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3. 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/4610e820-1b09-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21 [https://perma.cc/M78B-6EPY]
(referencing a volume of $700 billion based on Bank of America data). For a higher market size of
outstanding loans, see Opportunities in Global Direct Lending: A Historical and Prospective View of the
U.S.
and
European
Markets,
ARES
MGMT.
LP
11-12
(Apr.
2018),
https://www.aresmgmt.com/media/458997/2018-Direct-Lending-White-Paper_vF-3-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DA9P-SLYV] (estimating the market size in 2017 at $909 billion); see also Sally
Bakewell & Christopher Cannon, Investors Are Pilling Into Loans That Banks Have Avoided Since The
Crash, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-private-credit-yields/
[https://perma.cc/4V8C-YUWZ] (“It’s private credit, and it has transformed the oldest game in banking:
loans. In the decade since the crisis, investors have poured vast sums of money at companies that are
generally too small or too risky for sober bankers.”).
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private club like nature of middle market lending only very little is known
about the overall size and risk profile of these markets.239 With the
massive inflows of money into private debt and mid-market lending,
numerous other factors may significantly increase raise corporate default
risks.240 For example, the economic outlook for 2020 remains
unpredictable as the U.S. Federal Reserve has heavily intervened in repo
markets in 2019.241 Moreover, a global liquidity trap with the potential of
undermining the ability to effectively manage economic swings through
monetary policy is looming242 and unpredicted interest rate adjustments
by the U.S. Federal Reserve may also still be possible.243 If any creditdefault-swap protection has been sold to hedge against these risks, the
long-term viability of CCPs may further be threatened by these defaults.

239. See, e.g., Shawn Munday, Wendy Hy, Tobias True & Jian Zhang, Performance of Private
Credit Funds: A First Look, THE JOURNAL OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, VOL. 21 (2), 31, 38-41 (Fall
2018) (analyzing 476 different private credit funds.); see also Jean Eaglesham & Coulter Jones, The Fuel
Powering Corporate America: $2.4 Trillion in Private Fundraising, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/stock-and-bond-markets-dethroned-private-fundraising-is-now-dominant1522683249 [https://perma.cc/SX4K-ATYQ].
240. See, e.g., Richard J. Shinder, Commentary: The coming crackdown in middle market corporate
credit,
PENSIONS
&
INVESTMENTS
(Nov.
20,
2018),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20181120/ONLINE/181129999/commentary-the-coming-crackup-inmiddle-market-corporate-credit [https://perma.cc/5KSU-3C2R] (“Nobody can be certain when the next
financial crisis will hit. What seems increasingly likely is that middle-market credit will be in its crosshairs
when it does.”); see also Robin Wigglesworth, Non-bank lenders thrive in the shadows, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
3.
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/4610e820-1b09-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21
[https://perma.cc/S3U6-BZN9] (quoting the head of a credit hedge fund as noting: “It puzzles me, . . .
[t]hey are lending to complete sh[**] at a spread of 100-150 basis points above yield.”).
241. See, e.g., Colby Smith & Joe Rennison, Grim repo: how the Fed plans to return crucial market
to normal, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/8ffb6f9a-2be9-11ea-a12699756bd8f45e [https://perma.cc/2ATE-LJWN] (noting that “[b]y injecting tens of billions of dollars into
the financial system [since the end of 2019], in form of daily and longer-term repo loans and outright
purchases of Treasury bills, the Fed ensured there was enough cash swilling around to prevent market
rates from spiking higher.").
242. See, e.g., Lionel Barber & Chris Giles, Central banks running low on ways to fight recession,
warns Mark Carney, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/713a70b4-315d-11ea-a3290bcf87a328f2 [https://perma.cc/N9X4-LX96] (quoting Mark Carney the Governor of the Bank of England
noting that “[i]f there were to be a deeper downturn, [that requires] more stimulus than a conventional
recession, then it’s not clear that monetary policy would have sufficient space.”).
243. See, e.g., Heather Long, Federal Reserve predicts on interest rate cuts in 2020, ignoring
Trump’s
calls
to
boost
the
economy,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
11,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/12/11/federal-reserve-predicts-no-interest-rate-cutsignoring-trumps-calls-boost-economy/ [https://perma.cc/YZ6E-YE9Q] (“Powell left the door open to
changing interest rates in 2020, but he stressed there is a high bar for moving rates up or down.”); see also
Jeff Cox, The new-look Fed seems committed to low rates, but will face challenges if one thing changes,
CNBC.COM (Jan. 3. 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/03/fed-committed-to-low-rates-but-faceschallenges-if-inflation-changes.html [https://perma.cc/AQ3H-UVJ8] (noting that “[s]hould economic
growth and inflation in particular pick up, the Fed very well could have to tighten [interest rates]...”).
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B. Unconventional Credit Events
Another example of risk exposure for CCPs is unconventional or socalled narrowly tailored credit events (NTCEs).
These events are
artificially created defaults, which are intended to be triggered
intentionally by market participants in order to benefit themselves.244
In a recent case,245 the U.S. homebuilder Hovnanian agreed to
intentionally default on some of its existing debt obligations in order to
secure more favorable refinancing terms from Blackrock.246 At no time
was Hovnanian in financial distress or unable to service its debt.247
In anticipation of the proposed debt refinancing between Hovnanian
and Blackrock, Blackrock bought over $300 million in CDS protection
referencing Hovnanian and betting that the homebuilder would default.248
Of course, Blackrock knew that if Hovnanian would accept the proposed
refinancing agreement that the homebuilder would be required to default
on the referenced debt. Blackrock’s goal of creating this unconventional
credit event and forcing Hovnanian to intentionally default was to directly
benefit the hedge fund and to offset the cost of granting Hovnanian more
favorable repayment terms.249 Because Blackrock was a CDS protection
buyer on Hovnanian’s debt obligations, the hedge fund was entitled to
receive payments on its CDS contracts after Hovnanian’s artificially
created default.250
Creating unconventional credit events challenge some basic
fundamentals of derivative markets, such as the assumption that CDS
issuers do not intentionally default on their debt obligations.251 The fact
244. Fabien Carruzzo, Stephen Zide, & Daniel King, iHeart, and Other Unconventional CDS Credit
Events, WESTLAW (May 17, 2017), https://www.kramerlevin.com/images/content/2/5/v4/2551/iHeart20and-20Other-20Unconventional-20CDS-20Credit-20Events.pdf [https://perma.cc/929B-JNZ3].
245. Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt. LP. v. GSO Capital Partners L.P., No. 18-CV-00232-LTS-BCM, 2018
WL 620490, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 29, 2018).
246. Id. at *2-10.
247. Id.
248. Id. (noting that as part of the agreement Hovnanian was barred from making 2018 interest
payments in the amount of $1.04 million resulting in a failure-to-pay credit event determination by the
ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committee); see, e.g., Joe Rennison, Blackrock-led debt sparks
outcry, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018) https://www.ft.com/content/69194bda-f5af-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00
[https://perma.cc/G5MQ-R8KH]; Helen Bartholomew, Fixing CDSs: lots of patches, no magic wand,
RISK.NET (Apr. 20, 2018) https://www.risk.net/derivatives/5532846/fixing-cdss-lots-of-patches-nomagic-wand [https://perma.cc/ZRS5-BW2E]; see also Andrew Scurria, Home Builder Accused of Default
Swap Scheme With Blackrock Unit, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/homebuilder-accused-of-default-swap-scheme-with-blackstone-unit-1512168887
[https://perma.cc/93SBNPHU].
249. E.g., Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt., 2018 WL 620490, at *4 (the court summarized that the purpose
was to “maximize recovery for [Blackrock] under an CDS failure to pay Credit Event…”).
250. See Bartholomew, supra note 248 (“[T]he two firms had found a way to burn down an empty
house and split the payout.”).
251. See, e.g., Declaration of Robert Pickel in Support, Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt. LP. v. GSO Capital
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that issuers do so may impact the overall value of CDS contracts and their
respective risk profiles. CDS protection may become uneconomical and
prove too expensive for protection buyers. In the future, we may also see
an increasing number of technical defaults in order to secure favorable
refinancing or debt restructuring. During periods of economic downturn,
these unconventional defaults may occur in addition to true defaults
potentially overburdening CCP risk protection systems.252
Courts generally seem unsympathetic to disputes related to these
complex transactions and are hesitant to unscramble them, unless
damages are more than economic in nature.253 Courts also consider any
potential harm to the public as limited and view CDS traders and brokers
as a relatively insular and sophisticated subset of the public.254 In
addition, CDS market participants are further viewed as being able to
easily address the risk of unconventional credit events by amending their
contractual obligations.255
What this view does not sufficiently take into account is what impact
the behavior of a sophisticated subset of the public may have on the
greater public and specifically if this behavior results in the failure of one
or more CCPs.256 In fact, rather than eliminating moral hazard, this view
may once again foster an environment in which a certain group of
investors and financial companies simply expects a public bailout, which
in turn undermines the credibility of CDS markets.
In early 2018, the CFTC has called for action and threatened to
investigate any manufactured defaults unless the financial industry comes

Partners L.P., Hovnanian Enter., Inc. et al., No. 18-CV-00232-LTS-BCM, Docket Entry No. 9, ¶5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2018) (arguing that “[t]here is an underlying assumption in CDS trades that the
companies (“reference entities”) that issue the debt securities referenced in CDS trades will endeavor
whenever financially possible to make good on their obligations and avoid payment defaults.”).
252. The argument that many of the CDS contracts involved may only be bilateral or single named
and not centrally cleared contracts misses the point that the described behavior impacts the fundamentals
of all derivative markets including those of standardized CDS contracts. In addition, single-name
contracts cleared with CCPs for 44% of outstanding notionals at the end of 2017. See, e.g., Louie Woodall,
CDS market structure reformed – BIS, RISK.NET (Jun. 6, 2018), https://www.risk.net/riskquantum/5670786/cds-market-structure-transformed-bis [https://perma.cc/8V6F-8KQN]; see also Bank
of International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review: International banking and financial market
developments 6 (June 2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1806.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD8CUYHU] (noting that “[a]t end-December 2017, the share of all single-name contracts (in terms of notional
amounts) cleared with CCPs stood at 44%, compared with 65% for multi-name contracts.”).
253. See, e.g., Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt., 2018 WL 620490, at *4 (the court notes “that any
proliferation of engineered defaults that did occur could likely be mitigated by the actions on the part of
ISDA.”).
254. Id. at *6.
255. Id. at *14-15.
256. See, e.g., Davide Scigliuzzo, CFTC steps into debate on voluntary defaults, REUTERS (Apr.
27,
2018)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cftc/cftc-steps-into-debate-on-voluntary-defaultsidUSKBN1HY2FY [https://perma.cc/5JA9-ZQQL].
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up with an appropriate fix to prevent these events.257 After a year-long
consultation,258 the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA)259 responded and introduced a new causation test to determine
when a failure-to-pay event shall trigger payouts on credit events.260 The
new test requires that any such event must result from deterioration in
creditworthiness or financial condition.261 Rather than introducing a rulebased approach, this test provides for discretion and introduces an element
of subjectivity.262 While the goal of the new causation test seems to be to
prevent gaming the test,263 only time will tell whether this test is workable
or effective.264 As described below, the latter is particularly questionable
in light of the indecisiveness of the ISDA’s Determinations Committees’
decision making, which appears to favor a more rule-based and bright line
257. See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Statement on Manufactured Credit
Events (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/divisionsstatement042418
[https://perma.cc/7WTP-UJKV] (“Market participants and their advisors are advised that in instances of
manufactured credit events, the Divisions will carefully consider all available actions to help ensure
market integrity and combat manipulation or fraud involving CDS, in coordination with our regulatory
counterparts, when appropriate.”); see also Kris Devasabai & Helen Bartholomew, CTFC probes CDS
market
under
last
enforcement
head,
RISK.NET
(May
8,
2018),
https://www.risk.net/derivatives/5576906/cftc-probed-cds-market-under-last-enforcement-head
[https://perma.cc/LZ9M-JUJU] (“The former head of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s
division of enforcement [Aitan Goelman] has backed the agency’s efforts to clamp down on
‘manufactured’ credit default swap payouts, in which a market participant strikes an agreement with the
reference entity, helping both firms but potentially hurting other CDS users.”).
258. See, e.g., ISDA Board Statement on Narrowly Tailored Credit Events, Int’l Swaps and
Derivatives Ass’n (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.isda.org/a/6UmEE/ISDA-Board-Statement-onNarrowly-Tailored-Credit-Events.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM4W-9S8B] (“We have . . . instructed the ISDA
staff, as part of its ongoing dialogue with the market, to consult with market participants and advise the
Board on whether further amendments to the ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions should be considered”);
see also Bartholomew, supra note 248 (quoting Robert Pickel, former ISDA chief executive, as noting
that “A lot of the possible fixes are just band-aids and don’t go to the fundamental issue of whether this
is an appropriate use of credit derivatives”).
259. See also infra Section V.C.
260. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions Relating to
Narrowly Tailored Credit Events, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, 2 (March 6, 2019),
https://www.isda.org/a/nyKME/20190306-NTCE-consultation-doc-complete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6CB2-PZ6G] (“The definition of the Failure to Pay Credit Event (Section 4.5 of the
Definitions) will be amended to add a requirement that the relevant payment failure result from or in a
deterioration in creditworthiness or financial condition of the Reference Entity. This requirement would
apply to corporate and financial Reference Entities but would not apply to sovereign Reference Entities.”).
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Helen Bartholomew, Isda proposes fix for ‘manufactured defaults,’ RISK.NET (Mar.
6,
2019),
https://www.risk.net/derivatives/6451091/isda-proposes-fix-for-manufactured-defaults
[https://perma.cc/XA26-UF3G] (quoting Mark New, special counsel at ISDA of the Americas, as noting
the test will inject an element of subjectivity in the determinations process, which is viewed preferable to
a rules-based, tick-box approach that could be more easily gamed).
263. Id.
264. Id. (Noting that “[u]sing the same test for failure-to-pay events is not without risks. Isda’s
determination committee has generally favoured rules-based, ‘bright line” tests, which provide legal
certainty.”).
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test.265
C. ISDA Determinations Committee Refusals
The indecisiveness or inability of specially established decisionmaking bodies to declare whether a credit event has occurred may also
result in significant market uncertainties and increase risk for CCPs.266
Derivative contracts often outsource the determination of credit or default
triggering events to special decision-making bodies that may be created
by various trade associations.
The most prominent examples of such decision-making bodies are the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Determinations
Committees. Without a doubt, the ISDA is the most important trade
organization of participants in derivative markets globally.267 The
organization has more than 850 members in over 60 different countries.268
ISDA is not uncontroversial and, among other activities, dominates
markets through the use of the ISDA Master Agreement, which is a
standardized contract used almost exclusively for every derivative
transaction around the world.269 After the financial crisis, ISDA
established so-called determinations committees, which are tasked to
judge when a company is in default on their CDS contracts.270
The ISDA Determinations Committees were established in direct
response to Lehman’s failure and are meant to prevent any additional
confusion in financial markets by avoiding long, drawn-out litigation.271
Made up of representatives of banks and investors, and with a view of

265. Id.
266. See, e.g., Philip Stafford, ICE drops out of Isda credit-derivatives committee role, FIN. TIMES
(Oct.
6,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/c695222f-7d10-3288-a5fd-be4858105a52
[https://perma.cc/7UTN-LXJ4] (describing the uncertainty created by the Isda committee’s decision about
Nobel Inc.’s possible default).
267. See, e.g., John Biggins and Colin Scott, Private Governance, Public Implications, and the
Tightrope of Regulatory Reform: The ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committee 7 (Comparative
Research
in
Law
and
Political
Econ,
Research
Paper
No.
57/2013,
2013)
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsr
edir=1&article=1299&context=clpe [https://perma.cc/ML3U-CNGG].
268. See, e.g., About ISDA, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, https://www.isda.org/aboutisda/ [https://perma.cc/XG2Y-2QBX]; ISDA Members, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N,
https://www2.isda.org/membership/members-list/ [https://perma.cc/84GZ-86BK].
269. See, e.g., CASTAGNINO, supra note 45 at 187-190; see also, PARKER, supra note 41, at 14-18.
270. See, e.g., Robert Smith and David Shepard, Noble Group Ltd: World biggest banks square off
over Noble credit default swaps, FIN. TIMES, (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/1e20366e89b9-11e7-8bb1-5ba57d47eff7 [https://perma.cc/F56B-S2K5].
271. See, e.g., Stafford & Sheppard, supra note 188; see also Lianting Tu, Noble Default-Swap
(Sept.
5,
2017),
Verdict
in
Play
as
Test
of
ISDA
System,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-05/noble-group-default-swap-verdict-in-play-astest-of-isda-system [https://perma.cc/GUG4-ZHNA].
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eliminating bilateral settlements, the creation of these committees was
thought to address the legal and economic basis risk in CDS markets.272
The committees were developed with the additional goal of facilitating
central clearing and directly addressing any related concerns about
operational complexity.273
Yet, in late 2017, the ISDA Determinations Committee repeatedly
refused to decide the question of whether Noble Group Ltd. defaulted on
its debt in June of 2017 and eventually dismissed the question.274 In
addition, the Determinations Committee also suspended any payments on
Noble’s debt pending further evaluation of the credit event.275
After a huge accounting scandal, Noble Group Ltd., the largest
independent commodity trader in Asia, continued to be in serious
financial trouble. In June of 2017, Noble arranged for a 120-day
repayment extension on a loan facility.276 Many derivative traders
272. See, e.g., Biggins & Scott, supra note 267, at 17-20.
273. See, e.g., INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, THE ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES
DETERMINATIONS COMMITTEES 5, ¶3.1 (Noting that “[b]efore the establishment of the DCs in 2009, the
CDS markets managed Credit Event settlement using physical settlement, cash settlement and eventually
voluntary auction protocols. (a) To facilitate central clearing and to address concerns regarding increasing
operational complexity and economic risks associated with bilateral dispute resolution and traditional cash
or physical settlement, market participants and ISDA began to develop a third type of settlement for CDS
contracts – Auction Settlement.”).
274. See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, Determinations Committee Decision: Has a
Restructuring Credit Event occurred with respect to Noble Group Limited? 2 (Jun. 22, 2017),
https://www.cdsdeterminationscommittees.org/documents/2017/06/aej-decision-06222017-noble-grouplimited.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEC8-D5L9] (Timeline for determination extended); INT’L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS’N , Has a Restructuring Credit Event occurred with respect to Noble Group Limited?
(Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.cdsdeterminationscommittees.org/documents/2017/08/dc-decision08092017-noble-group-limited.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V8E-ANTA] (dismissal); INT’L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, Asia-Ex Japan Determinations Committee Statement (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.cdsdeterminationscommittees.org/documents/2017/08/aej-dc-statement-08102017noble.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7PS-VYAA] (“[T]he dismissal of a [Determinations Committee] Question
will not constitute a [Determinations Committee] Resolution with respect to whether or not the matter
referenced in such DC Question”); but see Scott O’Malia, ISDA Chief Executive Officer, Some Thoughts
on
Noble
(Aug.
30,
2017),
https://www.isda.org/2017/08/30/some-thoughts-on-noble/
[https://perma.cc/3XSD-HP5W] (“[T]he [Determinations Committee] felt it did not have sufficient
information to determine the [Determinations Committee] question one way or the other, because it was
not able to get hold of the underlying loan documentation and details of the guarantee.”).
275. See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, Asia-Ex Japan Determinations Committee Statement
(Aug. 30, 2017), at https://www.cdsdeterminationscommittees.org/documents/2017/08/noble-aej-dcstatement-30082017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W2Z-952V] (“The [Determinations Committee] met on 29
August 2017 and again on 30 August 2017 to consider the New Noble [Determinations Committee]
Questions and the DC Resolved that the Settlement Suspension provisions of Section 10.1 of the 2014
Definitions and Section 6.5 of the Updated 2003 Definitions currently apply pending Resolution by the
DC of the New Noble DC Questions.”); see also Robert Smith, ISDA freezes attempts to settle Noble
CDS, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/80378f9a-0ad4-3dc0-9deb-ac6bf50130f7
[https://perma.cc/K39N-TF74] (“The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) committee
tasked with making a ruling on the tussle over Noble Group’s credit-default swaps has suspended any
attempts to settle the derivatives contracts bilaterally.”).
276. See, e.g., Finbarr Bermingham, Struggling Noble Group secures debt extension relief, GLOBAL
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interpreted the 120-day extension as a potential default by Noble, which
should have immediately triggered approximately $160 million in
payments on various CDS protection contracts.277 JP Morgan Chase &
Company and BNP Paribas SA, among others, asked the ISDA
Determinations Committee to consider whether a credit event has
occurred with regard to Noble.278
The ISDA Determinations Committee’s repeated refusal to make a
determination-decision and the subsequent suspension of any payouts on
Noble’s debt created a new level of uncertainty in CDS markets. This
uncertainty drew into question many of the reforms in derivative markets
that followed the Great Recession.
As of the writing of this article, the ISDA Determinations Committee
has decided, that Noble is in default.279 However, without a consistent
and transparent settlement framework, uncertainty in CDS markets may
continue and once again raise prospects of drawn out litigation. The
failure of the Determinations Committee may further reintroduce the very
operational and economic risk it was meant to address and push an even
higher number of derivative transactions into central clearing.
This is because CCPs generally have broader discretion and more
flexibility to declare default when compared to the ISDA Determinations
Committee or bilateral trades.
As an intermediary between
counterparties, CCPs are able to offset losing positions much more
quickly and significantly reduce the potential of drawn out legal
challenges. This advantage may increase the volume of centrally cleared
CDS contracts to a much larger extend then seen before and particularly
if uncertainty in bilateral markets returns to pre-2009 levels due to
ineffective default determinations.
Declarations or the lack of declarations of default by the ISDA
Determinations Committee may also conflict with default determinations
made by CCPs at the same time. For example, CDS contracts written on
the same reference entity, such as those by Noble Group Ltd, may be
available as bilateral and centrally cleared contracts. What impact will
determinations of the ISDA Committee have on the declaration of default
by a CCP?
TRADE REVIEW (Jun. 20, 2017), https://www.gtreview.com/news/asia/struggling-trader-noble-securesdebt-extension-relief/ [https://perma.cc/E3UC-LCUT].
277. See, e.g., Anjani Trivedi, Another Noble Mess – This Time, It’s Derivatives, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/another-noble-messthis-time-its-derivatives-1504000314
[https://perma.cc/Z86G-4J88]; see also Smith & Shepard, supra note 229.
278. See, e.g., Smith & Shepard, supra note 270.
279. See, e.g., INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, Asia-Ex Japan Determinations Committee
Statement (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.cdsdeterminationscommittees.org/documents/2017/09/aej-dcstatement-09192017-noble-limited-group.pdf [perma.cc/9CH4-A3TK] (decision that default may be
triggered, but only if supported by proper documentation).
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D. Non-Default Factors
In addition to some of the explicit default factors mentioned, there are
also many non-default factors that may have the potential to significantly
impact the risk of default for many CCPs or their clearing members.
While non-default factors are not the focus of this article, it may be
helpful to provide at least a few examples of some of these factors.
Investment losses, operational risk events, legal and regulatory risks,
the failure of a custodian, or the failure of a settlement platform may be
some of the most obvious examples for non-default losses.280 At the same
time, our current global political climate, which is at least partially
responsible for the Brexit vote in the UK,281 may be an even more
consequential non-default event.
Other examples of non-default factors are international sanctions282 and
280. See, e.g., Carla Stamegna, Recovery and resolution of central counterparties (CCPs), EUR.
PARLIAMENTARY
RESEARCH
SERV.
(EPRS)
3
(Mar.
29,
2017),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599345/EPRS_BRI%282017%29599345_E
N.pdf, [https://perma.cc/T848-HM5V] (noting that “CCPs may also incur losses that depend on other
factors (‘non-default losses’), such as investment losses operational risk events, legal risks, or failure of a
custodian […] or settlement platform.”).
281. See, Brian Caplen, May’s bad Brexit for banks, THEBANKER (July 24, 2018),
http://www.thebanker.com/Editor-s-Blog/May-s-bad-Brexit-for-banks
[https://perma.cc/9JZ2-U337]
(noting that the financial sector contributes 12% of the UK’s GDP and that “the pleas of the banking sector
have fallen on deaf ears and [that] there will be a cost in terms of lost jobs and investment.”); Helen
Bartholomew, Brexit threatens some swaptions trades, RISK.NET (July 11, 2018),
https://www.risk.net/derivatives/5764651/brexit-threatens-some-swaptions-trades
[https://perma.cc/J4W8-WYY9] (arguing that many swaptions may stop working after the UK leaves the
EU without a deal on cross-border financial services.); Martin Arnold, JPMorgan issues bleak warning
on Brexit damage, FIN. TIMES, (July 10, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/af41135c-8436-11e8-96ddfa565ec55929 [https://perma.cc/4HH7-TMJC] (Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase’s chief executive, is
quoted as saying “We still do not fully understand what Brexit is, its economic effects and how its effects
will play out: these are huge question marks that will stay for a long time.”); see also INT’L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, Brexit – CCP Location and Legal Uncertainty (Aug. 2017),
https://www.isda.org/a/U8iDE/brexit-paper-1-final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PFA-SKT9]; Benoît Cœuré,
Speech at the Global Financial Markets Association: European CCPs after Brexit, (June 20, 2017),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/ecb.sp170620.en.html
[https://perma.cc/B2AHK34C]; Karel Lannoo, Derivatives Clearing and Brexit: A comment on the proposed EMIR revisions,
EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS INSTITUTE POLICY BRIEF NO. 25, 9-10 (Nov. 2017),
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/ECMI_PB25_KL_BrexitClearing.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBC3-BACT];
Volker Brühl, Clearing of Euro Derivatives Post Brexit – An Analysis of Present Cost Estimates, 912 (Center For Financial Studies Goethe University Frankfurt, Working Paper Series No. 588, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3098932 [https://perma.cc/FLL5-2H2A] (arguing
that “[d]ue to the strategic importance of OTC derivatives clearing in terms of avoiding systemic risks,
the costs associated with a relocation appear negligible, especially since they are likely to be temporary.”);
Clarus Financial Technology, Moving Euro Clearing out of the UK: The 77Bn Problem? (Sept. 28 2016),
https://www.clarusft.com/moving-euro-clearing-out-of-the-uk-the-77bn-problem/
[https://perma.cc/56U7-UQH3] (arguing that Brexit may result in a significant Initial Margin increase of
nearly 50%.).
282. See, e.g., Neil Hume, Guy Chazan, & Harriet Agnew, Europe in diplomatic push to ease Russia
sanctions, FIN. TIMES , (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/9b9bbd3c-44a5-11e8-93cf67ac3a6482fd [https://perma.cc/A6U2-AXCN] (noting that Russian sanctions have led to a 30% price
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most recently the trade tariffs imposed by the United States against China,
Canada, and the European Union.283 Many of these protectionist actions
may not only result in an increase of regulatory arbitrage, but also the
overall erosion of global cooperation in financial markets, which is of
particular consequence for CCPs.284
Interestingly enough, the uncertainties in global financial markets may
also explain the overall growing volume of cleared products.285 In 2018,
the volume of most cleared major OTC derivative products has
significantly increased when compared to 2017.286 Without any
significant changes in market share by any of the CCPs, the volume
growth in 2018 was primarily captured by the CCPs with the largest share
in their respective product classes.287 As a result, it seems fair to argue
that because of some of the non-default factors, the largest CCPs may
become even bigger and more systemically important than they already
are. This, of course, may also increase the cascade effect when one of
these CCPs fails.
Finally, the switch from the scandal-ridden London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR) to other benchmarks such as the Secured Overnight
Financing Rate (SOFR) in the U.S.,288 the Sterling Overnight Index
jump in aluminum impacting key EU industries from cars to aerospace).
283. See, e.g., David Weigel, Farmers who propelled Trump to presidency fear becoming pawns in
trade war, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/farmers-whopropelled-trump-to-presidency-fear-becoming-pawns-in-trade-war/2018/04/08/2d110a50-398f-11e89c0a-85d477d9a226_story.html [https://perma.cc/3LNK-JRYS] (reporting of the volatility of the soybean
market in the U.S. and its impact on farmers); see also Ed Crooks, US businesses react with alarm to
Trump’c China tariffs, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/8f825846-2dfb-11e8a34a-7e7563b0b0f4 [https://perma.cc/EDW9-9F94] (noting that tariffs will cause harm to US workers,
businesses, and economic growth); Ana Swanson, I.M.F. Sees Global Risk in Trump Trade Threats, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/us/politics/imf-global-economy-interestrates-inflation.html [https://perma.cc/W5Z5-JRGZ] (reporting that trade wars could dampen business
investment and spark a sell-off in stock markets).
284. See J. Christopher Giancarlo, An EU Plan to Invade U.S. Markets: In response to Brexit,
Brussels looks to expand its reach, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-eu-planto-invade-u-s-markets-1509907579 [https://perma.cc/755F-B9PS] (arguing that overlapping and
uncoordinated regulation in the EU and the US would be disruptive, expensive and detrimental to the U.S.
trading markets and economy); see also Chris Davis & Narayanan Somasundaram, Trade war threatens
Koreans autocall loses, RISK.NET (July 18, 2018) https://www.risk.net/derivatives/5784461/trade-warthreatens-korea-autocall-losses [https://perma.cc/FJ9V-SFS9] (reporting that since the US-China trade
tensions the HSCEI has edged “closer to territory that dealers say could generate hedging losses of as
much as 240 million.”).
285. See, e.g., Amir Khwaja, Swaps data: the big get bigger in cleared swaps, RISK.NET (July 11,
2018),
https://www.risk.net/comment/5748931/swaps-data-the-big-get-bigger-in-cleared-swaps
[https://perma.cc/52ZT-9LVQ] (identifying escalading trade tensions, the continuing uncertainty of
European politics and the Federal Reserve’s rate-hike path are as the reasons for the growing activity
across most of the big cleared products with the exception of yen interest rate swaps.)
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See THE N.Y. FED. RESERVE, STATEMENT REGARDING THE PUBLICATION OF THE OVERNIGHT
TREASURY
REPO
RATES
(May
27,
2017),
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Average (SONIA)289 in the UK or the Euro Short-term Rate (Ester) in the
EU290 may also create significant non-default operational risks for CCPs
in the future.291
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_170524a
[https://perma.cc/22NNCDVC] (describing three different benchmark rates: (1) the Narrow general collateral repo rate, (2) the
Broad general collateral repo rate, and (3) the Broad Treasury financing rate); see also Alternative
Reference
Committee
(ARRC),
Minutes
for
the
June
22,
2017
Meeting,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/microsites/arrc/files/2017/ARRC-Minutes-Jun-22-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U2AB-M5X2]; Press Release, Alternative Reference Committee (ARRC), Broad Repo
Rate
Announcement
(June
22,
2017),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/microsites/arrc/files/2017/ARRC-press-release-Jun-222017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UNV-CBRB] (announcing the broad treasury financing rate as the preferred
alternative to Libor USD); Lukas Becker, First SOFR swaps trade as banks test new benchmark,
RISK.NET(July
17,
2018),
https://www.risk.net/derivatives/5781681/first-sofr-swaps-traded
[https://perma.cc/RAL4-KNAV] (noting that “[t]he trading and clearing of the first SOFR swaps represent
the next stage in the evolution of the fledging SOFR market.”); Bruce Klein, Goodbye Libor, Hello SOFR,
COMMUNITYVOICE
(Apr.
19,
2018),
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesnycouncil/2018/04/19/goodbye-libor-hello-sofr/#676cf841717d
[https://perma.cc/5NY4-2JGE] (noting that the transfer will be a challenge, but also more transparent and
less open to manipulation due to the fact that SOFR is based on “real” transactions and actual overnight
repo trades compared to the subjective estimates provided by bankers under Libor); Barry Mills, From
Libor to SOFR, ABA BANKING J. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/02/from-liborto-sofr/ [https://perma.cc/LJY4-TZCU] (describing the background of Libor and how SOFR is intended
to function as an alternative benchmark if and when the publication of the Libor ends); Karen Bretell,
What is SOFR? The new U.S. Libor alternative, REUTERS, (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-bonds-sofr-explainer/what-is-sofr-the-new-u-s-libor-alternativeidUSKCN1HA0H1 [https://perma.cc/5DM5-FPE3] (noting that initially SOFR is intended to work
alongside Libor and to eventually decrease the need to rely on Libor).
289. See, e.g., Phillip Stafford, Life after Libor: BoE takes on Sonia benchmark oversight, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/58cf7234-46dd-11e8-8ae9-4b5ddcca99b3
[https://perma.cc/9EGL-JHBD] (Dave Ramsden, Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking at the BoE
is quoted as saying that the “implementation of the reforms to Sonia is an important milestone in the
Bank’s delivery of improvements to the resilience and effectiveness of financial markets. The reforms
improve the sustainability and representativeness of this key piece of the sterling market infrastructure.”).
290. See e.g., Press Release, European Central Bank, Decisions Taken by The Governing Council
of the ECB (in addition to decisions setting interest rates) (May 16, 2018),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/govcdec/otherdec/2018/html/ecb.gc180518.en.html
[https://perma.cc/T7SN-QJZU] (Ester will be produced in 2020, complement existing benchmark rates
produced by the private sector and serve as a backstop reference rate); Press Release, European Central
Bank, ECB announces methodology for calculating Euro Short Term Rate (ESTER) (June 28, 2018),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/ecb.pr180628.en.html
[https://perma.cc/4K9UPY93] (announcing the first release in summer of 2018); EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, ESTER
(June
28,
2018),
METHODOLOGY
AND
POLICIES
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/initiatives/interest_rate_benchmarks/shared/pdf/ecb.ESTER_methodol
ogy_and_policies.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE7J-4VZQ] (defining ESTER, data and publication
standards).
291. See, e.g., Robert Mackenzie Smith, Pimco criticizes, LCH over SOFR plan, RISK.NET(July 16,
2018),
https://www.risk.net/derivatives/5769311/pimco-criticises-lch-over-sofr-plan
[https://perma.cc/3TQ2-L65H] (citing William De Leon, global head of portfolio risk management at
Pimco, as noting that “[w]hereas CME has declared that it’s going to use SOFR, I think it is important
that LCH [also] uses SOFR and not Fed funds, otherwise it’s going to wind up with a contract that is sort
of a bastard contract. I think that’s an important thing to consider, and as a best practice, we should
encourage new contracts not to be in between.”); see also Nazneen Sherif, Libor switch calls for modeling
overhaul, quants warn, RISK.NET (July 5, 2018), https://www.risk.net/derivatives/5748776/libor-switch-
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
CCPs have proven resilient during the Great Recession.292 However,
since then, their systemic importance has significantly increased. The
broadly adopted mandatory clearing mandate has resulted in a
redistribution and concentration of counterparty risk from banks and other
systemically important financial institutions to CCPs. To address this
increased systemic risk of CCPs, national regulators have implemented
many prudential requirements. What is missing, however, are meaningful
global rules to address the cascade effect that may result from the
complete failure of any major interconnected CCP reaching across
borders.293
While the ability to reduce counterparty risk through mutualization of
member losses and the use of default waterfalls are critical safeguards in
financial markets, it may be the ability of CCPs to maintain long-term
viability during events of financial distress - and, in particular after some
of the CCPs’ internal resources have been exhausted - that will prove most
essential in preventing catastrophic cascade effects. This is to say that
while a CCP may face market risks when one of its clearing members
fails, if the defaulting member complied with the rules of the
clearinghouse and if all of the member’s collateral and default fund
contributions are available to the CCP, this should not have any impact
on the capital or the viability of the CCP.
Instead, the greatest systemic risk of any major interconnected CCP

calls-for-modelling-overhaul-quants-warn [https://perma.cc/V39Z-2ZYW] (noting that the uncertainty of
the transition to new benchmarks will impact risk modeling and that the transition may end in a “last
minute panic”). Another potential risk for CCPs is the possibility that they may have to comply with the
EU Benchmark Regulation and be considered benchmark administrators. See, e.g., Lukas Becker, Eonia
(July
9,
2018),
woes
hold
up
euro
swaptions
switch,
RISK.NET
https://www.risk.net/derivatives/5758231/eonia-woes-hold-up-euro-swaptions-switch
[https://perma.cc/77W6-7NX7]; see also J. Christopher Giancarlo, Opening Statement before the Market
Risk
Advisory
Committee
(July
12,
2018),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/giancarlostatement071218
[https://perma.cc/S73L-CC4V] (arguing that “[t]he transition from LIBOR to SOFR and the other riskfree rates requires thoughtfulness and preparation in order to support and not jeopardize financial
stability).
292. See, e.g., Randall Kroszner, Making Markets More Robust 23-24 (Apr. 30, 2009) (revised draft
prepared
for
the
Alvin
Hansen
Symposium),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.603.8795&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KL5-EZCF] (arguing that “[c]learinghouses as central counterparties can be an
effective way to mitigate the potential problem ‘too interconnected to fail’,” whereas I argue in this article
that the level of interconnectedness between clearinghouses and its members may in fact have the opposite
effect.); see also NORMAN, supra note 58, at 34.
293. See, e.g., Manmohan Singh & Dermot Turing, Central Counterparties Resolution – An
Working
Paper
WP/18/65,
Mar.
2018),
Unresolved
Problem
4
(IMF
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/WP/2018/wp1865.ashx
[https://perma.cc/AJ3FUADA].
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may result from wrong-way risk or extreme tail events overwhelming any
internal liquidity facility and triggering a CCP to become insolvent. In
other words, what happens if a clearing member fails that also serves as
the CCPs only liquidity facility? The CCP may also fail, because the CCP
may no longer be able to pay variation margins to members whose
positions improved and will also be unable to balance its own books as a
result.
If the continuity of CCP services during times of financial distress and
without the need for any public bailouts remains the goal, any long-term
viability of CCPs that requires the continuity of services must include
effective recovery and resolution tools. To be sure, these tools must go
beyond any internal default mechanisms, such as margin calls, waterfalls,
or auctions.
The following section will discuss some of these proposed CCP
recovery and solution tools with a focus on the U.S. This jurisdiction was
chosen because of its overall importance and transaction volumes in
derivative markets.294
A. Background Information
Ten years after the Great Recession, the concepts and meanings of
recovery and resolution of CCPs remain subject to debate.295 While
preserving business continuity and the avoidance of taxpayer bailouts
seems to be the main objective of CCPs,296 it is unclear how this objective
may be accomplished. In particular, it is questionable how business
continuity of a CCP may be achieved and cascade events may be
prevented if a CCP outright fails and prudential standards proved
insufficient.
At the international level, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) may
have provided the most comprehensive definition of CCP resolution

294. See, e.g., Bank of International Settlements, Statistical Release: OTC Derivatives at end-June
2018 (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1810.pdf [https://perma.cc/48VK-JSRH].
295. See, e.g., Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 11, at 16-18; see also Singh & Turing, supra note
293, at 7-9.
296. See, e.g., Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for
Financial
Institutions,
(Oct.
2011),
http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_111104cc.pdf?page_moved=1 [https://perma.cc/48TL-739E]; Financial Stability
Board, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes 2-3 (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_141015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9J6Q-BX8G] (The 2014 version and update of the 2011
Key Attributes explicitly notes that “[n]o changes were made to the text of the twelve Key Attributes of
October 2011” and that the “twelve Key Attributes remain the umbrella standard for resolution regimes
covering financial institutions of all types that could be systemic in failure.” In its Preamble the Key
Attributes specifically state that “[a]n effective resolution regime … should: (i) ensure continuity of
systemically important financial services, and payment, clearing and settlement functions.”).
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objectives.297 The FSB is an international standard-setting body set up by
the G20 in 2009 in direct response to the Great Recession.298 The FSB is
specifically tasked to monitor the global financial system and to develop
policies that may help avoid any future financial crisis.299 To ensure the
consistency of its standard setting,300 the FSB works closely with other
international organizations, including the Committee on Payments and
Market Infrastructure (CPMI) as well as the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), to develop its standards.301
In a discussion note published in 2016, the FSB notes “[a]n effective
CCP resolution should have as its objectives the pursuit of financial
stability and the continuity of critical functions of the CCP in all
jurisdictions where it provides systemically important services without
exposing taxpayers to risk of loss.”302 The FSB describes at least three
different approaches to achieve this objective. Namely, the FSB suggests
that authorities try to (1) restore a CCP’s ability to perform its functions
as a going concern, (2) provide for the possibility of another entity to
continue to perform the functions of the CCP in resolution, or (3) enter
into an arrangement which is coupled with the orderly wind-down of the
CCP in resolution.303
But maybe most important, the FSB suggests that the restoration of
market and public confidence needs to be part of any CCP resolution
297. See Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial
Institutions (Oct. 2014), www.fsb.org/2014/10/r_141015/ [https://perma.cc/9J6Q-BX8G].
298. See, e.g., FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (FSB), REPORT TO THE G20 LOS CABOS SUMMIT ON
STRENGTHENING FSB CAPACITY, RESOURCES AND GOVERNANCE 1-3 (June 12, 2012),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_120619c.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L4H-APQ7].
299. Id.
300. See, e.g., FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (FSB), CHAIR’S REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE JOINT WORKPLAN FOR STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE, RECOVERY AND RESOLVABILITY OF
CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES (July 5 2017), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P050717-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26VU-75X4].
301. See COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. ON
SEC. COMM’N, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. ON SEC. COMM’N, PRINCIPLES FOR FIN.
INFRASTRUCTURES (Apr.
2012) [hereinafter CPSS-IOSCO Principles April 2012],
MKT.
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9X2-UKY7] ; COMM. ON PAYMENTS
AND MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES & BD. FOR INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS
& INT’L ORG. ON SEC. COMM’N, RECOVERY OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES (Oct. 2014),
ON
PAYMENTS
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d121.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GNW-EEB8]; COMM.
AND MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES & BD. OF INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS
& INT’L ORG. ON SEC. COMM’N, RESILIENCE OF CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES (CCPS): FURTHER
GUIDANCE ON THE PFMI (July 2017), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d163.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3NXZKFC]; COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES & BD. OF INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N,
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. ON SEC. COMM’N, RECOVERY OF FIN. MKT.
(July
2017) https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d162.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8VLINFRASTRUCTURES,
2S3F].
302. Financial Stability Board, Essential Aspects of CCP Resolution Planning, Discussion Note,
¶ 1.1.1. at 11 (Aug. 16, 2016).
303. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss2/2

48

Henkel: Using Central Counterparties

2020]

USING CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES

445

while at the same “time minimizing contagion to the CCP’s participants,
affiliates or other [Financial Market Infrastructures].”304 As part of this
contagion risk (i.e. cascade effects), the FSB also points out that
disruptions in links with Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs), which
are part of the interconnectedness of CCPs, need to be avoided if material
negative effects on financial stability could result.305 Specific examples
are access to securities or cash collateral held by CCPs.306
CCPs are considered some of the most important and essential FMIs,
which are defined as multilateral systems or networks between financial
institutions used for clearing, settling services, or recording payments,
securities, derivatives, or any other financial transaction.307 Cascade
effects are generally recognized as an inherent risk of FMIs due to their
interdependencies between financial institutions.308
The FSB further clarified its definition of its CCP resolution objective
in a 2017 guidance paper309 in which the FSB specifically stressed the risk
of cascade effects among CCPs while pointing out the need of avoiding
any disruption in the operation of networks between central
counterparties and other financial institutions.310
While the FSB, guidance of CCP recovery and resolution may be a
necessary step towards harmonizing and avoiding cascade effects in
financial markets, the biggest challenge may be the implementation of
these standards by national authorities. Of particular concern is the
availability of adequate financial resources to support the recovery and
resolution of CCPs,311 which is, of course, also directly tied to the question
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See, e.g., CPSS-IOSCO Principles April 2012, supra note 301, at 7 (“FMI is defined as a
multilateral system among participating institutions, including the operator of the system, used for the
purposes of clearing, settling, or recording payments, securities, derivatives, or other financial
transactions”); see also FIN. STABILITY BD., IMPROVING FINANCIAL REGULATION: REPORT TO THE G20
(Sept.
25,
2009),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_090925b.pdf?page_moved=1
[https://perma.cc/ZL6P-HZ88].
308. See, e.g., Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Saguato, Regulating Financial Market Infrastructures 7
(ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No. 259/2014, June 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2450095 [https://perma.cc/K3TG-ZXJC].
309. FIN. STABILITY BD., GUIDANCE ON CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY RESOLUTION AND RESOLUTION
PLANNING: REPORT TO THE G20, ¶1 (July 5, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P0507171.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UDG-M5WA].
310. Id. at ¶ 1.2. (Noting that “CCP resolution should seek to: (i) maintain market and public
confidence while minimising adverse contagion4 to the CCP’s participants or to the wider financial
system, including other FMIs; (ii) avoid any disruption in the operation of links between the CCP in
resolution and other FMIs where such disruptions would have a material negative effect on financial
stability or the functioning of markets.”).
311. See, e.g., Fin. Stability Bd., Financial Resources to support CCP resolution and the treatment
of CCP equity in resolution 2-3 (Nov. 15, 2018), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P151118-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJ3M-N8NA] (stating that “[a]s part of planning and development of potential
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of whether bailouts may be avoided in the future.
This article argues that it may be a misconception that taxpayer bailouts
of CCPs can be entirely avoided while maintaining and even increasing
incentives for market participants to centrally clear their financial
products. Any result of these incentives may only be an increased
concentration of risk in the hand of a few systemically important CCPs,
which may not only become bigger as a result, but also further extrapolate
any potential cascade effects after the failure of just one single CCP due
to its size and interconnectedness. As such, it seems improbable that any
disruption in network operations or cascade effects may be prevented or
minimized without exposing taxpayers to a significant risk of loss at the
same time. In fact, one may argue that today, not only are CCPs of
systemic importance, but rather that it is the totality of the FMI networks
itself that have become systematically relevant.
B. Central Counterparties Are Not Banks
A discussion of CCP recovery and resolution must address the
difference between CCPs and banks, as they are not the same.
The role and function of CCPs has been described already,312 but it is
essential to understand that CCPs may not be viewed through the
paradigm of banking regulation or resolution.313 Banks and CCPs are
based on different business models and should not be, and are not,
regulated in the same way, which is of particular importance with regard
to recovery planning of these institutions. Not considering these
differences may result in a simple transfer of risk, further increasing the
potential of any spillover and cascade effects.
It is indisputable that banks and CCPs both face significant systemic,
credit, liquidity, and operational risks.314 At the same time, because CCPs
and banks have very different business models, revenue sources, and
balance sheet structures, their risks are not the same.315
resolution strategies including any preferred resolution strategy or strategies, authorities should undertake
an assessment of the adequacy of financial resources consistent with the expectations set out in the FSB
Guidance.”).
312. See, e.g., Part II.
313. See, e.g., Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that “[a] failure to understand that
clearing is about commitment, not asset/liability (maturity) transformation and that CCPs are not banks
leads to the application of an inappropriate paradigm for regulating CCPs – one that sees CCPs through
the lens of banking regulators and, in particular, capital regulation.”].
314. Id.
315. See, e.g., David Hughes & Mark Manning, CCPs and Banks: Different Risks, Different
Regulations, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA, Q. BULL. (Reserve Bank of Australia), Dec. 2015, at 68-70,
https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2015/dec/pdf/bu-1215-8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BDCSTRW] (arguing that banks operate with a fundamentally different purpose and risk profile); see also
Mark Jozsef Manning & David Hughes, Central Counterparties and Banks: vive la difference, J. OF FIN.
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To be clear, CCPs replace or substitute the original counterparties to a
financial contract and terminate the original counterparties’ bilateral
contractual relationship.316 In that manner, CCPs become “the buyer to
every seller and the seller to every buyer” on all trades submitted for
clearing.317 In that role, CCPs manage the risks related to the contractual
performance of the underlying contract by incentivizing clearing
members not to default. CCPs do this by requiring clearing members as
buyers and sellers to provide adequate collateral, which in turn is meant
to guarantee the buyers’ and sellers’ contract performance.
In fact, clearing may be best understood as an “institutional
arrangement that [is] designed to enhance contractual performance.”318
Some commentators have also described CCPs as commitment
mechanisms319 that may play a “unique, quasi-legislative, quasiregulatory role in establishing rules and procedures, that govern the
contract obligations of both clearing members and the CCP.”320
The definition of a commitment mechanism seems particularly
helpful321 to explain the business model of CCPs and how they operate.
MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, Mar. 2016, at 1-24 (arguing that banks and CCPs affect systemic risk in
different ways); Lin, Li & Jay Surti, Capital Requirements for the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Central
Counterparties 5 (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 13/3, 2013)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2226276 [https://perma.cc/KZ67-9XH4] (“While
the nature of CCPs’ businesses, balance-sheets and revenues are, in general, quite distinct from banks,
their businesses generate the same types of financial risks.”).
316. See, e.g., Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties 7 (July 2012),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN92-V4NV] (defining a “central counterparty
(CCP) [as] a clearing house that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more
financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring
the future performance of open contracts. A CCP becomes counterparty to trades with market participants
through novation, an open offer system, or another legally binding arrangement. For the purposes of the
capital framework, a CCP is a financial institution.”); see also Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 11, at 2 n.4
(further explaining that it is necessary to “recognize that the bilateral relationship between the members
that submit trades for clearing is irrevocably terminated by novation (or an equivalent legal process).”).
317. Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 11, at 2 n.4.
318. Ed Nosal & Robert Steigerwald, What is clearing and why is it important, THE FED. RES. BANK
CHICAGO,
CHICAGO
FED.
LETTER,
N O.
278,
3
(Sept.
2010),
OF
https://www.fedinprint.org/items/fedhle/y2010isepn278.html [https://perma.cc/XV6B-57YR] (Nosal and
Steigerwald criticize the Arrow-Debreu model noting that “[i]f … people cannot commit, then ….
contractual performance may be impaired. One can think of clearing, therefore, as a set of institutional
arrangements that are designed to enhance contractual performance.”).
319. Id.; see also Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 11, at 3 n.6.
320. See, e.g., Paul Tucker, Deputy Gov. for Fin. Stability, Bank of Engl., Remarks at the
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation-Centre of Financial Innovation Post Trade Fellowship Launch:
Clearinghouses as systemic risk managers (June 1 2011), https://www.bis.org/review/r110608g.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4A9-GYW2]; Nosal & Steigerwald, supra note 318.
321. See Steigerwald & Cox, supra note 11, at 3 n.5; Nosal & Steigerwald, supra note 318. The
use of the term commitment mechanism and the criticism of the Arrow-Debreu benchmark model is not
entirely convincing when considering that the obligation to compensate after a “strategic breach” of an
existing contractual obligation, that breach may also be understood as an alternative form of performance.
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Commitment mechanisms are a way to change incentive structures and
are intended to make performance promises more credible. In other
words, commitment mechanisms are meant to remove the risk of
opportunistic behavior by one counterparty and may be described as a
structural arrangement or operational strategy which promotes and
sustains the commitment to the originally promised performance of that
counterparty.322
If viewed as commitment mechanisms, CCPs provide essential market
liquidity for financial contracts and manage the default risk of its clearing
members. Clearing members must comply with the rules of the CCP and
meet their obligations.323 For example, if any clearing member, after
receiving calls to post additional collateral, fails to do so, it may lose all
of their previously posted collateral as well as all of their default fund
contributions, which the CCP, in turn, may use to avoid any institutional
loses.
The primary purpose of CCPs, therefore, is to manage and control risk.
CCPs do not engage in any typical banking business, such as deposit
taking, providing investment services, or market making. CCPs also do
not issue debt324 and their balance sheets do not compare to banks because
they are not equally leveraged.325 But maybe most important, while the
In other words, when entering into a contract, counterparties commit to at least one of two things: (1) the
commitment to perform under the contract or (2), in case of a breach and actual damages incurred, the
commitment to pay compensation or damages. The commitment to compensate the other party for
damages may negate the assumption of a lack of commitment for strategic breach, because the
performance commitment is the payment of compensation for breach. Based on this critique, it may also
be fair to argue that the role of CCPs should be understood to be more focused on risk mitigation, the
support of liquidity and operational integrity in financial markets. This is to say that through the
mutualization of risk among clearing members, CCPs offer an essential and efficient means of exchange
supporting market liquidity and offering the potential mitigation of clearing members’ default or breach
of contract.
322. The term “commitment mechanism” relates to commitment theory and the concept of
commitment, which also relate to the game-theoretic approach to the commitment problem. See THOMAS
C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1960); THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-3 (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS,
2006) (Defining commitment “to mean becoming committed, bound, or obligated to some course of action
or inaction or to some constraint on future action. It is relinquishing some options, eliminating some
choices, surrendering some control over one’s future behavior. And it is doing so deliberately, with a
purpose. The purpose is to influence someone else’s choice. Commitment does so by affecting that
other’s expectation of the committed one’s behavior.”); see also Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment and
Social Organization: A Study of Commitment Mechanisms in Utopian Communities, 33 AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 499 (Aug. 1968).
323. Steigerwald & Cox, supra note 11, at 3.
324. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 320.
325. See, e.g., Hughes & Manning, supra note 315, at 70 (“The bulk of the assets held by a CCP
are the collateral (margin) and default fund contributions that it receives from participants against cleared
positions. […] A CCP typically maintains no debt and therefore does not operate on a leveraged basis.
A bank’s balance sheet, by contrast, is typically highly leveraged, comprising a mix of loans and other
assets (such as trading assets and liquid assets) backed by a mix of deposit funding, wholesale debt funding
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services of even the biggest and most interconnected systemically
important banks may be substituted by any other bank, this is not the case
for any major interconnected CCP. Due to the short liquidation horizon
of most open positions at a CCP, these positions may not be easily
transferred to a different CCP and instead trigger an immediate failure of
the CCP followed by widespread cascade effects through global financial
markets.326
C. Lack of Recovery and Resolution Procedures
With the objective of business continuity, there is currently no clear
recovery or resolution procedure available in the United States that would
directly apply to CCPs. In light of the derivative market volume in the
United States, this is of great concern.327 Moreover, the United States is
also home to some of the biggest, most systemically important and
interconnected CCPs which operate across many borders.328
The only two potentially available resolution mechanisms in the United
States seem ill fitted and do not offer a clear path towards either recovery
or restructure of CCPs. 329 Instead, the available mechanisms focus on
financial activities of banks and nonbank financial companies, such as
insurance companies.
But maybe even more important, these
mechanisms seem to exclusively consider liquidation and wind down as
the only option for covered financial institution and do not offer an option
for continuity or recovery.

and equity capital.”).
326. Steigerwald & Cox, supra note 11, at 14.
327. See, e.g., Statistical Release: OTC derivatives statistics at end-June 2018, Bank for
International
Settlements
3
(Oct.
31,
2018),
https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1810.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3RR-XN43] (The notional amounts outstanding were mainly driven by US dollardenominated contracts, increasing from $157 trillion at end-2017 to $193 trillion at end-June 2018.).
328. For a list of CCPs or Derivative Clearing Organizations registered in the United States, see
Derivatives
Clearing
Organization
Database,
U.S.
CFTC,
https://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/sirt.aspx?Topic=ClearingOrganizations [https://perma.cc/GXY6-X786].
329. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Central Counterparties and Orderly Liquidation Authority, 36 J.
ON THE LAW OF INV. & RISK MGMT. PROD., FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L., VOL. 1-10 (Oct. 2016)
[hereinafter
CCPs
and
OLA],
https://www.creditslips.org/files/glfdlr_36_9_article-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96A9-PFFM] (“At best, there are currently two mechanisms for resolving a
clearinghouse in financial distress: OLA and subchapter IV of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.”); see
also Stephen J. Lubben, Failure of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank’s Fatal Flaw? 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
127, 152 (2015) (noting that there is a theoretical possibility to define CCPs as commodity brokers under
the Commodities Exchange Act); Stephen J. Lubben, Nationalize the Clearinghouses!, SETON HALL
PUBLIC
LAW
RESEARCH
PAPER
N O.
2458506
23
(June
24,
2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2458506 [https://perma.cc/3RHP-NR22].
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1. Orderly Liquidation Authority
The first available option under U.S. law is the so-called Orderly
Liquidation Authority (OLA), which is implemented in Title II of the
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).330
Under OLA, large bank holding companies, systemically important
nonbanks, or any company that is predominantly engaged in financial
activities may be subject to FDIC receivership.331 FDIC receivership is
voluntary or involuntary332 and may be initiated after a Chapter 11
bankruptcy filing has been found to be inappropriate.333
The U.S. Treasury Department may place a “covered financial
company”334 under receivership after a joint recommendation by the
FDIC and the FRB, which must be followed by an order of the U.S.
District Court of Columbia authorizing the FDIC receivership.335
Covered financial companies are placed under receivership if the failure
of the company under the Bankruptcy Code or other applicable
insolvency regimes, such as the Securities Investor Protection Act
(SIPA),336 would trigger serious adverse effects on the financial stability
of the United States.337
Although Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act does not directly mention or
define CCPs as covered financial companies, some commentators338
suggest that CCPs may be covered financial companies because they
330. 12 U.S.C. § 5381 (2011).
331. 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b) (2011).
332. 12 U.S.C. §5383(a)(1)(A) (2011).
333. 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(2)(F), § 5381(a)(2) (2011).
334. 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(8) (2011) (“The term ‘‘covered financial company’’— (A) means a
financial company for which a determination has been made under section 5383(b) of this title; and (B)
does not include an insured depository institution.”).
335. 12 U.S.C. § 5382 (2011).
336. 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (2017) (Under SIPA the trustee is required to distribute securities directly
to customers and investors to the greatest extend possible to satisfy any claims. This is different to the
approach taken by a trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Instead of turning over securities, the
trustee must generally turn securities into cash first and satisfy creditors’ claims in cash.).
337. 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b), § 5384(a) (2011) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to provide the
necessary authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial
stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.”).
338. See, e.g., CCPs and OLA, supra note 329, at 2-3; see also JP Morgan Chase & Co. Office of
Regulatory Affairs, What is the Resolution Plan for CCPs?, PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 2014),
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/document/resolution-plan-ccps.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TF87-X7TS] (“Absent unusual facts and circumstances, a CCP in the United States is a
“financial company” because 85% or more of its revenue is derived from safekeeping, custody, clearance,
settlement, extensions of credit and bilateral or multilateral netting services, all of which are not only
financial activities but within the business of banking.”); CFTC & FDIC Market Risk Advisory
Committee, Staff Presentation of the CFTC and FDIC: DCO Resolution 15 (June 27, 2016),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/mrac062716_dcor
esolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/79Y2-6WPX] (“DCOs are likely eligible for resolution under the Orderly
Liquidation Authority as ‘financial companies’ under FDIC Regulation 12 CFR § 380.[8].”).
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qualify as institutions “predominantly engaged in financial activities.”339
Under section 201(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC was granted
the power to establish standards for determining when a financial
institution is predominantly engaged in financial activities.340 In its
standards, the FDIC relies on an 85% or greater calculation of the total
consolidated revenue of financial institutions.341 According to this
standard, a financial institution is considered “predominantly engaged” in
financial activities if
(1) [a]t least 85 percent of the total consolidated revenues of such company
(determined in accordance with applicable accounting standards) for either
of its two most recently completed fiscal years were derived, directly or
indirectly, from financial activities, or (2) based upon all of the relevant
facts and circumstances, the consolidated revenues of the company from
financial activities constitute 85% or more of the total consolidated
revenues of the company.342

The definition of “financial activity” under the FDIC standard is
equally broad and fails to directly mention clearing activities or include
any reference to CCPs.343 In fact, the only reference to derivatives is
mentioned in the context of “investing and trading activities” in which a
principal engages in “[f]orward contracts, options, futures, options on
futures, swaps, and similar contracts.”344 While a CCP may become a
principle of a derivative contract through novation, a CCP is not directly
involved in investing and trading activities as a principal.
Therefore, the only applicable standard relating to CCPs may be the
activity of “safeguarding money or securities.”345 However, the FDIC
does not explicitly define the term “safeguarding money or securities.”346
But, even if this standard would apply and if it could be construed that
CCPs are in the business of safeguarding money, it is doubtful that this
activity constitutes eighty-five percent or more of total revenue of every
major interconnected and systemically important CCP.347 This is because
339. 12 C.F.R § 380.8 (2013); see also Definition of “Predominantly Engaged in Activities That
Are Financial in Nature or Incidental Thereto,” 78 Fed. Reg. 34,711 (June 10, 2013) (codified in 12 C.F.R.
§ 380.8) (The FDIC mentions derivative trades as financial activities multiple times, but does not mention
clearinghouses with the exception of a pin cite in footnote 74 or in context of clearing transactions that
involve securities.).
340. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 201(b),
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5384).
341. 12 C.F.R. § 380.8 (a)(1)-(2) (2013).
342. 12 C.F.R. § 380.8 (a)(1)-(2) (2013).
343. 12 C.F. R. § 380.8 (b)(3) (2013).
344. 12 C.F.R. § 380.8 (b)(3)(vi)(H)(2) (2013).
345. 12 C.F.R. § 380.8 (b)(3)(i) (2013).
346. A general definition of safeguarding money and securities may be found in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17Ad-12(a)(1)-(2) (2013).
347. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Cronin, CME Group, Comment Letter to FDIC re: Proposed Rules on
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many of the services needed to safeguard money are not offered by
CCPs.348 Instead, CCPs rely on many other financial institutions to
provide liquidity, lines of credit, custodianship, settlement services, and
cash management.349
Regardless of the difficulties in determining whether OLA applies
directly to CCPs, OLA may also be ill suited as a recovery or resolution
mechanism for CCPs for at least four reasons.
First, as the primary regulators of CCPs,350 the CFTC and the SEC are
not given any role in the decision-making process to put a clearinghouse
under receivership.351 Both regulators must only be consulted after the
FDIC has been appointed as receiver.352 The announcement of an FDIC
receivership without prior consultation of any of the primary regulators
of CCPs may therefore not constitute a comprehensive evaluation of all
relevant market risks. Against the background of the objective to
continue services, this seems highly problematic and may prove
counterintuitive by further increasing the potential of cascade effects.
Second, the concept of a “lift-out” of the viable business of a CCP
under OLA also seems to rely on a misconception of how CCPs function
Orderly
Liquidation
Authority
75
Fed.
Reg.
64173
(Nov.
18,
2010),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2010/10c22orderliq.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6VV-QC5E]
(“CME Inc’s only activities that could possibly qualify as financial in nature, and hence count toward the
specific numerical threshold, are its clearing and settlement services. Such services could be construed to
entail the ‘safeguarding of money’ – a recognized type of financial activity under section 4(k) of the Bank
Holding Company Act (‘BHC Act’) … Because these clearing and settlement activities do not constitute
85 percent or more of CME Inc’s total revenues, however, CME Inc. cannot be deemed ‘predominantly
engaged’ in financial activities. Thus, CME Inc. is not covered by the definition of ‘financial company’
set forth in § 201(a)(11) of Title II.”); see also CCPs and OLA, supra note 329, at 3. (Please note while
Lubben comments in fn. 15 that “[p]resumably regulators could require the clearing operations [of CME]
to be incorporated into one or more subsidiaries,” he does not provide any further argument or authority
on how this could be accomplished. It is unclear which power or legislative mandate regulators could
rely on to force CME to restructure its business model. It seems hard to imagine that, without any such
express mandate, regulators could force any CCP to restructure and especially if the CCP operate across
borders.).
348. See supra Part II.B.v.
349. Id.
350. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 111-203, Title VIII, 124
Stat. 1376, 1802-1822 (2010) (establishing the new regulatory framework for systemically important
utilities); see also, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Clearing Organizations, Derivatives
Clearing
Organizations (last
visited
Mar.
21,
2019) http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/ClearingOrganizations/index.htm [https://perma.cc/H3G24ZL7]; DONNA NORDENBERG & MARC LABONTE, DODD-FRANK ACT TITLE VIII: SUPERVISION OF
PAYMENT, CLEARING, AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES, CRS REPORT R41529 13-23 (Dec. 10,
2010), https://www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/crs-r41529.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9NHVR4G] (The CFTC and the SEC are the prudential regulators and primary supervisors for derivatives
clearing organizations and clearing agencies, respectively.).
351. 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(a) (2011); see also CCPs and OLA, supra note 329, at 5.
352. 12 U.S.C. § 5384(c) (2011) (“The [FDIC], as receiver— (1) shall consult with the primary
financial regulatory agency or agencies of the covered financial company and its covered subsidiaries for
purposes of ensuring an orderly liquidation of the covered financial company;…”).
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in practice. Lift-out is defined as the organization of one or more bridge
financial institutions that would assume the liabilities and functions of the
failing CCP.353 However, the failure of a CCP strongly suggests that the
clearinghouse relied on incorrect risk modeling.354 As a result, any buyer
or bridge CCP would have to immediately have a different risk-model
available and the ability to implement it.355 This may create many
additional operational challenges, including the calculation of margins or
member default fund contributions among the clearing members of the
failing CCP.
Moreover, because of the threat of spillover and cascade effects, with
every hour and day that a failing CCP or a bridge CCP continues its
business based on incorrect risk modeling, the problem may exponentially
get worse.356 As some commentators have noted, “[t]his leads to a
paradox: if lift-out is unachievable in practice, the policy objective of
restoring the critical function of CCPs in resolution seems to oblige the
resolution authority to perpetuate a failed risk model.”357
Third, the funding process for liquidation under OLA does not consider
a CCP’s short liquidation horizon. Under OLA, the FDIC would be
limited by time to issue the total amount of obligations that are available
for repayment to counterparties of a failed CCP.358 During the first thirty
days following the announcement of receivership, the FDIC may only
access the liquidation fund under OLA to distribute up to ten percent of
the total consolidated assets of the financial institution under
receivership.359 The FDIC must then wait for full access to the fund until
after the passing of the first thirty days.360 In addition, even after thirty
days, the access to the liquidation fund is limited to ninety percent of the
fair value of the total consolidated assets that are available for
repayment.361 With likely disputes over asset valuation, it is questionable
that sufficient funds will be made available in any timely fashion to
353. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(h) (2017).
354. See, e.g., Singh & Turing, supra note 293, at 12. (Noting that “[w]hat CCPs do is calculate
their potential loss in the event of member default, and call for margin and default fund contributions to
cover that loss. If a member default has given rise to losses, which are so large that the margin and default
fund were not able to contain them, there was something wrong with the way that the CCP was doing
business – its only business. That would, then, suggest that reviving the CCP (which is old, failed, risk
model) would be a false decision. Lift-out to a private buyer or to a bridge CCP must overcome this
challenge.”).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 12-13.
357. Id. at 12 (the authors argue that variation margin gains haircutting (VMGH) is the least
troublesome CCP resolution tool).
358. 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (n)(6) (2017).
359. 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (n)(6)(A) (2017).
360. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n)(6)(B) (2017).
361. Id.
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recover a failing CCP.
It is also doubtful that any clearing member or counterparty of a failing
CCP may be able to wait for more than thirty days to fully receive
adjustments or debits on their margin payments without potentially facing
their own risk of default. Equally hard to imagine is that the initial
availability of only up to 10% of the total amount of consolidated assets
of a failing CCP may be reconciled with the overall objective of
continuation of services.
Finally, OLA does not only give federal regulators substantial
discretion in whether to place any troubled financial institution under
receivership362 and how to implement receivership,363 under OLA the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver may also be subject to court review,
which may not be finalized in less than sixty-one days.
If a covered financial institution does not voluntarily consent to the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver, the Secretary of the Treasury must
seek an order by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
authorizing the appointment of the FDIC as receiver.364 The petition for
review is filed under seal and the District Court has twenty-four hours to
schedule a hearing and make its determination.365 If the court does not
make a decision within twenty-four hours, the petition is granted by
operation of law and the FDIC is appointed as a receiver.366
In its decision, the court is limited to reviewing whether the Secretary
of the Treasury was correct in finding that (1) the financial institution is a
covered financial institution in default or in danger of default, and (2) that
the institution qualifies as a covered financial company under OLA.367 If
the court decides that the determination of the Secretary was incorrect,
the court must issue a written and reasoned statement and provide the
Secretary with an immediate opportunity to amend and re-file the petition,
possibly triggering a second twenty-four hour decision timeframe for the
District Court.368
Following the final decision of the District Court, the Secretary and the
covered financial company in question also have the opportunity to appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and may further
petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari following the
decision of the Court of Appeals.369 While both, the appeal and the writ

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

12. U.S.C. § 5386 (a)(1) (2017).
12. U.S.C. §§ 5384 (2011), 5386 (2017), 5390 (2017).
12 U.S.C. § 5382 (2018).
12 U.S.C. § 5382 (a)(1)(A) (2018).
12 U.S.C. § 5382 (a)(1)(A)(v) (2018).
12 U.S.C. § 5382 (a)(1)(A)(iii) (2018).
12 U.S.C. § 5382 (a)(1)(A)(iv)(II) (2018).
12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2018).
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for certiorari, must be considered on an expedited basis, the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court have up to thirty days to make their
decision.370
With the uncertainty surrounding the question of whether CCPs are
covered financial companies under OLA, it is very likely that the decision
to place a failing CCP under FDIC receivership may be challenged in
court. It is further possible that a final decision ultimately may have to be
settled by the U.S. Supreme Court. Given the different organizational
structures of CCPs in the United States, there may even be multiple court
challenge to resolve this issue. Considering that time is of the essence for
an effective recovery or resolution of a failing CCP, the effectiveness of
OLA seems questionable. Similarly, the time restricted access to
liquidation funds under OLA371 and the potential for a drawn-out court
battle over the appropriateness of FDIC receivership also fails to consider
the short liquidation horizon for open accounts at CCPs.
Overall, OLA remains controversial today. Proponents argue that OLA
currently offers the only existing and workable approach to avoid cascade
effects from the failure of systemically important financial institution and
preventing the need for public bailouts.372 Critics, on the other hand,
argue that OLA may be inappropriate for the wind down of complex
financial institutions without threatening financial markets and that
policymakers may have too much discretionary power in the resolution of
these institutions, which may result in preferential treatment of some
institutions and perpetuate market distortions.373
370. Id.
371. 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (n)(6) (2010).
372. See Financial Scholars Oppose Eliminating “Orderly Liquidation Authority” As CrisisAvoidance Restructuring Backstop, Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon, Professor of Law, Columbia Law
School, and Mark J. Roe, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School to Michael Crapo, Senator and
Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Sherrod Brown, Senator and
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Chuck Grassley, Senator
and Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Dianne Feinstein, Senator and Ranking Member,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Jeb Hensarling, Congressman and Chairman, House Financial
Services Committee, Maxine Waters, Congresswoman and Ranking Member, House Financial Services
Committee, Bob Goodlatte, Congressman and Chairman, House Judiciary Committee, John Conyers, Jr.,
Congressman and Ranking Member, House Judiciary Committee, (May 23, 2017) (the letter was signed
by 122 law professors and economists arguing that bankruptcy cannot substitute for resolution via OLA);
see also Robert J. Samuelson, How are we preparing for the next financial panic?, WASH. POST (June 1,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-are-we-preparing-for-the-next-financialpanic/2017/06/01/a123c2c8-46cb-11e7-98cd-af64b4fe2dfc_story.html [https://perma.cc/7362-WD3W]
(comprehensively describing the debate for and against the Orderly Liquidation Authority).
373. See Examining How the Dodd-Frank Act Could Result in More Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts:
Hearing before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (opening remarks of Chairman
Hensarling (R-TX)), (“Title II, Section 210, … clearly creates a taxpayer-funded bailout system); see also
Evan Weinberger, Trump Orders Review of 2 Key Dodd-Frank Act Powers, LAW360 (Apr. 21, 2017),
http://bit.ly/2GBCSm6 [https://perma.cc/H5DV-YLYE]; Raj Gnanarajah & David W. Perkins, The
Orderly Liquidation Authority: Reform Proposals, CRS INSIGHT REPORT IN10886 (Apr.17, 2018),
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Various proposals to reform OLA have been made. The most notable
may be the Financial Choice Act374 and the 2018 OLA report by the
Treasury Department.375 While the Choice Act wants to entirely abolish
OLA,376 the Treasury Report recommends retaining OLA, but reforming
it by, among other measures, eliminating the FDIC’s authority to treat
similar situated creditors differently on an ad hoc basis,377 using privatesector borrowing instead of direct lending from the Treasury Department
to fund the Orderly Liquidation Fund (“OLF”),378 limiting the duration of
access to OLF loans,379 and reforming judicial review provisions related
to the Treasury petition for an order authorizing the appointment of a
receiver to resolve a failing financial institution.380
The report by the Treasury Department recognizes that “existing
provisions of the bankruptcy code were not designed with the resolution
of a large, complex financial corporation in mind,”381 but neither the
report by the Treasury Department nor the Choice Act considers whether
OLA applies to CCPs, or whether new recovery and resolution
mechanisms would be required to address the threat for financial markets
that may result from the failure of a single interconnected and
systemically important CCP.
2. Liquidation of Commodity Traders and Other Financial Institutions
The second potentially available recovery and resolution mechanism
for CCPs in the United States is Subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.382 Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is not a
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10886.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2L6-EN9S]; Thomas H. Jackson, Resolving
Financial Institutions: A Proposed Bankruptcy Code Alternative, 2 BANKING PERSPECTIVE (2014),
http://bit.ly/2rQWAac [https://perma.cc/MD9D-DELB] (This notion that Title II is a last-resort option,
however, creates a tension between the purposes of bankruptcy law and the announced purposes of a Title
II proceeding.); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY AND THE BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVE,
IN ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (MARTIN NEIL BAILY &
JOHN B. TAYLOR EDS. 2019); THOMAS H. JACKSON ET AL., BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUT: A SPECIAL
CHAPTER 14, MAKING FAILURE FEASIBLE (KENNETH E. SCOTT & JOHN B. TAYLOR, EDS. 2012).
374. H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (passed House), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/house-bill/10 [https://perma.cc/JE6P-TFTS].
375. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: ORDERLY
LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND BANKRUPTCY REFORM, (2018) [hereinafter THE TREASURY REPORT],
https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/1014000/1014496/ola_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KTX8-XF9Z].
376. Financial Choice Act, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 111 (2017).
377. See THE TREASURY REPORT, supra note 327, at 4.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 6.
380. See id. (arguing that judicial review needs to be strengthened while at the same time preserving
regulators’ ability to act swiftly).
381. Id. at 25.
382. 11 U.S.C. §§ 761, 767 (2016).
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recovery mechanism that guarantees the continuation of services of any
business. Therefore, it may conflict with the generally accepted objective
for recovery and resolution of CCPs.
Indeed, Chapter 7 is the resolution mechanism under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in which a bankruptcy trustee liquidates all of the
debtor’s nonexempt assets and distributes all of the net proceeds of those
assets to creditors.383 The discharge following a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is
the equivalent to a wind down and generally considered a “fresh start,”384
which in itself seems asymmetrical to any form of CCP recovery or
continuation of services. Premised on the assumption that creditors,
stockholders, employees, and the community at large are better off if a
business can be rescued and continue services, Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code provides for the only meaningful recovery mechanism
and the ability to restructure a failing business under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.385 Chapter 11 also offers the only recovery mechanism under U.S.
law that may allow for the temporary or limited continuation of services
with the goal of resolution. Liquidation is permitted under Chapter 11
because not every business can be saved.386 A limited continuation of
services under Chapter 11 prior to liquidation under Chapter 7 may
therefore include the potential benefit of at least tempering any cascade
effects.387
While financial institutions, such as banks and other depository
institutions are generally not eligible for relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code,388 Subchapter IV and V of Chapter 7 make an exception for certain
financial institutions, including clearing organizations389 and clearing
banks.390 Clearing organizations under Subchapter IV are defined as
organizations that are registered according to the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA)391 and may include CCPs, which are defined as derivative
clearing organizations under the CEA and that have registered with the
CFTC.392
383. See, e.g., CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 87-92 ( 4th ed. 2016); Please
note that Chapter 12 (family farmers and fishermen) and Chapter 13 (individual consumers) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code offer reorganization procedures, but neither is applicable in the current context.
384. Id. at 4.
385. Id. at 92-98.
386. Id. at 97-98.
387. Id. at 1024 (“Reorganization… might offer an opportunity for a viable business to realize a
‘going concern’ premium over liquidation value.”).
388. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (b)(2)-(3) (2012); see also TABB, supra note 334, at 107-108; MICHAEL
SCHILLING, RESOLUTION AND INSOLVENCY OF BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6-7 (1st ed. 2016).
389. 11 U.S.C. § 761 (1), (2), (4)(D), (4)(F)(ii), (9)(D), (16).
390. 11 U.S.C. § 781 (3).
391. 11 U.S.C. §§ 761 (1), (2).
392. 7 U.S.C. § 1a (15) (2012). Suffice it to say that there are also CCPs that are registered with
the SEC.
See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Clearing Agencies,
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However, most surprisingly, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code also
categorizes clearing organizations as a subcategory of commodity brokers
and seemingly entirely disregards the concept and role of CCPs in
financial markets.393 This has the additional effect that clearing
organizations and CCPs are not permitted to seek any relief under Chapter
11,394 further foreclosing any meaningful recovery mechanisms or
continuation of services for CCPs under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. What
makes this particularly surprising is the fact that even Lehman Brothers
was allowed to file for relief under Chapter 11.395
In sum, under Subchapter IV of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, CCPs may
only be liquidated and resolved. Subchapter IV does not offer any viable
recovery option that would allow for a continuation of clearing services
to avoid or limit cascade effects.
VII. SOLUTION PROPOSALS
Many different solutions have been proposed to avoid systemic risk in
the central clearing context. In this section, some of these solutions will
be introduced and discussed, including the suggestion of new forms of
clearing based on digital ledgers, blockchain technology, and smart
contracts. Other proposals focus on catastrophe or CAT bonds, insurance
surcharges, and taxing systemic risk.
A. New Clearing Infrastructures
New financial market and clearing infrastructures are among the
solutions proposed to reduce concentration risk and cascade effects
triggered by potential CCP failures. Many of the proposed new
infrastructures rely on technologies such as digital ledgers, blockchain, or
cryptography.396 Many of them are intended to develop better and more
https://www.sec.gov/tm/clearing-agencies [https://perma.cc/JLB8-4YXB] (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
393. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (6) (2005) (“The term “commodity broker” means futures commission
merchant, foreign futures commission merchant, clearing organization, leverage transaction merchant, or
commodity options dealer, as defined in section 761 of this title, with respect to which there is a customer,
as defined in section 761 of this title.”).
394. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (enumerating persons and entities that are eligible to be debtors under
Chapter 11 and explicitly excluding stock and commodity brokers).
395. In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also 4
ANTON R. VALUKAS, REPORT OF THE EXAMINER, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
396. See, e.g., International Swaps and Derivatives Association and Linklaters, Whitepaper: Smart
Contracts and Distributed Ledger – A Legal Perspective, 4 (2017), https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smartcontracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-perspective.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LH3Y-SJY9]
(“New
technologies allow a fundamental reshaping of derivatives infrastructure, which could reduce operational
risks, streamline increasingly cumbersome and time-consuming processes, and cut costs.”).
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efficient collateral management solutions.397 Because the companies
developing these infrastructures consider themselves primarily as
technology providers, they may be labeled as “Fintech companies.”
Fintech companies are defined as technology companies that seek to
improve and automate both the delivery and use of financial services.398
While an in-depth discussion of Fintech companies and the technology
they use is beyond the scope of this article,399 it is important to provide a
few examples of Fintech companies and how they may impact CCPs in
the future. The three examples discussed here are SynSwap,400
Clearable,401 and Clearmatics.402
All three companies aim to
“decentralize” central clearing, disrupt the CCP model, and rewrite
collateral management rules.403
According to the information provided on the company’s website,
“Synswap is a single platform for cleared and non-cleared swaps,
designed to streamline the entire post-trade process. Key features include
automatic matching, confirmation, collateral management, netting,
compression and recordkeeping. Leveraging blockchain technology
Synswap fully automates complex events and removes manual
interventions from the post-trade workflow.”404 Synswap was founded in
late 2016 with the goal of replacing the centralized clearing model of
397. See, e.g., International Swaps and Derivatives, Whitepaper: The Future of Derivatives
Processing and Market Infrastructure 9-14 (Sept. 2016), https://www.isda.org/a/UEKDE/infrastructurewhite-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/XD8G-NA6H] (“[A]n appropriately designed market infrastructure and
processing model can consider how market participants from different sectors interact with infrastructures,
and promote solutions that accommodate their needs. For example, in the new environment of mandated
clearing, market participants need the ability to efficiently and quickly port positions between clearing
members at a CCP.”).
398. See,
e.g.,
Fintech,
Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fintech.asp [https://perma.cc/PW77-XZBZ] (“Fintechis used to
describe new tech that seeks to improve and automate the delivery and use of financial services. At its
core, fintech is utilized to help companies, business owners and consumers better manage their financial
operations, processes and lives by utilizing specialized software and algorithms that are used
on computers and, increasingly, smartphones.”).
399. See, e.g., Philip Stafford, FT Explainer: The blockchain and financial markets, Clearing and
Settlement, FIN. TIMES (July 14, 2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/454be1c8-2577-11e5-9c4ea775d2b173ca [https://perma.cc/E2DB-7APK].
400. SYNSWAP, https://www.synswap.com/ [https://perma.cc/GU8X-CF4Z].
401. CLEARABLE, http://www.clearable.com/ [https://perma.cc/8SDY-NAFJ].
402. CLEARMΑTICS, https://www.clearmatics.com/ [https://perma.cc/T6F4-PWW3].
403. See, e.g., Bill Hodgson, New Startup will replace central clearing and rewrite global
regulation on margin, OTC SPACE (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.theotcspace.com/2016/09/26/newstartup-will-replace-central-clearing-and-rewrite-global-regulation-margin
[https://perma.cc/H69JTGXF]; see also Joe Parsons, Blockchain Startup aims to replace clearinghouses, THE TRADE (Oct. 11,
2016),
https://www.thetradenews.com/blockchain-startup-aims-to-replace-clearing-houses/
[https://perma.cc/9FXR-U3MD] (“A new blockchain start-up focused on cleared and uncleared
derivatives is aiming to replace the role of clearing houses and win industry-wide support.”).
404. Streamlined Workflow, SYNSWAP, https://www.synswap.com/ [https://perma.cc/JYV5BWTP] (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
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CCPs through, what the company calls, “distributed clearing
solutions.”405 The company notes “[d]istributed clearing retains all
benefits from central clearing – reduction of counterparty risk exposure,
multilateral netting, default management – while removing concentration
risk from CCPs.”406 At the same time, Synswap does not want to be
understood as a CCP and argues that because of their peer-to-peer trade
execution, novation, and intermediation are no longer required.407
The company will initially only focus on interest and credit default
swaps, and primarily work in interdealer markets and with buy-side
participants.408 Synswap has not yet gained any regulatory approval, but
it has applied for approval in a number of different jurisdictions.409
Clearable, the second example, has also not yet gained any regulatory
approval. When compared to Synswap, Clearable410 is attempting to
implement a very similar solution by relying on blockchain technology to
disrupt central clearing. At the same time, Clearable may view itself
more as a clearinghouse as opposed to Synswap.411 Clearable believes
that current CCPs are inefficient, rigid, and overly capital intensive.412 It
also argues that many of the regulatory changes after the Great Recession
have forced financial companies out of business, including prime brokers
and futures commission merchants.413 Clearable seems convinced that it
can solve this problem and increase market participation by reducing
capital requirements for all trading institutions.414 According to
405. See, e.g., Hodgson, supra note 403 (citing one of the co-founders of Synswap); Paul Clark,
The 30-year-old ex-trader trying to bring investment bankers together using Blockchain,
EFINANCIALCARREERS (Apr. 10, 2017), https://news.efinancialcareers.com/uk-en/280051/the-30-yearold-ex-traders-trying-to-bring-investment-banks-together-using-blockchain [https://perma.cc/MB93694Z] (“Synswap, will use blockchain technology to automate the OTC derivative clearing process.”).
406. Distributed Clearing, SYNSWAP, https://www.synswap.com/ [https://perma.cc/JYV5-BWTP]
(last visited March 8, 2019).
407. See, e.g., Hodgson, supra note 403 (transcribing an interview with one of the co-founders of
Synswap: “No, there is no central counterparty in our distributed clearing model. Our firm is not a
counterparty in any of the trades processed through Synswap … We should not be considered as a CCP
as we are not a clearing house and we are not a counterparty either.”).
408. See, e.g., Parsons, supra note 403 (quoting Sophia Grami, co-founder of Synswap as noting
that “[f]or now we are focusing on interest rate swaps and credit default swaps, and will further develop
the platform for other asset classes”).
409. Id. (“[T]he platform is currently in the process of gaining regulatory approval from a number
of national financial authorities…”We do not expect regulators to approve a new clearing method
overnight and are aware that this is not a short-term project.”).
410. CLEARABLE, http://www.clearable.com/ [https://perma.cc/8SDY-NAFJ].
411. Jim Falvey, Presentation Blockchain and Futures Clearing, FIN(LEGAL)TECH CONFERENCE,
CHICAGO KENT-COLLEGE OF LAW (Nov. 4, 2016), Slide 10 (Referring to Clearable as “Real-time OTC
derivatives clearing house on blockchain rails …”) (presentation slides available from the author of this
article).
412. Id. at slide 8.
413. Id. at slide 9.
414. Id. at slide 10.
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Clearable’s Chief Regulatory Officer, Jim Falvey, additional advantages
of utilizing blockchain technology are the ability to better customize
derivative transactions, settlement and transfer of ownership in real-time,
and reducing systemic risk while increasing market liquidity at the same
time.415
Clearable.com Digitized Trade & Clearing Model416

The third example, Clearmatics, identifies itself as a blockchain R&D
company, which builds “member-owned and governed decentralized
network platforms for the peer-to-peer exchange.”417
With a proclaimed focus on capital markets, Clearmatics intends to
remove friction and market inefficiencies.418 The company claims that its
technology will encourage self-regulation and, in turn, mitigate and
reduce risk.419 Specifically, Clearmatics seems to believe that its
technology and platform may be able to remove the need for any financial
intermediation and directly “mitigate concentration and liquidity risk,
reduce settlement cycles to real time, remove friction, and lower the
transaction cost of economic exchange.”420
In similarity to the two previously discussed examples, Clearmatics is

415. Id.
416. Id. at
slide 11; see also Clearable, Our Model, CLEARABLE www.clearable.com
[https://perma.cc/R8CE-C9A8] (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
417. See Our Mission, CLEARMATICS www.clearmatics.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/66VAJDDE].
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

65

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2

462

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

currently also lacking regulatory approval. What seems to distinguish
Clearmatics from Synswap and Clearable are the use of different
technologies in the blockchain environment and the development of a
much broader infrastructure which is not limited to address post-trade
inefficiencies.421 The overall goal appears to be what the company calls
a distributed Financial Market Infrastructure or dFMI. The main
advantage of this infrastructure would be its interoperability, allowing for
the free movement of value across different blockchains.422
Information about these different financial infrastructure ventures
remains sparse and their functionality is difficult to assess properly. It
simply seems too early to tell whether any of the proposed new financial
infrastructures will be effective and if intermediation through CCPs can
be eliminated through blockchain technology.423 As of the writing of this
article, no regulatory approval has been granted to any of these new
infrastructures or platforms. In addition, without intermediation, the
advantage of CCPs as the buyer to every seller and the seller to every
buyer may also be lost. CCP clearing and novation removes bilateral
exposure to the original counterparty, but under any of the described
technology platforms this will not be the case and original counterparty
risk may remain with the original counterparties, which, in turn, may
impact pricing and once again increase interbank exposure and bilateral
interconnectedness of market participants. In addition, due to the current
lack of regulatory oversight and the limited understanding of regulators
on how these technologies work, it seems hard to accurately assess the
true risk exposure between counterparties when using these platforms.
It is also questionable how any of these technology platforms
facilitating trades do not also function or qualify as a new form of
intermediation. It is true that interoperability may address this critique
yet doing so in a universal and secure manner without the use of any
proprietary nodes seems an unresolved problem. But even if open-source
interoperability between technology platforms may ultimately be
421. See, e.g., Christophe MacIntosh, #BUIDL with Clearmatics: ETHDenver Bounties,
MEDIUM.COM (Feb. 14, 2019), https://medium.com/clearmatics/buidl-ion-denver-e99cc9c89597
[https://perma.cc/MD8K-2TLM] (“We are Clearmatics, a London based startup designing, building and
deploying Ethereum-based peer-to-peer platforms for financial market participants to transact seamlessly
and securely without unnecessary intermediaries.”).
422. Id.; see also Chris Chung, Ion: The Vision, MEDIUM.COM (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://medium.com/clearmatics/ion-vision-5fd5d168f9ae
[https://perma.cc/78G3-KRDN]
(“Interoperability, at its most abstract, is about a compatible and general language for two different systems
to communicate with each other.”).
423. See, e.g., Fredrik Ekström, Blockchain tech for derivatives CCPs – friends or foe? RISK.NET,
(Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.risk.net/risk-management/2453350/blockchain-tech-derivatives-ccpsfriend-or-foe [https://perma.cc/P7UD-U7XK] (“The concepts of [Digital Ledger Technology] – in its
fundamental form with decentralized recording of asset ownership – and derivatives CCP clearing are
inherently different.”).
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achieved, interoperability itself may perhaps become a source of systemic
risk and facilitate cascade effects by propagating follow-on systemic
events.424
Technology platforms without, or with limited, interoperability appear
more similar to vertically integrated CCPs and therefore may be better
able to isolate risk in a more efficient manner. In addition, and if
necessary, limited interoperability may also allow for faster decisionmaking and a shorter response time in case of a member default.425 On
the other hand, general interoperability between platforms may pose a risk
when the result is runnable networks that could become contagion
channels for cascade effects.
Finally, the biggest threat to financial stability may come from
automated intraday margin calls, which may not be easily executed or
stopped if they are excessive and self-executing. For example, the day
after the Brexit vote in the U.K. many CCPs simultaneously made margin
calls in the combined total of between $25 billion to $40 billion, and some
of the largest clearing members of these CCPs had to make payments in
the multiple billions.426 While ultimately no credit event occurred and all
clearing members made their payments, these concurrent margin calls
came very close to overwhelming some of the financial institutions
involved.427 If margin calls are automated and - based on blockchain
technology - are also self-executing, it seems fair to assume that the speed
and number of simultaneous large margin calls may increase even further
and potentially result in clearing member defaults and cascade effects.428
424. Interoperability is distinguished here from interchangeability of asset classes also known as
fungibility. At the same time, it is acknowledged that interoperability of blockchain technologies may
perhaps also aid and may even be necessary to provide fungibility in various market sectors.
425. See, e.g., NORMAN, supra note 58, at 18-21 (“[A] vertically-structured pairing of exchange
and clearing house should be able to take decisions more quickly…”).
426. See, e.g., Peter Madigan, Huge Brexit Margin Calls Stoke Intra-Day Funding Fears, RISK.NET,
(Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.risk.net/risk-management/2475620/huge-brexit-margin-calls-stoke-intraday-funding-fears [https://perma.cc./XME3-X7ZV] (“Estimates of the combined margin call issued by
derivatives central counterparties (CCPs) on the day [after the Brexit vote] range from $25 billion to $40
billion or more, with their largest members each reckoned to have stumped up multiple billions.”).
427. Id. (quoting an unnamed U.S.-based head of one bank’s clearing business as noting that
“[e]very clearer made its payments, there were no credit events, but I believe the regulators need to look
at the total level of payments that were made and ask themselves whether they are comfortable with a
system in which a handful of clearing members is being asked to fund tens of billions during volatile
conditions.”).
428. See, e.g., Financial Conduct Authority, Discussion Paper on Distributed Ledger Technology,
DP17/3, ¶ 3.37, at 19 (2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp17-03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ZAX-PV47] (“Firms will … need to consider carefully if full automation is
appropriate.”); Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, Distributed Ledger Technology in
Payment, Clearing and Settlement: An Analytical Framework, Bank of International Settlements 19, 3.4.3
(2017), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d157.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK99-MVQ8] (“[I]n a possible future
configuration with many automated contract tools, macroeconomic conditions could automatically trigger
margin calls across FMIs, leading to severe liquidity demand across the financial system and creating a
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Indeed, limits on the automated execution of margin calls could be
programed so that certain margin calls could be denied without
management approval. However, doing so may at the same time draw
into question the overall utility of automated and self-executing margin
calls.
B. Systemic Catastrophe Bonds
Systemic catastrophe, also called CAT bonds, have also been suggested
as a possible solution to reduce CCPs systemic risk contributions and
cascade effects.429 Primarily used in the insurance industry, CAT bonds
were introduced in the early 1990s to hedge against risks of hurricanes,
typhoons, tornados, earthquakes, European windstorms, thunderstorms,
hail, and even life insurance related risks or health insurance claims. 430
Similar to any ordinary bond, a CAT bond is issued by a bond issuer in
return for a capital sum or investment.431 Typically, the issuers are
insurance companies, special purpose vehicles, or any other suitable
entity.432 In return for their investment, CAT bond investors receive a
coupon rate based on the terms under which the bond begins to experience
a loss.433 The coupon rate may be paid out at regular intervals and for the
duration of the bond.434 If a qualifying catastrophe or triggering event
occurs, the investor will lose her investment and the issuer will receive
the money to cover their losses.435 Cat bonds typically include triggers
with clearly defined conditions, which have to be met to establish a payout

systemic event.”).
429. See, e.g., Shane Worner & Jeremy Bray, Cat Bonds can Help Combat the Systemic Risks of
CCPs, RISK.NET (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.risk.net/regulation/2467782/cat-bonds-can-help-combatthe-systemic-risks-of-ccps [https://perma.cc/5CAL-PSFX]; see also Matthew Leising, Catastrophe
Prevention Drives Insurance Pitch to Clearinghouses, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-11/catastrophe-prevention-drives-insurance-pitchto-clearinghouses [https://perma.cc/PNK7-Q9HC].
430. See, e.g., Thomas Berghman, Note: A Market Under(writing) the Weather: A Recommendation
to increase Insurer Capacity, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 221, 247-48 (2013) (“The Chicago Board of Trade,
following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, first introduced insurance futures and options based on weather”);
see also Catastrophe Bonds: Spreading Risk: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Davi D’Agostino),
(“When reinsurance prices or availability became problematic in the 1990s, insurers turned to risklinked
securities as an alternative means to spread catastrophe risk.”).
431. See, e.g., Thomas Berghman, supra note 430, at 250-51.
432. Id. at 221.
433. See, e.g., ANTHONY SAUNDERS & MARCIA MILLION CORNETT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
MANAGEMENT: A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 165-66 (9th ed. McGraw Hill Education)(2017); Frank
J. Fabozzi (ed.), Handbook of Finance, Financial Markets and Instruments 390 et seq. (Wiley &
Sons)(2008).
434. See, e.g., Saunders & Cornett, supra note 433, at 166.
435. See, e.g., Berghman, supra note 430, at 224.
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event.436
In other words, CAT bonds are “example[s] of insurance securitization
to create risk-lined securities which transfer a specific set of risks from
the issuer or sponsor to investors.”437 This alternative risk transfer back
to capital markets is of interest for CCP recovery. Similar to any default
risk transfer from the original counterparties to CCPs, CAT bonds may
allow CCPs to transfer the risk of their own default to bond investors in
capital markets. CAT bonds may be structured in many different ways
and could provide pre-occurrence cover, define a single major loss event,
or if aggregated cover is needed, require the exposure to multiple loss
events over the period of a predefined risk period.
For CCPs, triggering events could be certain predefined events,
including the depletion of a CCP’s internal default funds or the occurrence
of a certain type of market stress, including margin or repeated value-atrisk modeling breaches by clearing members.
The conditions and
parameters defining the triggering events may be negotiated between
issuer and investor prior to the issuance of the bonds and coupon rates
could be adjusted depending on risk.
The advantage of CAT bonds would be the immediate availability of
emergency funds to CCPs if they enter the vicinity of insolvency. The
availability of these funds may in turn guarantee the continuation of
service and recovery of the CCP without any spillover and cascade
effects.
However, even if the proposal of using CAT bonds becomes reality,
several open-ended questions would have to be addressed.
First, it is true that CAT bonds are a market-based approach to address
the risk of CCP failure and thus may appear to reduce the risk of a public
bailout. Yet, because of the risk transfer characteristics of CAT bonds,
these bonds may also be viewed as a bailout instrument in and of itself.
Regardless of their market-based approach, the availability of CAT bonds
alone may reduce a CCP’s incentives to effectively manage risk. As a
result, the availability of CAT bonds may create moral hazard rather than
eliminating it.438
436. Id.
437. Artemis, What is a Catastrophe Bond (or Cat Bond)?, http://www.artemis.bm/library/what-isa-catastrophe-bond/ [https://perma.cc/2GNM-RW7L].
438. For a different view, see Worner & Bray, supra note 429, at 4 (“The use of cat bonds to fund
a CCP’s default fund …. would do so without raising the moral hazard that would necessarily attend a
taxpayer-provided bailout or a liquidity backstop by the central bank.”). However, what both authors may
not have taken into account is that the amount and level of cat bonds a CCP has access to may give that
CCP an incentive to lower margin requirements in order to become more competitive and attract more
clearing members. The same may apply to intraday variation margin calls. In sum, the result may very
well be a form of clearing arbitrage, potentially trigging a race to the bottom between CCPs and with all
related negative effects. In addition, depending on who issued the CCP default cat bonds, that issuer may
itself contribute to systemic risk.
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While a recent study in insurance markets has concluded that “[CAT]
bond issues lead to economically significant decreases in the average
issuer’s contribution to systemic risk,”439 the same study also found that
“[CAT] bond issues do not significantly affect an insurer’s exposure to
externalities spilling over from other financial institutions during times of
market turmoil.” The latter may be of greater relevance because of the
close interconnected system within which CCPs operate and how they
rely on many of their own clearing members to provide additional
financial services. But regardless, because the business model of CCPs
is very different from insurance companies, a more targeted study is likely
necessary. It is also important to remember that CAT bonds are dept
instruments440 and CCPs are not in the business of issuing debt.441
Second, it is not only questionable who the issuers of CCP default CAT
bonds should be, but also, who the investors may be and what type of
assets the proceeds of these bonds may be invested in.442 Emergency
funds from CAT bonds need to be available immediately upon the
occurrence of a triggering event. At the same time, coupon rates also need
to be high enough to attract investors.
CCPs are not set up to be CAT bond issuers and may have to rely on
other financial institutions or special purpose vehicles to do so for them
as a counterparty or sponsor. More importantly, only the most liquid and
high-quality assets, i.e. treasury notes, may be appropriate for investment
of CAT bond proceeds. However, treasury notes and similar assets
typically carry lower interest rates than equities. As a result, if investors,
such as pension funds are required to achieve a certain level of returns,
they may be prevented from or not interested in investing in CAT bonds
if other higher-yielding and equally rated investment options are available
in the market.
The group of investors interested in investing in CCP default CAT
bonds may be further limited because clearing members of CCPs should
not be allowed to invest in these instruments. If permitted to do so, the
balance sheets of clearing members may be weakened after the bond is
called and if they lose their principal. In turn, this may create yet another
extreme tail event, potentially triggering clearing member default and
cascade effects.
Finally, even if CAT bonds may be considered an effective tool to

439. Gregor N.F. Weiß, Denefa Bostandzic and Felix Irresberger, Catastrophe Bonds and Systemic
Risk,
24
(2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2313160##
[https://perma.cc/MQ7S-DXWG].
440. See, e.g., James Chen & Chris Murphy, Catastrophe Bond – CAT, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (Apr.
25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/catastrophebond.asp [https://perma.cc/JP8D-B66Z].
441. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
442. See, e.g., Worner & Bray, supra note 429.
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avoid CCP failure and cascade effects, the implementation of rules to
regulate these instruments would require a number of legislative changes.
It is hard to imagine that in the current political environment in the United
States, Congress has the appetite to do so.
C. Systemic Risk Taxes and Systemic Surcharges
A number of scholars have also attempted to address systemic risk with
various financial sector tax proposals.443 Some of these proposals focus
on corrective taxes, financial transaction taxes, financial activities taxes,
or balance sheet levies.444 Other proposals suggest individually assessed
taxes, which may be based on a financial institutions’ systemic risk
contributions and are, for example, measured by the purchase price of
contingent capital insurance that a specific institution may be required to
pay relative to its expected losses during a financial crisis.445 A third set
of proposals focuses on the failure to impose higher income taxes on
banks or to abolish certain tax deductions. The latter proposals attempt
to address the dilemma that, in the U.S., banks and other financial
institutions have an incentive to finance their operations with debt rather
than equity because of the benefit of being able to deduct interest
payments, but not dividends.446
In sum, most of these proposals intend to limit or reduce excessive risk
taking by banks and other financial institutions, and taxes are imposed
with the goal of improving the behavior of financial firms. However,
none of these proposals seem to have any direct application for CCPs, and
they fail to consider how central clearing and its networks contribute to
systemic risk in financial markets.447
It is true that some of the proposals may be helpful in reducing systemic
risk before derivative contracts are cleared and thereby could reduce the
overall systemic risk in financial markets; however, this is part of the
same function that the central clearing mandate was meant to address and
may not arrest the risk of a catastrophic failure of a CCP. To be clear, the
systemic risk and cascade effects after the default of a CCP have a
443. See, e.g., Eric D. Chason, Taxing Systemic Risk, 16, U.N.H. L. R. 1 (2017); Mark J. Roe &
Michael Tröge, Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks Properly, 35 YALE J. ON REG. (2018); Viral
V. Acharya, Lasse H. Pedersen, Thomas Philippon and Matthew Richardson, A Tax on Systemic Risk,
SEMANTIC SCHOLAR (Feb. 3, 2010), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/A-Tax-on-Systemic-RiskAcharya-Pedersen/f30e7ec56461977ec1406cf66fe0fb69408f2059 [https://perma.cc/Y6P6-RZ2E].
444. See, e.g., Chason, supra note 443, at 1-5.
445. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., supra note 443, Section IV, footnote 8 and accompanying
text (advocating for a public-private to tax systemic risk).
446. See, e.g., Roe & Tröge, supra note 443, at 193-205 (“The most direct path to capital structure
neutrality is to tax debt the way we tax equity, that is, to end the deductibility of interest.”).
447. See supra Part III.
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different cause; it is the result of an overwhelming transfer of risk from
financial institutions to CCPs.
While taxing banks and financial transactions for their contribution to
systemic risk may be helpful if the tax levies are used to shore up CCPs
or fund external default funds, such as the Orderly Liquidations Fund, this
would still amount to the equivalent of a public bailout. In addition and
with regard to corrective taxes, it seems hard to imagine how a failed CCP
may be able to pay any of these taxes. To use the example of one
commentator: “If we want less of something - say pollution – we tax it.”448
In other words, how do we tax the default of a CCP which resulted from
wrong-way risk or an extreme tail event that was previously unrealized?
Any corrective tax will be frustrated if the risk producer is unavailable.
Regardless, any financial sector tax would need to be proposed by
Congress, and the argument, which was raised above in context of
systemic CAT bonds, applies here as well; any meaningful tax reform is
unlikely to be signed into law in the near future because there is no
political appetite to do so.449 Instead, the government and some
policymakers currently seem more interested to accommodate financial
institutions by eliminating many of the post-crisis safety regulations.450
Some scholars have also proposed systemic surcharges as a mechanism
to reduce systemic risk in derivative markets and which may be added on
to certain derivative contracts.451 Explored as an alternative to central
clearing, these surcharges may reduce the reliance on central clearing.452
The way in which a systemic surcharge would work is by calculating
and assessing a specific surcharge based on the effective spread that a
protection buyer of a credit default swap (CDS), for example, would be
required to pay to a protection seller.453 It is assumed that, because of the
surcharge add-on, CDS protection buyers may only pick protection sellers
with the smallest effective spread, which in turn may reliably decrease the
default risk and systemic risk inherent to a specific derivative
transaction.454
448. Chason, supra note 443, at 23.
449. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New
Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1172-73 (2006) (analyzing rent-seeking in and during
the tax legislative process).
450. See, e.g., John Heltman, Big Banks Plead for Capital Relief. D.C. Is Listening, AM. BANKER
(July 11, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/big-banks-plead-for-capital-relief-dc-islistening [https://perma.cc/XS4K-MPPN].
451. See, e.g., Matt v. Leduc, Sebastian Poledna and Stefan Thurner, Systemic Risk Management in
Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps, JOURNAL OF NETWORK THEORY IN FINANCE, VOL. 2, NO.
3
(2017),
https://www.risk.net/journal-of-network-theory-in-finance/5343306/systemic-riskmanagement-in-financial-networks-with-credit-default-swaps [https://perma.cc/BP8T-LDPF].
452. Id. at 1-3, 13.
453. Id. at 8.
454. Id. at 13.
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Assessing surcharges in that manner presupposes a regulated
derivatives market which is supervised by a well-capitalized agency or
perhaps a self-regulatory agency that is able to compute the effects of a
CDS contract on systemic risk.455 The computation of risk and systemic
effect would be made possible by the regulating agency’s knowledge of
the markets, which may perhaps also require access to a representative
data pool of trade repositories.456
The agency would regulate markets by incentivizing those CDS
contracts that decrease systemic risk and, on the other hand, penalize
contracts that increase systemic risk.457 Adding or adjusting systemic
surcharges to derivative contracts would effectively function as incentives
or penalties for counterparties.458
Before entering into any specific transaction, a protection buyer may
receive quotes of the effective spreads for various protection sellers from
the regulating agency.459 The agency quotes may include a risk
assessment and surcharge calculation, which in turn would incentivize the
protection buyers to purchase a CDS from a seller with the smallest
effective spread.460 If a surcharge is assessed, the charge will be collected
by the regulatory agency and may then be paid into a fund, which could
then be used to guarantee the fulfillment of CDS contracts in the event of
the default of the protection seller or both, the buyer and seller.461
It is apparent, that the described surcharge proposal is meant to
function as an alternative mechanism to central clearing and does not
directly address the problem of a CCP failure as discussed herein or the
fact that the majority of global jurisdiction has decided in favor of a
central clearing mandate. It is also clear that the systemic surcharge
proposed may be compared to initial and variation margin requirements
at CCPs and that CCPs, as self-regulatory organizations, may effectively
regulate centrally cleared derivative markets.462
At the same time, the model of systemic surcharges may provide an
additional source of funding for CCPs’ internal default funds or operate

455. Id. at 10.
456. Id. at 13.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. See, e.g., Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability, Bank of Eng., Clearinghouses
as Systemic Risk Managers: Remarks at the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation-Center for Study
of Financial Innovation Post Trade Fellowship Launch, (June 1, 2011) (transcript available at
https://www.bis.org/review/r110608g.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EES-R58V) (CCPs play a “unique, quasilegislative, quasi-regulatory role in establishing rules and procedures, that govern the contract obligations
of both clearing members and the CCP.”).
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as a market-based liquidity mechanism similar to deposit insurance. In
that sense, systemic surcharges are not viewed as an alternative to central
clearing, but rather an addition or a secondary market-based mechanism
to provide CCPs with additional default funds and short-term liquidity
during times of market volatility and stress.
It is fair to assume that with more appropriately funded default funds
or the immediate availability of a liquidity backstop to ensure the
continuation of services, extreme tail events and CCP failures may be
prevented more often than not, and internal default funds may be less
likely to be completely depleted. An additional advantage may be the fact
that a surcharge may also assess systemic risk contributions more fairly
between individual and institutional clearing members of CCPs and their
clients.
Before a derivative contract may be cleared by a CCP, the CCP could
review and consider previous spread quotes between counterparties or use
the median spread value among a class of instruments as a reference entity
to assess a systemic surcharge. To avoid regulatory arbitrage, CCPs may
perhaps rely on a single source of data, which is collected as part of the
CFTC’s real-time transaction reporting463 or a trade repository at the
National Futures Association (NFA)464 that could be similar to the Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE)465 operated by the Financial
Industry Regulatory Agency (FINRA).466 Another possibility may be
spread data collected by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation
(DTCC)467 and its Global Trade Repository (GTR)468 as an international
and industry-wide recognized post-trade financial services company.
In addition to default risk, CCPs could also take the true spread risk of
counterparties into account when assessing surcharges. As part of the
overall credit risk, the true spread risk may represent the likelihood that
the value of a derivative contract may also be impacted by certain actions
463. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 17.00 (1976).
464. NATIONAL
FUTURES
ASSOCIATION
(NFA),
About
NFA,
https://www.nfa.futures.org/about/index.html (last visited on March 2, 2019).
465. FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AGENCY, Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine
(TRACE), http://www.finra.org/industry/trace [https://perma.cc/WZG8-7HZT]. Please note that TRACE
is simply mentioned as an example here. It is acknowledged that the TRACE repository may not be
suitable for derivative transactions and focuses on fixed income securities. In December 2007, certain
derivative related transactions were also exempt from TRACE reporting because the reported transaction
prices were not accurate and FINRA determined that “reporting and dissemination of certain DerivativeRelated Transactions does not foster price discovery and may contribute to investor confusion.”
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AGENCY, Regulatory Notice 07-61, 1-2 (2007),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p037599.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z47P-M7SH].
466. FINANCIAL
INDUSTRY
REGULATORY
AGENCY
(FINRA),
About
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/7LN7-M3MZ].
467. DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION,
Repository
Services,
http://www.dtcc.com/derivatives-services/global-trade-repository [https://perma.cc/82QK-WY79].
468. Id.
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or financial mistakes one or both counterparties make. These actions may
impact counterparties’ credit rating or creditworthiness. Some examples
of actions to be considered could be prior manufactured defaults, margin
or repeated value-at-risk model breaches, frequent cuts of derivative
exposures to reduce loss-absorbency requirements under international
standards or compression rates. Based on the evaluation of the true spread
risk, CCPs could give their clearing members risk scores indicating
creditworthiness and their contribution to systemic risk.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that more than a decade after the Great
Recession, the United States, as one of the biggest derivative markets by
volume, is not prepared to deal with the failure of one single major
interconnected CCP. In fact, in September 2018, during the week of the
ten-year anniversary of the Lehman’s failure, a CCP, Nasdaq Clear AB,
came very close to failing, giving rise to these concerns.
At the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009, G20 leaders agreed to a widereaching reform to over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets that
underscores the need for a change to the status quo. The requirement that
standardized OTC derivatives must be centrally cleared through central
counterparties (CCPs) was one of the cornerstones of this reform.469 This
article builds on this systemic reform mandate and has argued for contextspecific additions that could provide additional protections.
Although it was intended to mitigate systemic risk and to eliminate the
moral-hazard of too-big-to fail, the central clearing mandate has resulted
in a dramatic and one directional transfer of risk. This transfer of risk,
almost imperceptibly, has shifted the possibility of loss away from
systemically important banks and other financial institutions to CCPs. To
make matters worse, because of the increased volume of centrally cleared
derivative contracts, CCPs also needed to increasingly rely on their own
clearing members to provide financial services that they are not set up to
do. The resulting conflict of interest has changed the entire risk profile of
CCPs.
Today, a small core of highly connected CCPs and clearing members
dominate these networks and concentrate risk at never-before-seen levels.
The shock to one central element of the system in which CCPs now
operate may likely trigger spillover and cascade effects that could reach
far beyond their periphery. As such, the central clearing mandate may
have increased the risk of procyclicality in derivative markets.
469. Fernando Cerezetti, Jorge Cruz Lopez, Mark Manning and David Murphy, Who Pays? Who
Gains? Central Counterparty Resource Provisions in the post-Pittsburgh World, 7 J. OF FIN. MKT.
INFRASTRUCTURES 21 ( 2019).
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The latest deregulation attempts in the United States may spell further
trouble for CCPs. Industry standardization is lacking behind and financial
markets have again started to embrace crisis era products that challenge
financial stability, including collateral-debt-obligations (CDOs) and
credit-default-swaps (CDSs). New financial products, which are also tied
to derivative markets, i.e., exchange traded funds (ETFs), may further
challenge the long-term viability of CCPs. For example, ETFs are largely
unregulated and hold assets in excess of $4 trillion globally and are
predicted to reach $6 trillion by 2020. Yet, an even greater challenge may
be leveraged loan and direct lending markets, which are growing even
faster. Add to this the unscrupulous lending practices by shadow banks
and hedge funds aimed at manufacturing defaults in order to trigger CDS
payouts and growing global political uncertainties, central counterparties
may soon find themselves in a perfect storm in which default may no
longer be preventable.
The United States and its financial markets are not ready for the failure
of any—or even one—single major interconnected CCP. None of the
currently available recovery and resolution procedures in the United
States consider the business model of CCPs sufficiently and are unable to
arrest any catastrophic spillover and cascade effects triggered by any such
failure.
Many different proposals are currently being discussed on how to best
address the changed risk profile of CCPs. Some of these proposals
suggest that the use of technology, such as digital ledgers and blockchains
may replace central clearing and risk concentration. Other proposals
focus on the taxation of systemic risk.
Based on the continuing commitment to central clearing across global
financial markets, it is doubtful that any decentralized or digitized trade
and clearing model will replace CCPs any time soon, but the use of new
technologies may greatly enhance the CCP model in the future. Taxes
proposed on systemic risk do not seem to hold much promise for CCPs
directly, but they may reduce the overall risk in financial markets. The
proposed market-based surcharge on systemic risk of cleared derivative
contracts and counterparty credit risk is a more feasible option, but it
would also require a broad implementation by at least the biggest CCPs.
Arguably, the most advanced proposal is the European Commission’s
proposal for a regulation on the framework of the recovery and resolution
of central counterparties.470 While a detailed discussion of this proposal
was beyond the scope of this article, the European Commission suggests
a much broader, more transparent and comprehensive approach for CCP
recovery. This includes more detailed recovery plans, early intervention
470. See supra Part I; supra, note 3.
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rights for regulators, resolution tools, and actions which specifically
“should be carried out in a way which [do] not undermine the functioning
of the rest of a wider group of which the CCP may form part.”471
Another recent proposal considers unbundling the functions of a CCP
and carrying them out under different operational and organizational
frameworks.472 More specifically, this proposal advances the idea of
“decompos[ing] [CCP] functions into discrete elements and tailor the
operational and organizational framework to the particular characteristics
of each.”473
All of these proposals are important and need to be pursued, but none
of the proposals directly address our current dilemma that the
implementation of a central clearing mandate after the Great Recession
has created a dichotomy between the goal of risk mitigation and the
creation of an entirely new level of systemic risk. The risk profile of
CCPs has changed by creating institutions that may be too-big-to-bail;
therefore, other reforms are needed.
As one commentator in the context of the resolution and recovery of
systemically important banks and financial institutions has noted: “The
realistic goal is not avoiding bailouts altogether, but finding a predictable
legal framework for them that puts as much of the cost as possible on the
beneficiaries of the bailout at a time when it will not cause systemic
disruption.”474 Within this context, new technologies, taxes, surcharges,
CCP stress testing, and more effective regulation are potentially costeffective ways to limit global financial crises.

471. Id. at 14, ¶ 4.2.7.
472. Cerezetti et al., supra note 469, at 18-20; see also Alexander Campbell, Study Floats Idea of
Breaking Up CCP Services, RISK.NET (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.risk.net/regulation/6459006/studyfloats-idea-of-unbundling-ccp-services-in-new-structure#cxrecs_s [https://perma.cc/K7BG-4NLP].
473. Cerezetti et al., supra note 469, at 21.
474. Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution
Bankruptcy, 97 N. C. L. REV. 243, 291 (2019); see also Roe, supra note 7, at 1699-03.
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